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ONE HEALTH IN THE U.S. MILITARY:   
A REVIEW OF EXISTING SYSTEMS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
Background: 
The merging of the former U.S. Army Veterinary Command (VETCOM) with the former U.S. Army Center for 
Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) into the U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) 
in 2011 created an opportunity for the military to fully embrace the One Health concept.  That same year, the 
USAPHC began work on a Zoonotic Disease Report (ZDR) aimed at supporting critical zoonotic disease risk 
assessments by combining zoonotic disease data from human, entomological, laboratory, and animal data sources.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to facilitate the creation of a military Zoonotic Disease Surveillance program that 
combines disease data from both military human and animal sources.    
 
Methods:     
Five of the most commonly used human military medical data systems were systematically reviewed using a 
standardized template based on Centers for Disease Control and Preventive Medicine (CDC) guidelines.  The 
systems were then compared to each other in order to recommend the one(s) best suited for use in the USAPHC 
ZDR.  The first stage of the comparison focused on each system’s ability to meet the specific goals and objectives of 
the ZDR, whereas the second stage applied capture-recapture methodology to data system queries in order to 
evaluate each system’s data quality (completeness).   
 
A pilot study was conducted using Lyme borreliosis to investigate the utility of military pet dogs as sentinel 
surveillance for zoonotic disease in military populations.  Canine data came from 3996 surveys collected from 15 
military veterinary facilities from 1 November 2012 through 31 October 2013.  Surveys simultaneously collected 
Borrelia burgdorferi (Bb) seroprevalence and canine risk factor data for each participating pet dog.  Human data 
were obtained by querying the Defense Medical Surveillance System for the same 15 military locations and the 
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same time period.  The correlation of military pet dog Bb seroprevalence and military human Lyme disease 
(borreliosis) data was estimated using the Spearman Rank Correlation.  The difference between military pet dog data 
and civilian pet dog data was examined through the use of the chi-squared test for proportions.  Multivariable 
logistic regression was then used to investigate the potential for identified risk factors to impact the observed 
association.   
 
Results: 
The comparison of human military medical data systems found the Military Health System Management Analysis 
and Reporting Tool (M2) data system most completely met the specific goals and objects of the ZDR.  In addition, 
completeness calculation showed the M2 data source to be the most complete source of human data; 55% of total 
captured cases coming from the M2 system alone.  
 
The pilot study found a strong positive correlation between military human borreliosis data and military pet dog Bb 
seroprevalence data by location (rs = 0.821).   The study showed reassuring similarities in pet dog seroprevalence by 
location for the majority of sites, but also showed meaningful differences between two locations, potentially 
indicating military pet dogs as more appropriate indicators of Lyme disease risk for military populations than 
civilian pet dog data.  Unfortunately, whether canine Bb seroprevalence is influenced by the distribution of 
identified risk factors could not be determined due to limited study power. 
Conclusions: 
Based on this study M2 was recommended as the primary source of military human medical data for use in the 
Public Health Command Zoonotic Disease Report.  In addition, it was recommended that Service member pet dog 
data be incorporated as a sensitive and convenient measure of zoonotic disease risk in human military populations.   
The validity of the data, however, should be evaluated further with either larger sample sizes and/or a zoonotic 
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The One Health concept recognizes that human, animal, and ecosystem health are inextricably linked.  It seeks to 
promote and improve the health and well-being of all species by enhancing cooperation and collaboration between 
physicians, veterinarians, other scientific health and environmental professionals (1).  In 2009, the U.S. Army 
Surgeon General directed the creation of a new medical command that truly embraces this One Health concept (2).  
Effective July 2011, the U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) was established.  The new command was 
created by merging the former U.S. Army Veterinary Command (VETCOM) and the former U.S. Army Center for 
Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) (2).  The merger formally joined the technical skills of 
veterinarians, physicians, entomologists, laboratory specialists, epidemiologists, and many others.  The mission 
statement for this new command is: “Promote health and prevent disease, injury, and disability of Soldiers and 
military retirees, their Families, and Department of the Army civilian employees; and assure effective execution of 
full spectrum veterinary service for Army and Department of Defense Veterinary missions” 
(http://phc.amedd.army.mil/).   
 
Zoonoses account for 63% of all infectious reportable medical events within the Department of Defense (3).  For 
this reason, knowledge of zoonotic pathogen presence creates opportunities for improved preventive medicine 
strategies.  In 2011, the Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio, Disease Epidemiology Program within 
the USAPHC initiated the development of a Zoonotic Disease Report (ZDR).  The aim of the report is to provide 
U.S. Army public health personnel with critical health information regarding the presence and spread of zoonotic 
pathogens by combining zoonotic disease information from extant military human disease data systems, tick and 
mosquito borne disease as well as rabies specimen testing data from the Laboratory Services Portfolio, with animal 
data from intergovernmental organizations public access databases.  Ideally the animal data will include zoonotic 
diseases diagnosed at U.S. Army veterinary facilities once the web-based electronic medical record known as the 
Remote Online Veterinary Record (ROVR) is fully deployed.   
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to advocate for the formalized use of animal disease data from military veterinary 
facilities in sentinel surveillance for zoonotic diseases in military personnel.  The specific aim is to demonstrate the 
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utility of a Zoonotic Disease Surveillance program that combines zoonotic disease data from both human and animal 
sources into a comprehensive ZDR.  One step towards meeting this aim is to conduct a systematic comparison of the 
five human medical data systems most commonly used for public health surveillance in the U.S. Army in order to 
recommend the one(s) most suited for use in the USAPHC ZDR.  Another step is to demonstrate the use of military 
pet dogs as sentinel surveillance for zoonotic diseases in military populations.  These two steps are hereafter referred 
to Project 1 and Project 2, respectively.  The overall approach is outlined in Figure 1. 
 
Specifically, the chapters of this dissertation are as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 is an extensive review and critical assessment of previously published studies and technical reports that 
pertain to the topics discussed in this dissertation.  Broadly, such topics fall into the three main categories:  a 
description of public health surveillance strategies, the evaluation of public health surveillance systems, and the use 
of animals as sentinels in zoonotic disease surveillance.   
 
Chapter 3 is a systematic review of extant data systems used in public health surveillance. The chapter discusses the 
need for a standardized approach in describing public health data systems.  Next it briefly reviews selected national 
and global public health surveillance systems, all of which have a zoonotic disease capability.  The focus of the 
chapter, however, is an extensive description of the five most commonly used human military medical data systems.   
 
Chapter 4 is an in-depth comparison of the five most commonly used human military medical data systems.  The 
chapter discusses the goals of the ZDR and the specific medical data system criteria needed to meet these goals.   
Because the comparison is conducted in two separate stages, the chapter is split into two distinct sections.  Section I 
focuses on a systematic comparison of the military medical data system attributes, whereas Section II emphasizes 
the evaluation of data system quality.  The chapter concludes with an overall recommendation for the best data 
systems for use in the ZDR. 
 
Chapter 5 provides the details of a pilot study using Lyme borreliosis to investigate the utility of military pet dogs as 
sentinel surveillance for zoonotic disease in military populations.  Specifically, canine B. burgdorferi seroprevalence 
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data collected from participating military veterinary facilities from 1 November 2012 through 31 October 2013 are 
compared to human Lyme disease data from extant military medical data systems for the same time period.  These 
data are used to determine the correlation between B. burgdorferi seroprevalence in military pet dogs and Lyme 
disease cases in military personnel.  The application of the study as a model for the ZDR is then discussed.   
 
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of this dissertation, recommending the human medical data system that is best 
suited for use in a zoonotic disease report and advocating the formalized incorporation of animal disease data from 
military veterinary facilities.  The chapter discusses considerations for implementing these changes and concludes 
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Public Health Surveillance  
Definitions  
 
In public health, the term monitoring refers to the ongoing efforts directed at assessing the health status of a given 
population (1).  The sampling of individuals may be continuous or repeated.  The health status monitored may be a 
specific infectious disease or a general condition/symptom/outcome.  The population can be defined on many 
different levels, both temporally (birth cohort) and spatially (national, regional, family group/herd) as well as 
categorically (occupation, race, species, breed).  The term survey refers to the systematic collection of information 
in support of an investigation (1).  The sampling is aimed at answering a particular question or hypothesis, therefore 
the frequency and duration of sampling, along with the specific health status and population are clearly stated.  In 
comparison to the previous two terms, the term surveillance refers to something more active, a system that not only 
collects health status data, but also involves a specified action when a set threshold is exceeded (1)     
 
The World Health Organization defines public health surveillance as the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, 
interpretation, and dissemination of population based data regarding a health-related event for use in public health 
action to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve health (2).  Such data can be used to measure the burden of 
disease, identify populations at risk, and monitor trends in disease.  It can also be used to initiate immediate action, 
prioritize resource allocation, justify policy changes, and implement new public health programs (2, 3, 4).  Animal 
health surveillance is defined by the United States Department of Agriculture as the ongoing systematic collection, 
collation, analysis, and interpretation of data and dissemination of information to those who need to know so that 
action can be taken (5).   The purposes of such surveillance is rapid detection of introduced diseases and emerging 
issues,  monitoring and providing actionable information for endemic diseases, and measuring regional prevalence 




As demonstrated by these two definitions, surveillance has many different utilities.  In addition to the actions 
mentioned above, surveillance can be used in disease control and disease eradication programs (6).  Disease control 
programs (DCPs) combine monitoring and surveillance activities with disease control and intervention strategies 
over a prolonged period of time with the aim of reducing the frequency of a specific disease.  Disease eradication 
programs (DEPs) are a special case of DCP where the objective is to eliminate the specific disease (6).  The success 
of each of these programs relies on strict definition of three specific surveillance components:  the disease 
monitoring system being used, the disease threshold that will trigger action, and the action that will be taken (6).   
 
Types of Surveillance Strategies  
 
Surveillance may be conducted in many different ways depending on the specific goals, approaches, and 
methodologies used; herein referred to cumulatively as surveillance strategies (7).  This section will briefly review 
several (but not all) of the currently employed surveillance strategies; providing examples of each as available.  
Although the descriptions of each strategy may appear clear-cut, the application of the strategies is not; many of 
examples discussed below employ more than one surveillance strategy resulting in significant overlap. 
 
Public Health Surveillance 
 
Public health surveillance generally refers to a broad scale surveillance strategy that relies on a variety of different 
sources to draw conclusions on disease status for a population.  There are two main approaches:  1) health officials 
submit case reports for specified diseases/conditions to designated agencies, or 2) researchers collate data from 
multiple sources in order to make generalizations about a disease status/disease burden.   
 
The agency-driven process usually requires health officials to report cases of “notifiable” disease (as defined by 
receiving agencies) to local health departments; health department officials verify the disease reports, monitor 
incidence, identify possible outbreaks, and forward their findings to the next level (receiving agency: state, region, 
federal agency, country representative).  At this level the information may be collated and independently analyzed, 
or forwarded further to organizations that monitor health at a global level.  Examples of agencies that employ this 
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method of surveillance include the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), and the Department of Defense (DoD) (8, 9, 10, 11).  An example of a publication that utilizes this sort of 
data is the WHO’s annual The World Health Statistics (12). The publication compiles statistics for key health 
indicators monitored by the WHO into an analytical report aimed at addressing cross‐cutting topics such as women 
and health (in the 2013 issue) and a summary of the progress made towards achieving the health-related Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and associated targets.  The statistics in the publication are based on data reported by 
its 194 Member States.  In order to ensure the best use of this country reported data and to maximize the 
comparability of the statistics across countries and over time, adjustments are made to deal with missing values and 
to correct for known biases (12).   The Defense Reporting System-internet (DRSi) is one system used by the DoD 
for the purpose of public health surveillance. The system is designed to capture reportable medical events data as 
defined by the Armed Forces Reportable Medical Events Guidelines and Case Definition (13, 14, 15).  The U.S. 
Army Public Health Command uses the data to produce daily and monthly reportable event reports for Army 
populations world-wide.  The value of the agency-approach is being able to provide a snap-shot of disease 
status/burden at a population based level. The disadvantage is the lack of population details which limits the 
generalizability of the findings thereby inhibiting the ability to make public health policy based on the data.   
 
The researcher-driven approach generally involves meta-analysis of existing literature or data.  In 2004, Crump et al 
conducted a population-based study of the global burden of typhoid fever by searching multilingual scientific 
literature for studies confirming diagnoses through blood cultures between 1966 and 2001 (16).  A total of 22 
eligible studies were identified, representing 21 regions and 13 countries.  Of these 21 regions, only 6 (29%) 
contained countries with national typhoid fever surveillance systems that routinely included confirmation by blood 
culture (16).  For regions where there was no data, country level extrapolation was done based on geographical 
proximity and socioeconomic conditions followed by extrapolations based on age-incidence curves (16).  In 2010, 
Majowicz et al. employed a similar approach to estimate the global burden of nontyphoidal Salmonella 
gastroenteritis (17).  Synthesizing existing data from the literature, special studies, and laboratory-based surveillance 
from 21 regions, they extrapolated disease burden estimates to countries and regions where data were lacking (17). 
These studies, although useful in providing rough estimates of disease burden globally, highlight many limitations to 
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this approach of public health surveillance.  The meta-analysis researcher has no control over the accuracy or 
validity of the data provided by each data source.  This heavy reliance on a small number of observations may lead 
to significant over or under-estimates of disease burden.  In addition, the researchers are limited to the details 
provided by the data sources, therefore in depth analysis of risk factors or other contributing variables could not be 




The term syndromic surveillance describes a surveillance strategy aimed at providing early warning of a disease 
occurrence before epidemic or outbreak status is attained (7).  The strategy uses the health-related data that precede 
the actual diagnosis to determine if a sufficient probability of a case or outbreak exists to warrant further public 
health response.  It is the ‘real-time’ monitoring of non-specific, pre-diagnostic indicators for disease outbreaks.  
Examples of operational syndromic surveillance systems include the Real Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance 
System (RODS) used by several states to gather data on the symptoms of emergency room patients, the National 
Retail Data Motor (NRDM) created by the University of Pittsburgh laboratory to examine sales of over-the-counter 
health-care products, the federal BioSense program designed to aggregate data relevant to bioterrorism and other 
public health threats within the United States, and the Electronic Surveillance System (ESSENCE) operated by the 
DoD to allow epidemiologists to track syndromes from military hospital feeds in real-time (7).   
 
Although the notion of syndromic surveillance as an early warning system makes sense in concept, the application 
of this strategy still remains largely unproven (7). In 2006, a French study showed that influenza data collected from 
real time syndromic surveillance at emergency departments correlated significantly with data collected from a 
network of sentinel general practitioners (18).  Although the results showed that the data complement each other, it 
could not prove that syndromic surveillance was any better suited for use in early detection of the disease (18).   
Analysis of the United Kingdom’s national syndromic surveillance system, intended to serve in early detection of 
infectious disease and bioterrorist attacks has indicated many sudden rises in the 11 monitored syndromes, but has 
never predicted an actual biological or chemical attack (19).  Instead, the data accurately tracked rises of community 
morbidity of already identified risks such as influenza-like illnesses during flu season and heat-related disease 
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during heat waves (19).  In 2014, local syndromic outbreak signals from telephone triage centers and over-the-
counter antidiarrheal sales were compared to nine known waterborne and foodborne outbreaks that occurred in 
Sweden between 2001 and 2007 (20).  Although syndromic outbreak signals were identified for the four largest 
outbreaks, the findings are difficult to generalize because the signals only represented large outbreaks with more 
than 1000 cases (20).   
 
The inability of syndromic surveillance to detect rare, small-scale events such as localized biological attacks or the 
initial cases of a newly imported or emerging disease has been discussed in global forums (7).  The studies discussed 
here, conclude that the syndromic systems were helpful because they were able either to accurately reproduce data 
generated by existing specific systems or to document excess mortality following an already identified risk. 
However, none demonstrated a real added capacity to detect events that preceded regular surveillance activities or 
events that would otherwise have been missed.  When using syndromic surveillance, it must be in an atmosphere 
that doesn’t penalize people for getting it wrong, an atmosphere where false positives are tolerated in favor of 
increased sensitivity such as broad situational awareness.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to increase the singular 
attribute of sensitivity, specificity, or timeliness of syndromic detection without decreasing the other two (7).    
 
Real-time and Batched Reporting 
 
The terms ‘real time’ and ‘batched’ for disease surveillance refers data collection strategies, but can be used to mean 
different things by different authors.  In general ‘batched’ data refers to data that has in some way been assembled 
and or processed; batched collections of health indicator data, batched processing of indicator data, batched 
reporting of data that triggers some set rule or alert, batched reporting of data at predetermined time intervals (7).  
Inherent in these descriptions is a time delay between data collection and batched reporting.  ‘Real-time’, on the 
other hand, implies the data collected is simultaneously available for use in surveillance activities. Many hospitals 
have automated information systems based on the Health Level Seven (HL7) format.  These systems provide a 
comprehensive framework for the exchange, integration, sharing and retrieval of electronic health information such 
as clinical observations, laboratory or pharmacy orders, patient admissions and transfer data, and billing 
information.  The monitoring of HL7 data streams is often the closest to real time that hospitals can get.  Many 
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surveillance systems claim ‘real time’ reporting, but few are actually suited to do so; most data collection systems 
require some form of processing.  In truth, surveillance reports delivered in real time, in the form of automated 
alerts, tend to have considerable problems as processing is needed to reduce entry and transmission errors (7).   
The Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) system is a computer-based public health surveillance 
system for early detection of disease outbreaks that uses the HL7 message protocol. Although the name claims the 
system to function in real time, the extensive data processing steps involved in transforming the data into utilizable 
formats nullifies this statement (21).  The RODS system was used during the 2002 Winter Olympics and is 
advocated as a resource for implementing, evaluating, and applying new methods of public health surveillance (21).  
Public health officials in Sydney, Australia used the 2003 Rugby World Cup (RWC) to test the viability of a near 
real-time syndromic surveillance system using automated data routinely collected from Emergency Departments 
(EDs) in the Sydney metropolitan area (22).  The system did not identify any major public health threats during the 
RWC, which was consistent with evidence from other sources.  Interestingly, however, the system also did not 
detect two known outbreaks that were already in progress before the tournament.  This was likely due to limited 
baseline data early in the monitoring process which prevented the system from automatically identifying these 
ongoing outbreaks (22).  Because many influenza infections are subclinical, Wu et al investigated the use of ‘real-
time’ sero-surveillance rather than syndromic surveillance as a method of estimating outbreak infection severity 
(23). Using sera samples from the first wave of the 2009 Hong Kong pandemic, infection attack rates (IAR) and 
infection-hospitalization rates (IHR) were estimated.  The study found IAR and IHR estimates to be one to two 
weeks behind the pandemic peak; assuming data had been available weekly in real-time (23). Computer simulations 
for future pandemics indicated 300 serum specimens per week would be required to yield reliable estimates of IAR 
and IHP; assuming the true IAR was about 6% (23).  These findings show both the utility and the limitations of 
sero-surveillance in detecting emerging influenza pandemics.  While the data may be indicative of the severity of the 
outbreak, the reliability of the system is dependent on the existence of a well-established sero-surveillance program.  





Animal Disease Surveillance 
 
There are many reasons for the surveillance of disease in animal populations.  Such surveillance can serve to safe 
guard livestock industries and subsequent national and international trade.  The USDA conducts such surveillance 
for the purpose of protecting the U.S. livestock industry (5).  Surveillance in support of livestock production in 
developing countries is the priority for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (24).  
For the OIE the focus is on animal diseases that impact international trade (8).  Animal disease surveillance can also 
play a vital role in public health surveillance efforts, especially as it applies to emerging and infectious zoonotic 
diseases.  In 2001, a comprehensive literature review determined that 61% of infectious organisms known to be 
pathogenic to humans are zoonotic and 75% of the emerging pathogens are zoonotic (25).   Zoonotic diseases 
include those that can be transmitted directly from animal to human (dog bites transmitting Rabies, some intestinal 
parasites), require a shared vector (Ixodes ticks and Lyme disease, Culex mosquitoes and West Nile Virus), result 
from animals serving as reservoirs for disease transmission (fecal contamination of food and water with 
Salmonella), or come from shared environmental exposures (Anthrax spores in soil).  Unfortunately, there are no 
organizations or agencies dedicated to the surveillance of infectious zoonotic disease (26) and systematic review of 
surveillance systems used for emerging zoonoses revealed that only 19% incorporate information from both human 
and animals (27).  In particular, there is a significant lack of infrastructure that supports the surveillance of such 
diseases in companion animals (26), yet market estimates from the American Veterinary Medical Association 
showed that for 2012 there were 70 million pet dogs kept by 37% of households and 74 million pet cats kept by 30% 
of households (28).  Instead, the value of animal disease surveillance in public health is demonstrated in a series of 
independent studies, some of which will be discussed in more detail in the section of this chapter titled “Zoonotic 




Traditional public health surveillance, based on reports and medical practitioners, relies on information to travel up 
or down a predetermined public health hierarchy: farm to State department, hospital to public health officials, 
national to international, and vice versa.  Unfortunately, these seemingly orderly scenarios are often patchy and 
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erratic due to differences in priorities and available resources.  Electronic medical records (EMR) have significantly 
improved surveillance capabilities, but a lack of uniformity in existing EMR systems and the absence of their 
existence in many developing countries make reliance on these systems impractical.  Surveillance networks provide 
an alternative method of surveillance that incorporates data from nontraditional sources (e.g. Internet sites, news 
outlets, federal registries, universities, non-medical observer accounts) to fill in the gaps of missing medical data 
from traditional sources.  These networks serve to both collect and disseminate data relevant to public health 
surveillance at a global scale (7).  Examples of such networks include ProMED-mail (PMM), the Global Public 
Health Information Network (GPHIN), HealthMap, and the WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
(GOARN).  Geared towards integrating information on infectious diseases from a variety of sources and 
disseminating such intelligence widely and rapidly to the user community, the utility of these systems should be 
discussed in terms of impact of alerts generated by them rather that literature published based on them. 
 
The Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, ProMED, was founded in 1993 at a conference co-sponsored by 
the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the WHO.  The ProMED-mail was created in 1994 for the purpose 
of enhancing communication between ProMED working group members the initial list-serve contained 40 
subscribers from seven countries (29).   The first e-mail outbreak report was sent later that year, reporting a 
laboratory infection of Brazilian hemorrhagic fever (Sabia virus) in the United States (29).  In November 1994, 
PMM was opened to the public (29).   ProMED-mail currently reaches over 60,000 subscribers in at least 185 
countries and since 1999 operates as an official program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases, a 
nonprofit professional organization with 20,000 members worldwide (30).   ProMED-mail is open to all sources and 
is free of political constraints. Sources of information include media reports, official reports, online summaries, local 
observers, and others (29, 30, 31).  Reports are often contributed by ProMED-mail subscribers. A team of expert 
human, plant, and animal disease moderators screen, review, and investigate reports before posting to the network 
(29, 30). Reports are distributed by email to direct subscribers and posted immediately on the ProMED-mail web 
site (30).  These open communications and discussions amongst subscribers aided in the detection of the Ebola virus 
outbreak in Zaire (1995), West Nile virus in the United States (1999), SARS in China (2002), and H5N1 avian 




The Global Public Health Information Network (GPHIN) is an electronic public health early warning system 
developed by Canada's Public Health Agency, and is part of the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global 
Outbreak and Alert Response Network (GOARN) (32). This system monitors internet media, such as news wires 
and websites, in nine languages in order to help detect and report potential disease outbreaks or other health threats 
around the world (32, 33).  The advantage of this approach is that it does not rely on the gathering and dissemination 
of information to country level public health officials.  Reliance on public health officials is possible in most 
developed countries however, in countries where the public health infrastructures are rudimentary, deteriorating or 
non-existent; reporting of many public health threats is considerably less than adequate. Furthermore, the reluctance 
of some countries or authorities to report potential threats due to the negative impact on trade and tourism, or to gain 
a tactical advantage, has also resulted in limited exchange of information between authorities.  The information 
feeds are filtered for relevancy by an automated process which is then complemented by human analysis (32).  
Analysts at the GPHIN sort and score the more than 2,000 preliminary reports and news articles received on a daily 
basis (32, 33).  Scoring merely applies to a decision tree used to determine whether or not to post the report; GPHIN 
does not systematically validate the data (32).  Subscribers to GPHIN receive alerts by e-mail or when logging on to 
the system.  The GPHIN audience includes ministries of health and departments of agriculture from several nations 
as well as FAO, OIE, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).  The GPHIN prototype demonstrated its 
effectiveness as an early-warning system during the 2002 SARS outbreak, where it gathered information about an 
unusual outbreak occurring in Guangdong Province, Mainland China, as early as November 27, 2002 (32).   
 
In 2000 the WHO established the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) to connect existing 
surveillance networks internationally for the purpose of improving the coordination of outbreak responses and 
providing an operational framework for the delivery of support to these countries (34).  The network focuses 
technical and operational resources from scientific institutions in WHO Member States, medical and surveillance 
initiatives, regional technical networks, networks of laboratories, United Nations organizations (e.g. UNICEF, 
UNHCR), the Red Cross (International Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies and national societies) and international humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (e.g. 
Médecins sans Frontières, International Rescue Committee, Merlin and Epicentre) (34). Participation is open to 
technical institutions, networks and organizations that have the capacity to contribute to international outbreak alert 
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and response.  Since 2000, WHO and GOARN have responded to over 50 events worldwide with over 400 experts 
providing field support to some 40 countries (34).  The GOARN was instrumental in initiating the global response to 
the 2002 SARS outbreak (34). 
 
HealthMap is a freely available, web-based surveillance network that provides a global view of infectious disease 
outbreaks as reported by the WHO, PMM, Google News, and Eurosurveillance (35).  Created in 2006, it attempts to 
bridge the gaps in current open-source electronic surveillance networks by aggregating and integrating the 
information to produce graphic, continuously updated models of global disease outbreaks over space and time (35).  
Alerts are displayed on a global map that can be viewed at a wide range of resolutions and are linked to source sites 
that provide details of the outbreak and information on the particular disease (7).  Through an automated process, 
updating 24/7/365, the system monitors, organizes, integrates, filters, visualizes and disseminates online information 
about emerging diseases in nine languages, facilitating early detection of global public health threats (35).  The 
system does not have a formal verification process; therefore any reporting biases that may exist in the HealthMap 
data sources remain (7). 
 
The strength of these surveillance networks is to consolidate public health information at a global level for the 
purposes of international awareness.  By employing both traditional and non-traditional data sources, these networks 
are able to fill in official surveillance gaps in order to flesh out missing data.  They also are able to circumvent 
political filters that may prohibit truthful and honest reporting from certain governments/countries.  Such networks 
can serve as sensitive indicators for potential outbreaks and disease events.  In addition, they provide a forum for 
health officials to discuss and share concerns of emerging and current health threats.  There are several limitations to 
such networks, however.  For example, the lack of formal validation processes may lead to inaccurate conclusions 
and the implementation inappropriate (and potentially costly) public health actions.  In addition these networks may 
have significant economic consequences for countries that may be labeled (either accurately or inaccurately) as 





Evaluating Surveillance Systems  
 
The purpose of evaluating public health systems is to ensure that the problems of public health importance are being 
monitored efficiently and effectively (3).  Specifically, the focus should be on how well the system operates to meet 
the stated purpose and objectives of the given surveillance program.  In general, the evaluation should involve an 
assessment of system attributes such as simplicity, flexibility, acceptability, data quality, sensitivity, specificity, 
positive predictive value, representativeness, timeliness, and stability (3).  This section will briefly discuss several 
(but not all) of these attributes as defined by established CDC guidelines (3), providing examples of their use and 
demonstrating their impact on public health strategies.   
 
Surveillance System Attributes  
 
Simplicity refers to the structure of the system and its ease of operation; specific categories include methods of data 
collection (number and type of reporting sources), level of integration with other systems, methods for data analysis 
and data dissemination, time required to maintain and update the system, and human resource/staffing requirements.  
Overly complicated systems may be prone to system failures or may have extremely high human resource 
requirements.  Flexibility is important as it represents the ability of a system to accommodate changing information 
needs or operation conditions with little additional time, personnel, or funding; the ability to adapt and evolve to 
meet new requirements.  These two factors (simplicity and flexibility) contribute to the overall acceptability of the 
system, or the willingness of the user (data entry through analyst) to actually use the system.   
 
Data quality refers to the completeness and validity of the data recoded in the system.  There are many 
subcategories that may be used to evaluate a system’s data quality; all depend quite a bit on the purpose of the 
surveillance activity.  Mode of data entry (automated vs. manual) impacts correctness of the data, and in 
combination with an understanding of the completeness and validity of the records, contributes to the overall 
accuracy of the data.  Case definition and diagnostic criteria impact the sensitivity and specificity of the results.  
Sensitivity refers to the proportion of cases of a disease (or other health-related event) detected by the system, or the 
ability of the system to detect outbreaks or monitor changes in the number of cases over time.  Specificity refers to 
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the ability of the system to accurately identify as non-cases those without the disease or health-related event. The 
positive predictive value (PPV) of a system refers to the proportion of reported cases that actually have the disease 
or health-related event of concern.  The representativeness of the system pertains to the ability of the system to 
describe the occurrence of the disease or health-event in the population of interest, and requires an understanding of 
how the data was collected (population sampled, active vs. passive surveillance, voluntary vs. directed 
participation).  
 
Timeliness of the information refers to the time between the occurrence of the health related event and its 
appearance in a functional surveillance system.  Both the lag time between the detection of the medical event and 
the time required to generate a system record impacts a system’s timeliness.  The stability of the system is affected 
by security issues, system downtimes, and manpower constraints, all of which directly impact the overall reliability 
and availability of data generated by that system.   
 
Applications of System Attributes in Surveillance Programs 
 
Public Health Awareness and Risk Assessment Programs  
 
Programs aimed at increasing the public’s awareness or determining the risk of a disease or health-related event are 
generally designed to capture a broad snapshot of a particular condition in the population.  Determining the overall 
disease burden or prevalence is often the goal, therefore these programs often tolerate longer lag times between data 
collection and analysis (less timely surveillance systems).  Data collection may be actively collected to meet the 
specific goals of the program (active surveillance), or may be through data mining of existing system (passive 
surveillance).  Because these programs hope to determine the potential existence of a disease or condition, the data 
collection system employed aims to be as sensitive as possible, with less emphasis on specificity.  Surveillance done 
in support of these programs tends to lead to broad intervention or prevention programs and often policy changes.  
Depending on the specific goals of the programs, often dictated by the stakeholders and associated funding, 
surveillance efforts may be focused on a very specific population or demographic group.  In these cases the 
representativeness of the data collected is critically important. 
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In 2013, Argaw et al conducted a study to determine the risk factors for Visceral Leishmaniosis (VL) among 
resident and migrant populations in Kafta-Humera, Ethiopia (36).  Using hospital records to identify cases, they 
collected risk factor data through the administration of questionnaires.  The study showed sleeping under an acacia 
tree at night, poverty, and lower educational status to be associated with increased risk in both populations.  Among 
the resident population they also found living in a house with thatched walls and sleeping on the ground to be 
significant risk factors; whereas HIV status and sleeping near dogs added risk for migrants.   Bed net use, especially 
during the rainy season was found to be protective.  Case definitions followed local hospital diagnostic algorithms, 
where patients had at least 2 weeks of fever plus weight loss and/or splenomegaly and a laboratory confirmed 
diagnosis of VL.  Laboratory tests used had sensitivities ranging from 79% to 93% and specificities ranging from 
85% to 96% (36).  The high variability of diagnostic test capability and quality is one limitation of this study.  Also, 
the findings of this study are limited to a very specific population in a very specific location.  However, the risk 
factors and preventive measures identified are representative of this specific populous, and therefore the 
development of practical and relevant intervention practices are possible.   
 
In order to better understand the risks factors for severe H1N1 infections associated with the 2009 global outbreak, 
Van Kerkhove et al analyzed data obtained primarily from surveillance programs of the Ministries of Health or 
National Public Health Institutes of 19 countries from the period 1 April 2009 to 1 January 2010 (37).   Data sources 
included 70,000 laboratory-confirmed hospitalized H1N1 patients, 9,700 patients admitted to intensive care units 
(ICUs), and 2,500 deaths reports.  The highest risk of hospitalization was among 5–14 year old patients; while the 
maximum risk of death was in those 50 years old or older.  Although the infection rate was low in the over 65 year 
old group, the ratio of H1N1deaths to hospitalizations increased with age. The proportion of patients with one or 
more reported chronic conditions increased with severity of H1N1 infection (37).  Overall, the findings 
demonstrated that risk factors for severe H1N1 infection are similar to those for seasonal influenza; notable 
differences included younger age groups and obesity.  Although the study provides a broad overview of the risk 
factors associated with the H1N1 outbreak on a global scale, it does not provide enough detail to support the 
implementation of targeted preventive strategies on a local level.  Another significant limitation is the wide 
differences in surveillance systems employed by each country, to include potential differences in H1N1 case 
definitions and the completeness and quality of risk factor data.   This variability could have led to clustering of data 
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by country, making direct comparisons across countries inaccurate. The country level data lacked individual-level 
details which eliminated the ability to control for confounding and the subsequent identification of the independent 
contribution of individual risk factors. 
 
Disease Control Programs 
 
Disease Control Programs (DCP) are directed at “reducing the frequency of existing disease to levels biologically or 
economically justifiable or otherwise of little consequence” (6).  Such programs require a more accurate 
determination of the particular disease or condition in the population.  Determining the overall disease burden or 
prevalence is still important, but in addition the incidence (occurrence of new cases) of disease is also important.  
For this reason the surveillance system used must be timelier than that tolerated in awareness and risk assessment 
programs.  In general data collection is active, targeted specifically to the population of concern.  In addition, the 
methods used to determine the presence of disease must be sensitive enough to capture the disease (some false 
positives may be tolerated) but specific enough to limit the number of false positives.  The tolerated levels of 
sensitivity and specificity are dictated by the proposed control practices as well as the impact of not achieving 
control of the disease.  For example, resource intensive control practices such as central quarantines may warrant 
more specific (and potentially costly) diagnostic testing; whereas quarantines conducted at home residencies may be 
initiated with less specific testing.  A high rate of false positives (high sensitivity with low specificity) may be 
tolerated in order to control a particularly virulent disease; whereas the same would not be tolerated with a less 
virulent disease, especially if treatment is costly or invasive.    
 
In 1995 the CDC established Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) as a core component of their Emerging 
Infections Programs network (EIP) (38).  The collaboration between the CDC, state health departments, and 
universities is an active laboratory- and population-based surveillance system for invasive bacterial pathogens of 
public health importance (38). The ABCs data have been used in disease control programs to track disease trends in 
response to public health interventions, including the decline in pneumococcal disease following the introduction of 
the pediatric pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (38, 39).  Using very specific case definitions and reporting criteria, 
the system is designed to determine the incidence and epidemiologic characteristics of invasive disease due to 
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Haemophilus influenzae, Neisseria meningitidis, group A Streptococcus, group B Streptococcus, Streptococcus 
pneumoniae and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus  (MRSA) (38, 39).  Programs to assist state and local 
health departments with surveillance and control of MRSA and drug-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae have been 
developed based primarily on lessons learned from ABCs (38, 39).  A comparison of ABC surveillance data for 
invasive MRSA infections in 2011 to the baseline incidence of 2007 identified a decrease of nearly 26% (39).  The 
decrease was attributed to the Department of Health and Human Services Action Plan to Prevent Healthcare-
Associated Infections in support of the National Metric for Healthy People 2020 (39).  The strengths of the CDC 
ABCs program include strictly defined case definitions, standardized report submission templates and protocols, and 
annual audits of all participating laboratories.  One of the most significant limitations is that only 10 U.S. population 
areas are represented in these surveillance activities (as of April 2014).    
 
In an attempt to better understand an outbreak of human encephalitis that was associated with concurrent extensive 
bird mortality in the northeastern United States in 1999, scientists conducted complete genome sequencing of the 
virus isolated from the brain of a dead Chilean flamingo (40).   Together with gene amplification from several other 
species including mosquitoes and two fatal human cases, they were able to determine that West Nile virus (WNV), 
previously never detected in the U.S. was responsible for the human disease (40).   The rapid identification of the 
causative agent by these researchers was the first step in the development of systems and procedures to implement 
effective WNV control programs.   The CDC Division of Vector-borne Disease leads the WNV control program for 
the United States (41).  Their published guidelines provide details on how to conduct surveillance efforts as well as 
how to implement prevention and control strategies for the virus (41).  Because laboratory confirmation of disease in 
humans is not only unreliable but also lags several weeks behind active infection, effective WNV surveillance must 
also include efforts to monitor the virus in the mosquito vectors and non-human vertebrate hosts.  This 
comprehensive approach spurred the 2000 creation of ArboNET, the national arbovirus surveillance system which 
serves as a surveillance capture platform to monitor WNV infections in humans, mosquitoes, birds, and other animal 
(42).  Human data includes both disease cases and information collected from donor screening programs 
(presumptive viremic donors) (42).  Human data elements include (but are not limited to) age and sex, county of 
residence, date of symptom onset or date of donation, case status, and laboratory of diagnosis (42).  Non-human data 
elements include species, state and county, and date of symptom onset or collection. As a notifiable disease, health 
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care providers are required to report data to their state/local health department, who then enters it into an electronic 
database which is uploaded to the CDC database weekly (42).  The CDC analyzes the data and disseminates 
information regularly, weekly during the WNV season.  Information includes both human and animal disease cases 
and deaths by state, human demographics, mosquito cases/pools, and a comparison of current to previous year at 
same week (42).  Most of the ArboNET’s limitations are due to it being a passive surveillance system:  there is 
minimal clinical and laboratory data available to permit the confirming of cases, delays between case occurrence and 
reporting may exist, and variability in reporting practices by location may lead to gaps in data from some areas.  One 
of the systems greatest strengths is its comprehensiveness, merging data from human, animal, and vector sources.  In 
addition, the data within the system is standardized by defined case definitions and reporting protocols.  The 
timeliness of both the data reporting and the report dissemination provides incidence and geographic and temporal 
trend analysis, enabling the implementation of control strategies.   
 
Disease Eradication Programs 
 
The goal of a Disease Eradication Program (DEP) is to eliminate selected organisms from a populous which is 
specifically defined by population characteristics (e.g. species, race, gender) and location (e.g. herd, farm, region, 
state, city) (6).  Such programs require exact determination of the particular disease or condition in the population.  
The accurate and timely diagnosis of both prevalent and incident cases is critical and therefore active data collection, 
targeted specifically to the population of concern is used (6).  Eradication programs generally involve strict 
intervention and control strategies.  In animal populations these range from slaughtering affected animals to 
slaughtering the entire herd.  For human populations it may include an aggressive quarantine and vaccination 
program.  Both scenarios are resource intensive and very costly.  For this reason the methods used to determine 
presence of disease should not produce a high level of false positives.  However, complete eradication of disease 
assumes that all positive cases are correctly identified; therefore there cannot be any false negatives, either.  
Directors of DEP must have a deep understanding of not only the pathogen/organism being eradicated and the 




To date, only two diseases have ever been given the status of eradication:  smallpox and rinderpest.  Although 
widespread rinderpest eradication efforts started as early as the 1900s (the OIE was formed in response to the 
disease) most took place on an individual country basis (43).  With the support of the FAO, the OIE, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme (GREP) was created (43, 44).  
Initiated in 1994 as an international coordination mechanism to promote the global eradication of rinderpest by 
2010, the GREP established technical guidelines and standards for achieving the goal (43, 44).  The eradication of 
the disease was confirmed by the World Organization for Animal Health on 25 May 2011 (43).  The monumental 
accomplishment may be attributed to multiple factors.  The creation of GREP was paramount as it coordinated 
eradication efforts internationally and established technical guidelines and standards.   Specifically, it established 
appropriate disease surveillance techniques such as uniform sampling strategies, supported national laboratory 
services in organizing standardized surveillance activities, assisted national veterinary services to conform to OIE 
guidelines for declaration of freedom from disease and infection, and stockpiled high quality vaccines (43).  In 
addition the GREP articulated strategies for the prevention of or response to the re-introduction of the rinderpest 
virus to include effective national/regional emergency plans (43).   Initially, for a country to be recognized as free 
from rinderpest they were required by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code to go through three phases: 1) 
provisionally-free status of self-declaration, pending official recognition of freedom from disease 2) disease-free 
status, and 3) infection-free status.  Later they were only required to achieve infection-free status.  Doing so required 
the country to 1) provide a letter declaring historical freedom from rinderpest according to the 1999 declaration 
made by OIE Delegates; 2) provide a dossier for historical freedom, attesting to never have experienced the disease 
or that the disease had been eradicated from the country for more than 25 years, and/or that the country stopped 
vaccination more than 10 years prior; 3) submit field and laboratory rinderpest data required by the dossier (44).  
Several features specific to the pathogenesis of the disease were also important to the eradication of the disease.  For 
example, there is no carrier state where individual animals could act as long-term reservoirs of infection; animals 
exposed to rinderpest in nature develop clinical signs that either lead to death or recovery with life-long immunity 
(45).  Because, some animals only develop mild disease the existence of serological methods to aid in definitive 
diagnosis is also critical (under OIE protocol, even these mild cases of disease had to be fully investigated) (45).  
Lastly, an effective vaccine that confers life-long immunity was absolutely essential to the program’s control efforts 
and the eventual eradication of the disease (45).   
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Comparing Surveillance System Data 
 
Until now, this review has focused on the evaluation of public health surveillance systems as separate entities and on 
an individual basis.  In the next section the concentration shifts to evaluating surveillance systems by comparing 
similar systems to each other, specifically through assessing each one’s data.  Such comparisons may be used to 
validate overlapping data, estimate underlaps in data, identify redundancies in order to improve efficiencies and 
maximize resource management, and/or to aid in the selection of the appropriate system for a given 
project/incentive.  The data used in surveillance systems can come from a many different types of sources and can 
be in a variety of formats.  These differences can significantly impair the ability to compare the data, making 
subsequent surveillance system comparisons based on the data challenging.  This section will introduce potential 
differences in data; discuss issues that arise when attempting to compare data from different systems, and review 
approaches used to conduct these comparisons. The discussion assumes the data being compared are collected in 
order to answer related if not the same overarching question, such as the occurrence of a disease or event.   
 
Potential Differences in Data 
 
Data variability is a very broad term used to describe the difference data due to factors, such as data source, data 
type, and/or the method of data collection/system used to compile data.  Data source refers to the origin of the data, 
where it came from (e.g. hospitals, health departments, public records, media).  Data type refers to the category of 
data collected (e.g. syndromic, test result, fatalities, armed conflict).  In addition, data variability may be influenced 
by the mode of data collection (manual versus automated entry), which is further influenced by differences in data 
format (free-text, menu-driven, multiple choice).  All of these factors may contribute to differences in naming 
conventions for the event or disease of interest, which ultimately makes the direct comparison of data difficult.   
 
Data quality is affected by many different factors and may be discussed in terms of its validity and completeness.  
Validity can be measured by the sensitivity and specificity of the data.  Sensitivity is calculated by determining the 
proportion the total population’s cases that the dataset correctly identifies as cases or event or the probability of the 
dataset correctly identifying as cases or events those that are really are.  Specificity is the proportion of the total 
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population’s non-cases or non-events that the dataset correctly identifies as non-cases or non-events or the 
probability of the dataset correctly identifying as non-cases or non-events those that really are.  Completeness refers 
to the ability to capture or ascertain the information needed to accurately assess the objectives of the dataset.  
Incomplete data may lead to biased conclusions.  For example, if data collection is not emphasized as important, or 
if data entry is cumbersome, there may be a large amount of partial or missing data.  Differences in data quality 
directly contribute to observed differences in data. 
 
Approaches to Comparing Data  
 
Data Harmonization Techniques 
 
One of the barriers to comparing data from different systems is the lack of standardized naming conventions; 
therefore it has been proposed that the first phase of dataset comparison should be the creation of a combined 
dataset.  Nadrowski et al. propose the use of an open source web platform for the upload, validation, and storage of 
data from different sources (46).  The system is designed to allow for harmonization of naming conventions through 
a “bottom-up approach” to generating category lists from the primary data sources.  Although this method offers a 
potential solution to the heterogeneity of naming conventions, there are several concerns about its practicality.  The 
system is labor intensive, requiring manual entry of the primary source data into an ‘import workbook’ to facilitate 
its incorporation into the merged database (46).  In addition, there are multiple layers of data management involved 
in the data validation process which make this technique cumbersome and potentially impractical (46).  Another 
approach is to create a consortium of representatives for each data system being compared before attempting to 
merge the datasets (47.) This approach permits the collaborative creation of common naming conventions and case 
or event definitions (47).  Unfortunately, this approach is not practical in many if not most instances.  On a case-by-
case basis or for a particular joint project it may be feasible, but in most instances large scale meetings are costly and 





Metadata Coverage Index (MCI) 
 
Liolios et al. propose a record scoring system based on the richness of data sources as a proxy for data quality (48).  
Their Metadata Coverage Index (MCI) calculates the number of fields in a record or database for which information 
is provided as a percentage (score) of the total fields available (48).  Although the MCI may have utility in 
determining data entry compliance within specific databases or by specific record users, there are several limitations 
to its use to compare data quality across data sources.  The MCI score does not correlate to the validity of the data; a 
complete but inaccurate dataset will receive a higher score than a partially complete but 100% accurate one.  Also, 
there is no mechanism to weight fields that are deemed to be of higher importance; for example the outcome 
variable of interest versus an administrative code.  Lastly, because the MCI score is a proportion, it is highly 
dependent on the denominator or number of available fields of data.  This means even datasets that collected the 
exact same data will have different MCI scores when the data derives from sources with varying available fields. In 
fact, it would assign a lower score to the source with a larger collection capability, which may actually have better 




More complicated approaches have been proposed as well.  In an attempt to create an efficient and effective way to 
merge data from different distributed information retrieval systems, Wu and Li review existing ways to assess the 
degree of overlap between data systems and propose some new approaches (49).  When overlap is expected to be 
light and all data is of a similar quality, they suggest the simple Round-robin evaluation of each document or entry 
separately (49).  With excessively large data sets this method would quickly become labor and resource intensive.  
The zero-one score normalization method calculates a raw score for each database based on the number of 
documents retrieved  then uses a mathematical function to normalizes each score into a range of [0,1] linearly.  This 
permits the ranking of databases through these now-normalized scores (49).  Wu and Li, however, prefer to use the 
cubic and logistic regression to convert document ranks and normalized scores to actual estimates of the relation 
between rank and probability of relevance (49).  Another approach they reviewed involved using weight 
assignments; where databases expected to have the least overlap are assigned heavier weights than those with higher 
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expected overlaps.  They then propose their own methods, the shadow document method (SDM) and the Multi-
Evidence Method (MEM).  The SDM looks directly at the amount of overlap between two component databases 
through the use of queries and calculates a score based on the probability of a document not being found in both 
databases.  The multi-evidence method (MEM) requires the averaging the score of every document retrieved from 
the databases, then multiplication of the average by a factor which is a function of the number of databases that 
include the document in their results.  Although these methods might be effective tools for determining the extent of 
overlap between data sources for the purpose of merging data from distributed information retrieval systems, they 
may be too complicated to be practical.  The use of these modeling techniques would require extensive training and 




Capture-recapture (CR) techniques have long been used in wildlife biology to estimate total population numbers 
(50).  The approach involves two trapping events.  The first trapping produces the “capture” sample; these animals 
are counted, tagged, and released back into the population.  The second trapping produces the “recapture” sample; in 
addition to counting the total number captured in this second sample, the number of previously tagged animals 
(recaptured animals) is also counted (50).  The proportion of animals in the second trapping that have never been 
captured before represents the percent of the wildlife population that was not captured by either trapping event.  The 
total population size is then estimated by multiplying the sample size by this percentage.  In a similar way, CR 
techniques can be used to estimate the total number of cases or events expected when incomplete data exists.  In 
doing so, CR techniques facilitate the comparison of data by providing an estimate of the denominator data required 
for completeness calculations (50).  CR techniques were used to estimate the total number of people infected with 
human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) in Lazio, Italy, during 1990s (51).  The resulting population 
estimates were consistent with those using a more complex compartmental mathematical model.  The study 
concluded that CR techniques provide a simple and inexpensive means of obtaining accurate estimates of the total 
number of those infected with HIV when incomplete data from multiple sources must be used (51).  In 2007, the 
Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (NMCPHC) utilized CR techniques to conduct a small pilot study of 
Leishmaniosis cases in the San Diego area naval medical system (52).   Initially implemented to estimate the total 
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burden of disease, the resulting denominator data was then used in completeness calculations, enabling the 
comparison of data sources and a determination of the effectiveness of the three surveillance systems used (52).  The 
limitations of using CR to compare data from different sources are directly related this technique’s many underlying 
assumptions.   For example, it is implicit that each case has been diagnosed accurately and that matching between 
sources has been done appropriately.  Also, it is assumed that for any single source, each case in the population has 
the same “catchability” or probability of ascertainment, that selection bias does not exist between sources (50).  
Violation of these assumptions may lead to inaccurate estimations of total population data and therefore incorrect 




Sometimes it may not be appropriate or desirable to use the above mentioned methods for dataset comparisons. In 
such cases detailed descriptive comparisons of observed differences may be more appropriate.  In such 
circumstances it is still important to conduct the comparison systematically in order to ensure each dataset or system 
is being evaluated fairly and equally.  Doing this involves first determining which characteristics to evaluate.  These 
generally are driven by the reason for the data comparison, and may include characteristics such as the number of 
variables available to define the event of interest (e.g. patient demographics, disease status, category of event, 
unique identifiers), the methods used to validate the data, and the sources used to gather the data.   In 2012, in 
support of research studying the dynamics of civil war, a comparison of two leading conflict events datasets, the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Armed Conflict Location Events Dataset (ACLED), was conducted 
(53).  The goal of the comparison was to describe the differences between the two datasets (including strengths and 
weaknesses) and provide guidelines as to the most appropriate use of each (52).  Characteristics used to make these 
determinations include data source, conflict event definition, and quality-control practices.  The study found that 
both datasets shared a heavy reliance on media as their primary data source; however the two used very different 
conflict event definitions (52).  The UCDP restricts it domain to events which resulted in a fatality, thereby limiting 
the definition of a conflict event to those with fatalities.  The ACLED dataset, on the other hand, has a domain that 
includes not only events with fatalities and without fatalities, but also events that are characterized as non-violent 
(52).  In addition, it was discovered that the ACLED dataset had significant quality-control issues that could result in 
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biased results if left unchecked by the researcher.  In conclusion, it was discovered that those interested in non-
violent events such as troop movement only had the ACLED dataset to choose from, but researchers were told to be 
wary of the data due to quality-control issues (52).  Hedden et al conducted detailed descriptive analyses of multiple 
adult mental health data sources in order to facilitate the comparison of adult mental health prevalence estimates 
generated in the United States (54).  In specific, the study aimed to compare the prevalence estimates generated from 
the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) to estimates generated from other national data 
sources (54).  Descriptions included details on each source’s survey design and instrumentation, mode of data 
collection, and methods used to produce the estimates.  The comparison focused on the specific mental health 
indicators of serious mental illness (SMI), any mental illness (AMI), serious psychological distress (SPD), major 
depressive episodes (MDE), and suicidality (54).  The study concluded that the substantial differences in 
methodologies between the data sources explained the observed differences in adult mental health prevalence 
estimates, and recommended using the data from multiple sources in order to get the most comprehensive picture of 
mental health in the United States.     
 
The Use of Animals as Sentinels in Zoonotic Disease Surveillance  
 
The use of animal disease surveillance in public health was briefly mentioned earlier in this chapter as a valuable 
public health surveillance strategy.  The purpose of the current section is to further discuss the role of animals in 
public health, focusing on their use as sentinels in zoonotic disease surveillance.  This section will introduce the 
concept of “One Health”, discuss the application of animals as sentinels, and review research demonstrating animals 
as sentinel surveillance in public health strategy.   
 
One Health  
 
The One Health concept recognizes that human, animal, and ecosystem health are inextricably linked.  It seeks to 
promote, improve, and defend the health and well-being of all species by enhancing cooperation and collaboration 
between physicians, veterinarians, other scientific health and environmental professionals.   One of the stated 
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objectives of One Health is to achieve joint cross-species disease surveillance and control efforts in public health 
(55).  In 2008 the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) published the “One Health: A New 
Professional Imperative” dedicated to finding a holistic, collaborative approach to contemporary health issues 
through the convergence of human, animal, and environmental domains (56).   The document highlights that of the 
approximately 1,500 diseases recognized in humans; almost 60% are due to multi-host pathogens characterized by 
their movement across species lines.  While multi-host pathogens may present considerable challenges 
implementing disease control practices, the existence of these “other” hosts may provide surveillance opportunities 
that subsequently contributed to enhanced prevention strategies.   
 
Animals as Sentinels 
 
Sentinel surveillance focuses on specific subpopulations to enhance detection of disease and/or improve the cost-
effectiveness of surveillance activities (57).  The goal of using animals as sentinels for human disease surveillance is 
to estimate disease risk in order to make informed recommendations on preventive practices and therapeutic 
protocols (57).  The use of sentinels may answer a variety of surveillance questions such as 1) the presence of a 
pathogen in a new area, 2) changes in the prevalence or incidence of a pathogen or disease over time, 3) the rate 
and/or direction of pathogen spread, 4) the ecology of the pathogen, and 5) the effectiveness of pathogen control 
practices (57).   
 
There are many considerations when determining if an animal is a suitable sentinel for disease surveillance.  
Compiling a definitive list of characteristics is not practical, however, because the criteria against which the 
usefulness of a given sentinel population is assessed are influenced by the aim of the surveillance and the context of 
its use (58).  Halliday et al., instead propose the use of a “framework” for evaluating animals as sentinels for 
infectious disease.  Key to this framework is an understanding of how three fundamental components of the 
surveillance program interact:  the sentinel population being used to conduct the surveillance, the target 




In order to serve as sentinels, the animal models must be susceptible to the pathogen and must produce a measurable 
symptom or response that indicates exposure or infection (57).  How the sentinel responds to the pathogen 
determines how pathogen presence will be measured as well as the application of the data once it is obtained.  For 
example, disease presence may be easily observed through morbidity or mortality or it may involve active diagnostic 
testing through sampling such as sero-conversion or pathogen presence.  The sentinel response can be viewed as a 
test for the presence of the pathogen within the target population, and as such has properties that are analogous to 
test sensitivity and specificity.  Sentinel sensitivity is then the susceptibility of the sentinel to the pathogen and the 
sentinel specificity is the ease with which a sentinel response can be interpreted and attributed to a particular 
pathogen (58).  In addition, the temporal characteristics of the sentinel response may dictate the limits of the 
sentinel’s use in public health strategies; rapidly detectable responses may be used for early warning, whereas 
slower but long duration responses may be useful in prevalence studies.  The target population’s response to the 
pathogen influences the application of the sentinel data as well.  For example, if the target population tends to have a 
more severe response to the pathogen, then the surveillance system may tolerate lower sentinel specificity in favor 
of higher sentinel sensitivity.  Awareness of the relationship between the sentinel and the target population is not 
required to address all questions, but will allow for the investigation of more complex epidemiological questions and 
better informed interpretation of the data collected using that sentinel.  At a minimum, the sentinel and target 
population should be spatially associated (58).  Knowledge about the pathogen further facilitates an understanding 
of the other components: the sentinel response, the target population’s response, and the potential for transmission 
between the two populations.  Specifically pathogen factors that should be understood include, but are not limited 
to: infectivity, the ability to establish an infection; pathogenicity, the ability to produce clinical or detectable 
disease; and virulence, the ability to produce severe disease.   
 
Research Demonstrating Animals as Sentinels 
 
A survey of Washington state veterinarians in 2008 showed that more than three quarters of respondents believed a 
veterinarian’s role in educating clients on zoonotic disease was very important, but only 43% reported doing so on a 
daily basis (59).  Seventy-four percent of the population indicated wanting more public health agency assistance 
with issues involving zoonotic disease; specifically a web-based data dissemination system (59).  Despite the 
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recognition that animal and human health are intrinsically linked, and the apparent willingness of veterinarians to 
play their part, there still are no organizations or agencies dedicated to conducting zoonotic disease surveillance in 
animal and human populations simultaneously.  Instead, the value of animal disease surveillance in public health is 




Anthrax is a zoonotic pathogen that has also been identified as a potential bioterrorism agent.  A systematic review 
of the scientific literature from 1966 to 2005 determined that sentinel surveillance for sporadic cases of livestock in 
non-endemic areas may serve as an indicator for a potential attack (60).  In addition, although dogs and cats are less 
susceptible to the pathogen than ruminants, the review recommended including them in surveillance activities due to 
their proximity to humans (60).   The review did not indicate the methods of surveillance that should be used.  
Anthrax continues to be an issue in the Serengeti ecosystem of Tanzania (61).  Despite the recognized value of 
serologic data for disease surveillance, it is rarely used in studies of anthrax in the area.  Reasons include the 
perception that diagnosis can be based solely on the syndrome of sudden hemorrhagic death in herbivores, the rapid 
deterioration of effected carcasses which prevent productive sampling, the risk of exposure to those collecting the 
samples, or the lack of outbreak reporting due to inaccessibility (61).  In an effort to find a better way to monitor 
Anthrax in the region, Lembo et al. conducted a study investigating to potential to use sero-surveillance on native 
wildlife species, local livestock, and domestic dogs.  Using case reports and a serologic assay that enabled 
multispecies comparisons, researchers conducted a sero-surveillance study in the Serengeti ecosystem in Tanzania 
from 1996–2009 (61).  High seroprevalence among carnivores suggested regular nonfatal exposure in this species 
and reflected known patterns of endemicity for the region.  Also, because of the existence of robust preventive 
medicine campaigns in the area, the authors felt that routine surveillance of these domesticated dogs would be 
relatively easy to maintain.  The study concluded that dogs could serve as indicator species in sentinel surveillance 







In 2009 a study out of the Netherlands investigated the role of pets in the transmission of zoonotic parasites by 
analyzing fecal and hair samples from healthy household dogs and cats (62).  The study found Toxocara eggs in 
4.4% of dogs and 4.6% of cat fecal samples and in 12.2% of dogs and 3.4% of cat fur samples.  In addition Giardia 
was present in from 15.2% of the dog and 13.6% of the cat feces.  Cryptosporidium sp. were present in 8.7% of dog 
and 4.6% of cat feces (62).  In addition, the study evaluated the close physical contact and other behaviors between 
owners and their pets that further increase the risk of transmission of these zoonotic parasites.  Although not stated 
explicitly, the study demonstrates the value in routine monitoring of these parasites in even healthy animals as a 
mode of zoonotic disease surveillance for public health purposes (62).  In a 2012 study by Schurer et al. companion 
dogs were used to estimate the risk of internal parasites in the indigenous people of Saskatchewan (63).  Specifically 
they looked at the following intestinal parasites; Echinococcus granulosus, Toxocara canis, Toxoplasma gondii, 
Diphyllobothrium spp., and Giardia duodenalis.  The authors cited many reasons these dogs are suitable sentinels 
for internal parasites in these communities.  The dogs are highly susceptible and highly exposed to these parasites; 
dogs in remote and indigenous communities are often free-ranging and have access to human food, garbage, and 
carcasses of local fish and wildlife (63).   Sample collection is relatively non-invasive, diagnostic tests can be run on 
either fresh feces found in the environment or that taken directly from the pet (63).  Diagnostic testing for these 
parasites includes routine laboratory tests such as fecal floatation, microscopy, and commercial assays; all of which 
can be performed at the local veterinary facility (63).  Overall, the prevalence of canine intestinal parasitic infection 
in the indigenous communities was 20–71%, which was 5–16 times higher than a nearby urban center in 
Saskatchewan (63).  This information was interpreted to mean that the indigenous human population was at a 5-16 




Historically sentinel surveillance for influenza viruses has been done on either avian or porcine species.  Recent 
work, however, has challenged us to think outside the box.  During the 2003-2004 avian influenza A (H5N1) virus 
outbreak in Asia there were anecdotal reports of domestic and zoo cats being infected with fatal H5N1 virus from 
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infected chickens (64).  Previously this species was through to be resistant to infection.  Experimental infection of 4- 
to 6-month-old European shorthair cats showed that cats can be infected with H5N1 virus both by horizontal 
transmission and by feeding on virus infected birds (64).  The implications of the findings are that domestic cats 
may be playing a role in the spread of H5N1 virus between poultry farms, and from poultry to humans (64).  
Another study on experimentally infected cats showed the virus replicated not only in the respiratory tract but also in 
multiple extra-respiratory tissues causing systemic disease (65).  All infected cats subsequently excreted virus not 
only via the respiratory tract but also via the digestive tract (65).  The findings of these studies indicate that domestic 
cats may serve as sentinels in H5N1 surveillance; they are susceptible to infection and once infected demonstrate 
outwards signs of disease (death or multi-system disease) (65).  In addition, domestic cats may play an important 




One of the aims of this project is to demonstrate the use of military pet dogs as sentinel surveillance for military 
populations.  In support of this, a pilot study investigating the effectiveness of pet dog serology in sentinel 
surveillance for human Lyme disease was conducted for these populations.  To facilitate the pilot study, a detailed 
review of similar studies was conducted, resulting in a much more extensive review of research demonstrating 
animals as sentinel surveillance in this disease.   
Human Lyme disease is the most commonly reported vector-borne illness in U.S. and the seventh most common 
Nationally Notifiable disease (66).  The causative agent is a spirochetal bacteria from the genus Borrelia, 
specifically Borrelia burgdorferi sensu lato (67).  Within this group there are several relevant disease causing 
genospecies, this discussion will focus on the major Borreliae known to cause disease in humans, their vectors, and 
the geographical location of each.  The vectors of B. burgdorferi sensu lato are various species of Ixodes ticks, 
whose distribution is associated with the specific geographic distribution of the Borreliae genospecies (67).  In 
Europe both I. ricinus and I. persulcatus serve as vectors, carrying the three primary genospecies of concern for the 
region; B. burgdorferi sensu stricto (I. ricinus only), B. garinii, B. afzelli, and B. spielmanii (I. ricinus only).  B. 
garinii and B. afzelii, carried by the associated ticks, also cause human borreliosis in Asia (67).  In the United States, 
I.scapularis (northeastern, midwestern, and southeastern states down to northeastern Mexico, and up into southern 
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Canada) and I. pacificus together with I. neotomae (western states) carry the genospecies of concern in the United 
States, B. burgdorferi sensu sticto (Bb) (67).  Studies using dog serology in sentinel surveillance for human Lyme 
disease in the United States were most likely detecting Bb, not one of the other Borreilae genospecies.  Unless 
otherwise indicated, for the remainder of this document, the Borrelia pathogen will be referred to as Bb, the most 
common disease causing genospecies in the United States.   
 
Typical symptoms of human Lyme disease include fever, headache, fatigue, and a characteristic skin rash called 
erythema migrans (66).  Diagnosis can be difficult due to the vagueness of symptoms and the ambiguity of 
laboratory testing.  If left untreated, infection can spread to joints, the heart, and the nervous system.  Sixty percent 
of those infected develop chronic, severe arthritis (66).  Even with treatment, 10-20% may develop Post-Treatment 
Lyme Disease Syndrome (PTLDS) (66).  There is no current human vaccine.  In 1998, direct medical costs 
associated with Lyme disease were estimated to be $2,970 per case (68).  Indirect costs, including associated non-
medical costs and projected losses in productivity, were estimated to be $5,202 per case. For the same time period 
mean productivity loss per clinically defined late stage patient was $9,108 (68). 
 
Due to the high impact of the disease, difficulties in definitive diagnoses and treatment, and the lack of an existing 
human vaccine, the best way to combat the disease is through preventive measures.  The cornerstone of preventive 
strategies, however, is to understand the risk of disease.  Over the last several decades, there has been a plethora of 
research assessing the use of different surveillance strategies for the purpose of assessing the risk of Lyme disease in 
human populations.  Such activities range from the observation of climatic factors and forest growth patterns (69 -
72) to the monitoring of relevant wildlife and tick populations (73 - 78).  There have also been many studies and 
reviews assessing the effectiveness of dogs as sentinels for the risk of Lyme disease in humans (79-87).  Dogs are 
appropriate sentinels for several reasons.  Not only are they susceptible to infection but because of their increased 
likelihood of exposure to ticks, they appear to be at greater risk of infection than people.  In addition, attached ticks 
are less likely to be detected on dogs due to the animal’s fur, which allows the tick the full 36-48 hours needed for 
pathogen transmission.  Also, dogs mount an immunological response that is easily detected through routine 
commercial serological assays.  Lastly, because they share the same environment and visit the same outdoors areas, 
dogs give a good indication of the potential exposure to infected ticks for humans.   
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 A 1994 study investigated the use of dogs as sentinels for Lyme disease in humans in Massachusetts (81).  The 
researchers used regression analysis to determine the relationship between incident human cases of Lyme disease 
and canine seroprevalence of antibodies to Bb.  The study showed companion dogs to be highly predictive of the 
incidence of Lyme disease in humans for the state (81).  There were some limitations to this study, however.  
Seroprevalence estimates for this study were based on the assumption that seropositive dogs received their exposure 
in the towns where they resided.  In addition, details about the specificity of the diagnostic test used were not 
provided; most diagnostic testing available at the time could not discern between antibodies to Bb or those of related 
spirochetal bacteria such as Leptospires (the bacterial agent of Leptospirosis).  Olson et al. used canine sera solicited 
from local veterinarians, trappers, animal shelters, and humane societies to determine the utility of dogs as sentinel 
surveillance for Lyme disease in San Diego County, California (82).  Although samples were initially screened for 
sero-positivity using standard ELISA antibody testing, positive samples were confirmed through the use of split-
sample Western blot and indirect fluorescent antibody (IFA) testing (82).  No regional clustering of sero-positive 
animals was detected, which reflected the observed low incidence of human disease expected for the area (82).  The 
more strict diagnostic testing modalities (confirmatory antigen testing) in combination of the use of wild and stray 
dog populations (more representative of area prevalence) make this study design more accurate for determining the 
true risk of Lyme disease in the area.  Unfortunately, the impact of this study’s findings appears less significant 
given the low prevalence of the area.  Aimed at determining whether dogs prone to Borrelia sero-positivity pose a 
threat to their owners, researchers in the Netherlands conducted a seroprevalence study of hunters with hunting dogs 
and hunters without hunting dogs (83).  The study found that although hunting dogs (18%) had slightly higher 
seroprevalance than non-hunting dogs (17%) and hunters with hunting dogs (15%) had slightly higher 
seroprevalence than those without hunting dogs (13%), only 12% of the sero-positive hunters had hunting dogs 
which were also sero-positive.  On the basis of these findings the researchers concluded that ownership of dogs with 
increased risk of infection is not associated with higher risk of human Lyme disease in people, indicating humans 
and dogs are infected independently and further supporting the use of dogs in sentinel surveillance for Lyme disease 
(83).  Once again, this study was limited by the abilities of the diagnostic tests available at the time.  Although 
methods were used to account for the cross-reactivity of dogs vaccinated against the four most common canine 




In 2004 Duncan et al. employed the use of a new highly sensitive and specific in-house serological test to assess the 
use of dogs in sentinel surveillance for human Lyme disease in the Southeastern and Mid-Atlantic United States 
(84).  The new test was the SNAP® 3Dx assay.  Unlike IFA testing and other antigen-based ELISAs, the SNAP® 
3Dx assay detects antibodies to a C6-peptide antigen which is only present when an animal is naturally infected with 
the Bb pathogen (84).  According to the manufacturer, the test sensitivity and specificity were 92% and 100% 
respectively (84).  Comparisons among the sampled states indicated a trend of increasing sero-prevelence with 
northern movement up the eastern coastline.  These findings reflect the distribution of human Lyme disease reported 
to the CDC, and where interpreted by the authors to further support the use of dogs in sentinel surveillance for the 
disease (84).  In 2011, researchers from the CDC compared U.S. human Lyme disease data with recently published 
data on national canine Bb seroprevalence data (85).  The canine data came from a national database of SNAP® 3Dx 
and 4Dx assay results that were collected from voluntarily participating veterinary clinics nation-wide.  Canine 
seroprevalence was calculated as the number of sero-positive dogs divided by the total number of tested dogs for 
each state (88).  Using linear regression analysis, the authors showed that state canine sero-prevelence and human 
Lyme disease incidence were positively correlated (85).  In particular, the association was highest among states with 
very low (<2%) or very high (>5%) canine sero-prevelence.  Although the use of the C6 peptide assay may have 
increased the specificity of these serological findings, there were still limitations to this approach.  As with any test, 
manufacturer claims of accuracy in terms of sensitivity and specificity are limited to the diagnostic methods 
employed in their laboratory; no test is perfect, and all results should be viewed with healthy skepticism.  For 
example, the sensitivity and specificity is limited the Borrelia species and non-Borrelia pathogens tested for by the 
company.   Also, the authors of both studies assumed the locations where the test results were obtained represent the 
true exposure locality.  Due to the duration of the canine antibody response (discussed in a later section), dogs with a 
history of travel may not accurately represent the risk of disease for the test area.   
 
Smith et al. opted for an alternative approach to dogs as sentinels in Lyme disease surveillance, using them as a 
means of sampling ticks (86).  This approach still capitalized on several of the features that make dogs good 
sentinels for Lyme surveillance, but is not inhibited by some of the issues associated with sero-surveillance studies.  
The use of dogs to collect ticks permits the researchers to target the sampling to areas where humans are most likely 
to be exposed because companion dogs tend to share the environment with their human counterparts.  Also, because 
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dogs typically spend more time in these outdoor environments and the time spend tends to be directly in the tick 
habitat (tall grasses, shrubs, bushes), dogs are more likely to be exposed to tick.  Lastly, the dogs’ hair coat 
contributes an increased likelihood of tick bites and sustained attachment, further supporting the dog’s usefulness in 
collecting tick samples.  Participating owners were issued a questionnaire that included questions on their pet’s 
travel history and acaricide use (86).  The collected ticks were analyzed using PCR technology to determine the 
presence of the Borrelia pathogen.  Overall, the United Kingdom-based study found an overall prevalence of 
Borrelia in 2.3% of all ticks sampled, and a 0.5% prevalence of infected ticks on all dogs sampled (86).  None of the 
infected ticks came from dogs that had travelled abroad.  The researchers conclude that using dogs to collect ticks is 
an effective alternative approach to their use as sentinels for Lyme disease surveillance in humans.  There are 
limitations to this approach, however.  Most noteworthy, is that veterinary clinics do not have the ability to run PCR 
on tick samples, making this mode of surveillance less practical.  Another relates to the particular animal population 
surveyed, dogs seen at veterinary clinics.  This population of animals is likely on a high plane of preventive medical 
care, and although analysis did not show a significant association between a history of acaricide use and the 
presence of ticks in this population, there may be other owner behaviors or pet characteristics that may have 
influenced the study findings.   
 
Overall, these studies successfully demonstrate the potential to use dogs in sentinel surveillance for Lyme disease in 
human population.  Their review, however, reveals some common limitations.  First and foremost, as discussed 
briefly above, test results based on seroprevalence only indicated the location the animals were tested in and 
potentially not the true location of exposure.  Dogs testing positive may well have been exposed elsewhere or dogs 
testing negative may spend a significant amount of time in low risk areas.  Also, although some studies did collect 
data pertaining to known canine risk factors for Bb sero-positivity, none analyzed the potential impact of these 
factors on sero-prevelence estimates by location.  For example, locations with a high percent of toy breeds may 
predict lower prevalence simply because the decreased likelihood of tick exposure in these breeds (less likely to 
spend time outdoors or recreating in tick habitats).  In addition, most of the studies used dogs seen at veterinary 
clinics, which generally represent animals with a high level of preventive care and subsequently a lower probability 
of tick exposure.  This approach may underestimate the true prevalence in the area and brings question to the basic 
generalizability of the findings.  A more effective surveillance approach might be to include stray and wild dog 
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populations in these activities.  Most studies occurred in areas where Lyme disease is known to be endemic and 
therefore serological screening for Borrelia antibodies is part of the dog’s routine health care.  However, in regions 
where human Borreliosis is less common or just now emerging, routine serological screening is less likely to occur.  
Coupled with the fact that 95% of infected dogs do not produce outwardly visible signs, dogs may not be a very 
sensitive indicator of Lyme disease in these low prevalent areas (67).   
The inability of the reviewed studies to be able to distinguish test location from exposure location is directly related 
to the methods used to determine canine exposure.  For most of the studies exposure was determined using serology 
and seroprevalence.  The limitation of these seroprevalence estimates is their inability to differentiate between recent 
versus chronic exposures.   In 2012, scientists from Cornell University’s College of Veterinary Medicine published 
research detailing the different antibody dynamics that occur throughout the various stages of natural Borrelia 
infection (89).  The findings lead to the development of a novel multiplex assay capable of detecting these 
antibodies, resulting in the ability to discern acute from chronic infections (89).  Later that year the assay was used 
to determine the incidence of Bb in both dogs and horses in New York State (87).  The study recommends the use of 
the assay as a more sensitive tool in recognizing the risk of Lyme disease in human populations (87).  As of the data 
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Public Health Surveillance 
 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), public health surveillance is the continuous, systematic 
collection, analysis and interpretation of health-related data needed for the planning, implementation, and evaluation 
of public health practice. Such surveillance can serve as an early warning system for impending public health 
emergencies, document the impact of an intervention, track progress towards specified goals, and monitor and 
clarify the epidemiology of health problems.  The data from public health surveillance inform public health policy 
and strategies (1).  Inherent in this definition is the implication that action will be taken based on the collected public 
health data.   
 
Most developed countries have the ability to detect and diagnose human, animal, and plant disease, but many 
developing countries- where the majority of the global population resides- do not have the resources or 
infrastructure to support such activities.  In these regions of the world surveillance activities are often supported by 
outside agencies and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).  Within the 
United States, these activities fall under the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), state and local 
health departments, state agricultural departments, and the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA APHIS).  Although, each of these organizations is unique in its specific 
purpose and situation, their long history of existence offers an excellent opportunity for learning which factors lead 
to both successes and failures in public health surveillance efforts.  Because each of these organizations is unique in 
their specific purpose and objectives, a review of each organization’s surveillance systems offers an excellent 




Public Health Surveillance in the Military  
 
Public health surveillance in the military also involves the continuous systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, 
and dissemination of population based health-related events data.  Much like other surveillance programs, the data 
are used to reduce morbidity and mortality, to estimate the distribution, trends, and risks associated with significant 
medical events, and to aid in the development and assessment of policy and resource allocation (2).  In addition, 
health-related event data in the military are used by commanders and public health officials to enable early 
intervention and control strategies in order to prevent adverse military health outcomes and ensure overall strategic 
mission accomplishment (2).  Currently the military has several human medical data systems available for use in 
public health surveillance.  Because each system has different capabilities and attributes, an understanding of each 
one is critical for military leaders to make appropriate decisions based on the data.   
 
Describing Data Systems Used in Public Health Surveillance  
 
Surveillance systems can vary greatly depending on purpose, priority, infrastructure and resources.  Successful 
surveillance programs undergo periodic evaluations to ensure that problems of public health importance are being 
monitored efficiently and effectively.  In 2001 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published 
guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance programs (3).  These guidelines outline the critical components 
of successful systems, providing a standardized approach to describe and subsequently compare surveillance 
systems (3).   
 
This study will apply these guidelines to systematically describe the five military medical data systems most 
commonly used for public health surveillance purposes, as well as briefly discus the capabilities and attributes of 
data systems used in selected national and international public health surveillance programs.  In combination, this 
study aims to produce a document that can be used by military commanders and public health officials as a tool to 
understand differences in military medical data systems and subsequently inform optimal decision making and 




A Systematic Approach to Describing Data Systems Used in Public Health Surveillance  
 
The following discussion is based on the CDC Updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems 
(1).  Unless otherwise specified, this document serves as the primary reference.   
 
When evaluating public health systems, the focus should be on how well the system operates to meet the stated 
purpose and objectives of the given surveillance program.  In general, the evaluation should involve an assessment 
of system attributes such as simplicity, flexibility, data quality, acceptability, sensitivity, positive predictive value, 
representativeness, timeliness, and stability.  It should also attempt to incorporate informatics concerns such as 
hardware/software comparability, user interface, standard data format and coding, appropriate quality checks, and 
adherence to confidentiality and security standards.  As public health surveillance systems vary in methods, scope, 
purpose, and objectives, attributes that are important to one system might be less so or completely irrelevant to 
another.  For this reason, it may not be possible to assess each attribute in each system.  Below is a discussion of the 
specific system attributes used in this review.  The template used to collect the information from each military 
medical data system can be found in Appendix A-3.   
 
As stated earlier, the specific attributes and capabilities of a disease reporting/surveillance system are directly related 
to the stated purpose of that system.  For this reason it is imperative that any standardized system description starts 
with a listing of the system’s purpose, objectives, and justification.  The purpose is why the system exists, whereas 
its objectives state how the data will be used for public health action.  The justification explains how this system 
alone uniquely supports the stated purpose and specific objectives.   
 
Next the review should determine how the system defines a health-related event, essentially, what the system uses as 
an operating case definition.  A system’s case definition is dependent on the type of data the system accesses.  
Included in this description should be the system’s inclusion/exclusion criteria, whether the system is one based on 
syndromes, laboratory reports, International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes, or epidemiological reports.  In 
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addition, if possible, an understanding of the reported level of certainty (probable, suspect, confirmed) should be 
included.   
 
Equally important is an understanding of the system components such as population included, data sources, and 
level of integration with other systems.  These three components are critical to understanding the representativeness 
of the data; without a clear understanding of who the data represents it is not possible to implement a successful 
public health policy or strategy.  An understanding of the system’s purpose aids in understanding the target 
population.  Population variables may include categories such as gender, age, race, and occupation.  In the military, 
it also generally includes (but is not limited to) service component, branch of service, and rank.  Data source refers 
to where the data in the system is collected from, both medical and other (population data).  This should include 
automated and non-automated record sources.  Data type, on the other hand, refers to the category of data collected 
as discussed above (e.g. syndromic, laboratory based, medical, epidemiological reports).  A system’s level of 
integration with other data sources not only aids in identifying potential gaps and overlaps in data, but it also 
addresses the interoperability of the systems, and the ability of a system to be upgraded and its ability to respond to 
growing memory demands and queries.  In addition to these rather fixed components are some that are more fluid, 
such as the system’s ability to be managed (edited) and manipulated (analyzed, reported, disseminated).  An 
understanding of these system components is also critical to understating the overall quality of the data and therefore 
the applicability of conclusions made.   
 
The two remaining descriptive attributes relate to the resources (both human and informatics) required for the 
system to be operational.  Criteria used to evaluate this category include accessibility to the data, user-friendliness 
of the system, and overall efficiency of the data system.   Closely related to accessibility is stability.  The stability 
of the system is affected by firewall issues, system downtimes, and manpower constraints, all of which directly 
impact the overall reliability and availability of data generated by that system.   
 
These last three descriptive attributes are also related to the most critical aspect of health surveillance system 
evaluations; the assessment of the system’s performance in the field.  A perfectly designed system is still a failure 
if there are extenuating circumstances and/or issues that prevents its use.  There are many factors that come into play 
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when evaluating a system’s performance.  Simplicity refers to the structure of the system and its ease of operation; 
specific categories include methods of data collection (number and type of reporting sources), level of integration 
with other systems, methods for data analysis and data dissemination, time required to maintain and update the 
system, and human resource/staffing requirements.  Overly complicated systems may be prone to system failures or 
may have extremely high human resource requirements.  Flexibility is important as it represents the ability of a 
system to accommodate changing query requests and adapt and evolve to meet new requirements.  These two factors 
(simplicity and flexibility) contribute to the overall acceptability of the system, or the willingness of the user (data 
entry through analyst) to actually use the system.   
 
In terms of the end-user or analysts, there are several factors that can be used to assess a system’s performance.  
Utility refers to the level of usefulness of the retrieved data; the appropriateness of the estimators provided, and the 
ability to accurately detect disease trends.  In order to generate useful information, the system should be able to 
stratify the data temporally, spatially and categorically.  In addition, access to accurate and representative 
denominator data (from the same source, comparable across categories, representative over time) is important.  
Timeliness of the information refers to the time between the occurrence of the health related event and its 
appearance in a functional surveillance system.  Both the lag time between the detection of the medical event and 
the time required to generate a system record impacts a system’s timeliness.   
 
The topic of data quality is rather complicated and depends quite a bit on the purpose of the surveillance activity.  
There are many subcategories that may be used to evaluate a system’s data quality.  Mode of data entry (automated 
vs. manual) impacts correctness of the data, and in combination with an understanding of the completeness and 
validity of the records contributes to the overall accuracy of the data.  Case definition and diagnostic criteria impact 
the sensitivity and specificity of the results, whereas an understanding of how the data was collected (population 
sampled, active vs. passive surveillance, voluntary vs. directed participation) pertains more to the 
representativeness of the reported results.   
 
A comparative review of the performance of the five military human medical data systems most commonly used for 
public health surveillance was conducted in a separate study (Chapter 4).  The remainder of this chapter will apply 
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the terms and definitions discussed above to a broad overview of existing global zoonotic disease programs (Section 
I), then a detailed description of the five human medical data systems most commonly used for public health 
surveillance in the military  (Section II).  The goal of this review is to create a resource for military leaders and 
public health officials to use when determining which data system is best suited for certain tasks or analyses.   
 
Section I:  US and Global Data Systems Used in Public Health Surveillance  
National and Global Public Health Surveillance 
 
Early detection is essential to the control of emerging, reemerging, and novel infectious disease, whether naturally 
occurring or intentionally introduced (4).  Containing the spread of such diseases in a deeply interconnected world 
requires active vigilance for changes in disease trends that are the cornerstone of public health surveillance.   
Most developed countries have the ability to detect and diagnose human, animal, and plant disease, but many 
developing countries- where the majority of the global population resides- do not have the resources or 
infrastructure to support such activities (4).  A major challenge to global disease surveillance and detection is the 
disparity in existing local and regional surveillance capabilities.  These inequalities may range from differences in 
the ability to make diagnoses at the patient level to differences in reporting, data capture methods, and protocols.  
This section briefly reviews the data systems used in public health surveillance by four different organizations; three 
at a global level and one nationally.  Although each of the organizations has a unique mission, much can be learned 
by studying their overall approach to surveillance.   
 
The aim of this section is to apply knowledge of existing public health surveillance systems to the betterment of 








The list of data systems reviewed in this section are not meant to be all inclusive, rather it was limited to the data 
systems used by some of the best known international and national public health organizations:  The World Health 
Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE), and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  In order to be included in the review, 
information on each organization’s data systems had to be freely available for review on public domains.    
 
Descriptions of each public health surveillance system were compiled using public domain material from 
organizational websites and when available pertinent documents from the literature.  The limitations of this 
approach resulted in gaps in information at times, most notably in details pertaining to data entry, quality assurance, 
and data analysis.   
 
GHO:  WHO’s Data and Statistics Portal 
 
I.   Background 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the United 
Nations (UN) system which currently includes 194 Member States (1).   It is responsible for providing leadership on 
global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based 
policy options, providing technical support to countries, and monitoring and assessing health trends.  The WHO has 
six main global objectives which they refer to as agenda points: 1) promoting health development, 2) fostering 
health security,  4) harnessing research, information and evidence, 5) enhancing partnerships with UN agencies and 
other international organizations, donors, civil society and the private sector, and 6) improving health performance 




II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
The Global Health Observatory (GHO) is the WHO's portal to health-related statistics from around the world (5). 
The aim of the GHO portal is to provide easy access to country data and statistics with a focus on comparable 
estimates; enabling the WHO to analyze and monitor global, regional, and country trends.  The GHO database 
provides access to an interactive repository of health statistics. Users are able to display data for selected indicators 




A.  Operating Case Definitions 
 
The data within the GHO support global health priorities such as the health-related Millennium Development Goals, 
mortality and burden of disease, health systems, environmental health, non-communicable diseases, infectious 
diseases, health equity and violence and injuries (5). The system is based on “indicators” that are not only relevant to 
global public health, but are also readily available, of good data quality, and able to produce reliable and comparable 
health estimates across member states (6).  Taken together, these indicators provide a comprehensive summary of 
the current status of national health and health systems in the following nine areas: life expectancy and mortality, 
cause-specific mortality and morbidity, selected infectious diseases, health service coverage, risk factors, health 
systems, health expenditure, health inequities, demographic and socioeconomic statistics (5). 
 
B.  Target Population  
 
The data in the GHO is limited to the 194 Member States (5).  Estimates based on this data may be used in 
discussion of global health issues, but are not intended to be the definitive representation of global health.  Also, 
they should not be regarded as the nationally endorsed statistics for these Member States, which may use alternative 




C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems  
 
The WHO Department of Health Statistics and Information Systems compiles reports using publications and 
databases produced and maintained by WHO technical programs and regional offices (7).   A number of 
demographic and socioeconomic statistics are also derived from databases maintained by a range of other 
organizations including:  the United Nations International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank (7).   
 
D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
Country data may differ in terms of definitions, data-collection methods, population coverage and estimation 
methods used.  Estimates from GHO come from the Indicator and Measurement Registry (IMR) (6).  The IMR is a 
central source of indicator and measurement definitions (text and computer-readable), metadata, and translations.  It 
also ensures consistency across statistical domains, promotes interoperability of indicator exchange formats, 
provides internet access to indicator definitions, and incorporates other appropriate international standards required 
to support the compilation of metadata (6).  Ideally data comes from the national level; the IMR includes 31 data 
source codes ranging from civil registries and government statistics to population-based surveys and health 
professional education institution reports.  WHO defined data categories for health indicators and measurements 
include demographics, health equity monitor, health service coverage, health systems resources, morbidity, 
mortality, risk factors, and socioeconomics.  Data types may include categorical, count, financial, percent, rate, ratio, 
score, and statistics (6). 
 
The estimates from GHO are derived from multiple sources, depending on each indicator and on the availability and 
quality of data (5, 6).  In many countries, statistical and health information systems are weak and the underlying 
empirical data may not be available or may be of poor quality.  The use of standardized categories and methods 
enhances the cross-national comparability of the data, but may also lead to some distortion of estimates.  For the 
sake of the reports generated by the WHO, statistical modelling and other techniques are used in an attempt to fill 
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data gaps; all estimates are cleared only following consultation with Member States.  However, the estimates should 
not be regarded as the nationally endorsed statistics which may have been derived using alternative methodologies 
(6, 7). 
 
E.  Data Analysis  
 
The data in GHO are arranged in a format that is intended to provide easy access to country data and statistics with a 
focus on comparable estimates to facilitate the monitoring of spatial trends (5).  The GHO has “theme pages” that 
cover global health priorities such as the health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), mortality and 
burden of disease, health systems, environmental health, non-communicable diseases, infectious diseases, health 
equity and violence and injuries (1, 6).  The theme pages present: highlights showing the global situation and trends 
using regularly updated core indicators; data views customized for each theme, including country profiles and a map 
gallery; publications relevant to the theme; and links to relevant web pages within WHO and elsewhere (1,5,6). The 
GHO country data includes all country statistics and health profiles that are available within WHO (5, 6). 
 
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
The GHO database provides access to an interactive repository of health statistics (5). Users are able to display data 
for selected indicators, health topics, countries and regions, and download customized tables in Excel format.   In 
addition, the GHO issues analytical reports on priority health issues (5) 
 
User Generated Reports 
 
The GHO database is freely accessible to anyone with internet access (5).  User-generated reports are pull-down 
driven and may be searched by topic, country, or indicator (6).   Report properties may include data type and unit of 
measure, data sources, and method of measurement, estimation, or aggregation (potential for disaggregation).  There 
are also free text fields in the GHO generated reports where analysts can discuss the expected frequency of data 
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dissemination and collection, limitations of the presented data, and make recommendations for external links or 
points of contact (6).   
 
World Health Statistics  
 
The World Health Statistics annual publication, compiles statistics for key health indicators monitored by the WHO 
(7). The analytical report addresses cross‐cutting topics such as women and health and a summary of the progress 
made towards achieving the health-related MDGs and associated targets for its 194 Member States (7). In 2013 it 
also included summaries on the topics of reducing the health gaps between the world’s most-advantaged and least-
advantaged countries, and on current trends in Official Development Assistance (ODA) for health.  Every effort has 
been made to ensure the best use of country reported data – adjusted where necessary to deal with missing values, to 
correct for known biases, and to maximize the comparability of the statistics across countries and over time (7). 
 
EMPRES:  FAO’s Emergency Prevention System 
 
I.   Background 
 
In 1943 the United States, along with forty-four other governments, committed themselves to founding a permanent 
organization focused on food and agriculture security (8).  Two years later, the first conference of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) was held establishing the FAO as a specialized United 
Nations agency (8).  Achieving food security for all is the focus of FAO's efforts; specifically, ensuring people have 
regular access to sufficient high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives (8).  In order to accomplish this, the FAO 
has three main goals 1) the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition, 2) the elimination of poverty and 
the driving forward of economic and social progress for all and, 3) the sustainable management and utilization of 
natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources for the benefit of present and future 
generations (8, 9).  The organization’s specific objectives are to help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and 
malnutrition; make agriculture, forestry and fisheries more productive and sustainable; reduce rural poverty; enable 
inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems; and increase the resilience of livelihoods to disasters (8).  The 
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FAO believes that a key component of fighting hunger, malnutrition, and poverty is protection against animal and 
plant diseases and pests, and food safety threats (8,9). 
The FAO Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES) has the mandate to address prevention and early warning 
across the entire food chain (9). This is done through the following three systems: EMPRES Animal, EMPRES 
Plant Protection, and EMPRES Food Safety (9, 10).  The remainder of this discussion will only pertain to 
EMPRES’s utility in Animal Health; therefore for the remainder of the manuscript the use of the term EMPRES 
pertains to the EMPRES Global Animal Disease Information System.    
 
II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
EMPRES Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i) is a web-based application that aims to clarify 
animal disease events internationally by facilitating the organization of, and access to regional and global animal 
disease information for veterinary services worldwide (9). The purpose of EMPRES-i is to capture and consolidate 
timely and reliable disease information in order to enhance early warning and response to transboundary and high 
impact animal diseases, including emergent zoonoses.  The data in EMPRES-i are utilized to support prevention 




A. Operating Case Definitions 
 
The extreme diversity among the sources (from non-medical media sources to diagnostic reference laboratories), 
prohibits the application of strict operating case definitions.  Instead, the system offers a highly sensitive (but less 





B.  Target Population  
 
The EMPRES-i aims to represent global data on emerging zoonotic and transboundary animal disease.  The data 
collected in the system can be linked to the specific data source and location of the disease event, and therefore can 
be utilized locally or globally. 
 
C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems  
 
The EMPRES-i is an internet platform that facilitates the sharing of animal health data through the use of a secured 
internet-based database (using Oracle) (9, 10).  Data sources include both official and unofficial sources of 
information (9, 10).  Sources include country or regional project reports, filed mission reports, partner Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), cooperating institutions, government Ministries of Agriculture and Health, 
FAO in country representations or other United Nations parties, public domains, the media and web-based health 
surveillance systems (10, 11).  Users from these divers sources are granted differential access (guest, manager, 
administrator) with varying levels of privileges (view, edit, analyze) (11).   
 
D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
Data is added to EMPRES-i by designated users for selected data sources dependent on user access and privilege 
levels (10).  FAO officials use both official and unofficial sources such as in-country assistance projects and 
personal contacts with NGOs and other institutions in order to verify data (10).  The data in EMPRES-i is intended 
to enhance early warning efforts, and as such is intended to be highly sensitive.  Users can specifically query the 
database for details on disease status (confirmed or not), diagnostic criteria used, and may even contact public health 







E.  Data Analysis  
 
EMPRES-i provides up-to-date information on the global animal disease distribution and current threats at the 
national, regional and global level. Users can navigate through the system to perform specific searches of diseases or 
outbreaks by locality, period, or disease (see data dissemination and reporting options below). 
 
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
Depending on user’s assigned privileges, different levels of data details and confidentiality may be accessed.  In 
addition to disease data, EMPRES-i provides access to publications, manuals, and other resources such as details of 
chief veterinary officers (CVOs) and FAO/OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) reference laboratories (8, 9, 
10).  The system is constantly undergoing improvements; currently the public can access the following features: 
 
Early Warning Messages 
 
Consolidated information in EMPRES-i is used to generate and disseminate early warning messages (9, 10).  
 
Disease Event Database 
 
Under the disease event tab of the EMPRES-i website, users can access and retrieve information on wild or domestic 
animal disease outbreaks/cases throughout the world according to criteria defined by the user (10).  Details include, 
but are not limited to disease (status, serotype), date (observed and reported), animal data (species, number of cases, 
number at risk, deaths, destroyed, slaughtered), laboratory (disease tested, test performed, results, date, reference 
laboratory), location (region, latitude/longitude), source (media, agency, etc.) (10). Searches can include both 
current and historical disease data.  The data can be exported to PDF, CSV, or Excel formats for further analysis by 





Advanced Search/Mapping/Graphing Tools 
 
EMPRES-i can be used to create graphical representations of specific outbreaks/cases by time or by location (9, 10).  
Maps can be tailored to include layers such as livestock populations, biophysical features, socioeconomics, animal 




The ‘My EMPRES-i’ tab enables users to log in and access a personalized page designed by the user (10).  Display 
filters include, but are not limited to:  disease, period, and geographical region of interest (10). Users can subscribe 
to various newsletters and bulletins through this tab as well. 
 
WAHIS: OIE’s Web Interface for Animal Health Data 
 
I.   Background 
 
The need to fight animal diseases at global level was formally identified in 1924 and led to the creation of the Office 
International des Epizooties (OIE) (12).  In May 1994 the World Assembly of Delegates of the OIE requested the 
Foot and Mouth Disease and Other Epizootics Commission (now called the Scientific Commission for Animal 
Diseases) to develop a procedure for the official recognition by the OIE of the foot and mouth disease free status of 
Member Countries (12). The procedure has since been expanded to include rinderpest, contagious bovine 
pleuropneumonia and bovine spongiform encephalopathy. In 1998, the official agreement between the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the OIE further confirmed the OIE’s mandate to recognize disease and pest-free areas for 
trade purposes (12). By acquiring and maintaining its official status, a country demonstrates transparency, thereby 
gaining the trust of its trade partners, neighboring countries and the international community as a whole. In May 




The OIE is the intergovernmental organization responsible for improving animal health worldwide and is recognized 
as a reference organization by the World Trade Organization (WTO) (12).  The OIE has six stated objectives:  1) 
ensure transparency in the global animal disease situation, 2) collect, analyze and disseminate veterinary scientific 
information, 3) encourage international solidarity in the control of animal diseases, 4) safeguard world trade by 
publishing health standards for international trade in animals and animal products, 5) improve the legal framework 
and resources of national Veterinary Services, and 6) provide a better guarantee of food of animal origin and 
promote animal welfare through a science-based approach (12). 
 
II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives (WAHIS) 
 
The World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) is the internet-based system that the OIE uses to collect 
and publish their animal disease data (12).  The purpose of the system is to support transparency in the global animal 
disease situation by providing timely data sharing with the international community. The system consists of two 
components:  an early warning system to inform the international community, by means of “alert messages”, of 
relevant epidemiological events that occurred in OIE Member Countries, and a monitoring system that tracks OIE 
listed diseases (presence or absence) over time (12, 13).  In addition, WAHIS plays a critical role in almost all of the 
stated OIE objectives, specifically those pertaining to data collection, analysis, and dissemination.  Member 
Countries that conform to the obligations of the OIE have the trust of its trade partners, neighboring countries and 




A. Operating Case Definitions 
 
The diseases monitored in the WAHIS are limited to those included on the OIE list of notifiable terrestrial and 
aquatic animal diseases.  The list was generated to support Member Countries' efforts to prevent the transboundary 
spread of important animal diseases, including zoonoses, through transparent and consistent reporting (12, 13).  The 
list is reviewed annually.  The OIE - Terrestrial Animal Health Code provides Member Countries with guidelines for 
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disease detection.  The document also details the requirements for notification (through WAHIS) or, if not possible, 
by fax or e-mail) and discusses methods of prevention and control (13). 
 
B.  Target Population  
 
The target population of the OIE is the international community as a whole; however, the data captured in WAHIS 
only represents animal disease data from Member Countries.  In 2013 the OIE had a total of 178 Member Countries 
and maintains permanent relations with 45 other international and regional organizations and has Regional and sub-
regional Offices on every continent (12).   
 
C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems  
 
One of the formal obligations of OIE Member Countries is the submission of information on the relevant animal 
disease situation – including on zoonoses present in their territory - in the most timely and transparent way.  The 
World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) is the internet-based computer system used by Member 
Countries to submit the animal disease data (12).  Access to this secure site is only available to authorized users, 
namely the Delegates of OIE Member Countries and their authorized representatives (12).  The OIE also uses the 
system to disseminate the information to other countries, permitting affected regions to implement necessary 
preventive actions. Information is sent out immediately or periodically depending on the seriousness of the disease. 
This objective applies to disease occurrences both naturally occurring and deliberately caused.  
 
D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
Member Countries submit animal health data through WAHIS to the OIE where it is verified by OIE officials.  Once 






Epidemiological Event Data 
 
Whenever an important epidemiological event occurs in a Member Country, the Member Country must inform the 
OIE by sending an Immediate Notification which includes the reason for the notification, the name of the disease, 
the affected species, the geographical area affected, the control measures applied and any laboratory tests carried out 
or in progress (12).  Once they have been received, verified and validated by the OIE, the immediate notifications 
are published in the OIE's three official working languages (English, French and Spanish) under the heading 
“Alerts” and sent to everyone on the OIE-Info Distribution List (12). This list is open to Member Country Delegates, 
the OIE Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centers, and international and regional organizations.  In 
addition, institutions and individuals may directly receive the information if they apply for a subscription. Members 
must then continue to send weekly Follow-up Reports so that the event can be monitored as it evolves (12, 13). In all 
cases, the country must submit a final report to notify that the event has been resolved or that the disease has become 
endemic. In both cases, the country will continue to submit information in its biannual reports if the disease is on the 
OIE List (12). 
 
Recurring Report Submission 
 
Biannual Reports provide information on the presence or absence of diseases on the OIE List and the prevention and 
control measures applied. For diseases reported as being present in a country/territory during a given six-month 
period, the country/territory in question must provide quantitative data on the number of outbreaks, susceptible 
animals, cases, deaths, animals destroyed and animals vaccinated (12, 13). For diseases that are present and are 
notifiable in the country, the OIE recommends that countries provide quantitative data by month and by first 
administrative division. Countries/territories that so wish can enter their data in WAHIS each month during a given 
six-month period (i.e. without waiting until the end of the six-month period), thereby providing the international 
community with the most recent information on the diseases that are present and which Member Countries consider 
are the most important.  The selection of which option will depend on the national surveillance and monitoring 
systems in the country/territory in question and the type of information generated by these systems. The two 
biannual reports of a given year are combined as part of the Annual Report for OIE-listed diseases (12, 13).  
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E.  Data Analysis  
 
The WAHIS is a secured web site; access is restricted to authorized users.  The information in WAHIS is limited to 
what is submitted by Member Countries and includes immediate notification and follow-up reports, six-monthly 
reports and annual reports.  The system consists of an early warning system to inform the international community, 
by means of “alert messages”, of relevant epidemiological events that occurred in OIE Member Countries and a 
monitoring system in order to monitor OIE Listed diseases (presence or absence) over time.  In addition, according 
to the website, “the system not only provides countries with a simpler and quicker method of sending notifications 
and reports on disease information, but also allows them to utilize analysis capabilities to produce essential and 
useful information without delays.”  The details of these analytical capabilities were not accessible.  
 
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
The OIE works to make the animal disease data (to include diseases transmissible to humans and intentional 
introduction of pathogens) it receives from its Member Countries available in real-time.  Multiple dissemination and 





The World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) is only accessible to authorized users, namely Delegates of 
OIE Member Countries and their authorized representatives.  Members receive “alert messages” when relevant 




The World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) Interface provides public access to all data held within 
OIE's new World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS). The data in WAHID is compiled into three main 
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categories:  1) disease information by country/territory, 2) overall disease information, and 3) control measures.  It is 
the cornerstone in OIE efforts to improve the transparency, efficiency and speed with which animal health 
information is disseminated throughout the world (12). 
 
World Animal Health: OIE Publication 
 
In cooperation with the WHO and the FAO, OIE Member Countries are asked once a year to complete their annual 
report with information on non OIE-listed diseases.  In this report they are asked to specifically discuss the impact of 
any zoonoses on humans and animal populations.  Member countries are encouraged to provide information from 
their national reference laboratories, including diagnostic tests as well as vaccine data including manufacturers and 
vaccine production. All of the information is then gathered into the OIE World Animal Health publication (12). 
 
NAHRS:  USDA APHIS’s Animal Health Reporting System 
 
I.   Background 
 
The foundation for the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) was built in 1883 when the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) established the Department’s first regulatory program, the Veterinary 
Division (14).  Through a multitude of reorganizations in response to expanding missions, the USDA consolidated 
the previously independent animal and plant health bureaus in 1972, formally establishing the APHIS (14).  
 
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is a multi-faceted agency with a broad mission that includes 
protecting and promoting U.S. agricultural health, regulating genetically engineered organisms, administering the 
Animal Welfare Act and carrying out wildlife damage management activities (14). These efforts support the overall 
mission of the USDA, which is to protect and promote food, agriculture, natural resources and related issues. In the 
event that a pest or disease of concern is detected, APHIS implements emergency protocols and partners with 
affected States to quickly manage or eradicate the outbreak (14). This aggressive approach has enabled APHIS to 
successfully prevent and respond to potential pest and disease threats to U.S. agriculture (14). 
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II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
The National Animal Health Reporting System (NAHRS) was designed to collect data from chief animal health 
officials from each state on the presence of confirmed OIE listed diseases in the United States (15).  Although it is 
managed by the USDA APHIS (Veterinary Services Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health National 
Surveillance Unit), it is a result of the joint efforts of the United States Animal Health Association (USAHA), 
American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians (AAVLD), and USDA-APHIS (14, 15).  The 
specific objectives of NAHRS are:  1)  demonstrate the integrated and transparent nature of disease surveillance and 
reporting in the United States and ultimately help protect the global market share of America's animals and animal 
products sold, 2) provide the primary source of information used in the completion of OIE reports by USDA-





A. Operating Case Definitions 
 
The animal diseases monitored in NAHRS are limited to those on the OIE-reportable disease list including diseases 
for cattle, small ruminants, horses, swine, poultry, and aquaculture; it does not include OIE-reportable diseases for 
amphibians, bees, lagomorphs, and diseases OIE categorizes as ‘other' (e.g., camelpox and leishmaniasis) (15). The 
NAHRS reportable disease list is modified to keep up with changes to the OIE list (at the beginning of the next 
calendar year); only confirmed occurrences of NAHRS reportable diseases are to be reported (14).   Defined 
laboratory testing standards as well as the specific reporting criteria are detailed in the NAHRS Operation Manual 
and Uniform Methods & Rules; these criteria are considered minimum guidelines (14).  The NAHRS Steering 
Committee and National Surveillance Unit are developing a U.S. National List of Reportable Diseases (NLRAD) 





B.  Target Population  
 
The NAHRS aims to collect data on reportable animal diseases for all cattle, small ruminants, horses, swine, poultry, 
and aquaculture in the United States (16).  Participation in NAHRS reporting, however, is completely voluntary.  In 
federal fiscal year 2010, 48 states participated in NAHRS by providing monthly disease status reports; only Missouri 
and Louisiana did not participate (14).   
 
C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems  
 
State animal health officials collect and collate the confirmed occurrence of NAHRS reportable diseases.  After 
approval by a designated state official, the state monthly report is entered directly (manually) into the system and 
then submitted to NAHRS via the secure NAHRS online reporting system, or by fax or e-mail (14, 15). NAHRS 
reporting is coordinated by the USDA-APHIS-VS-CEAH-National Surveillance Unit (14, 15).  The NAHRS is not 
currently integrated with any other data system.   
 
D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
All reported disease data is submitted to NAHRS via an online reporting form which specifically lists the diseases of 
concern and limits the participant responses to yes (‘Y’) or no (‘N’) (14).  Participants must report on ALL listed 
diseases for livestock, poultry, and aquaculture species in their state.  A ‘yes' response indicates that at least one case 
of that particular disease was confirmed during the specific month; a “no” response indicates that, as far as state 
animal health officials are aware, no new cases of disease were confirmed in the state during the specific month. 
Confirmed occurrences of NAHRS reportable diseases are those diseases that meet NAHRS reporting criteria and/or 
are confirmed by using additional information (i.e., other testing methods or additional epidemiological information) 
(14, 15). 
 
State animal health officials determine if a case is a valid one that should be reported to NAHRS (14, 15). State 
animal health officials are encouraged to use information from as many verifiable sources as possible to complete 
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their monthly NAHRS reports. This may include information from state or university animal disease diagnostic 
laboratories, private or industry laboratories, private veterinarians, state fish or wildlife agencies, extension 
veterinarians, the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL), the National Animal Health Laboratory 
Network (NAHLN), public health agencies, and other reliable sources (14, 16). The State chief animal health 
official makes the final determination on data reported to NAHRS for their state (14). 
E.  Data Analysis  
 
The information in NAHRS is limited to disease status data (disease, present vs. free, data of last occurrence) and is 
collected for the intent of compiling the national summary-level data on disease occurrences that is provided to OIE 
(14). The USDA also uses NAHRS information in U.S. trade negotiations and to respond to inquiries or audits from 
trade partners (15). The NAHRS information is also used by the USDA-APHIS-VS-Centers for Epidemiology and 
Animal Health to provide historic information on occurrences of reportable diseases in the U.S.  
 
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
 
The primary reason for the NAHRS is to collect information to complete the biannual and annual reports that the 
U.S. is required to submit to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).  
 
Local and State Level Utilization 
 
Individual states benefit from participating in NAHRS by strengthening their internal animal health surveillance 
abilities through enhancement of disease reporting infrastructure and by using standardized disease reporting criteria 
(16). NAHRS reporting information enables states and animal industries to provide timely and accurate information 
for maintaining and developing international trade (14, 16).  Further, NAHRS reporting provides states with 
important current and historic records of occurrences of reportable diseases; this information may be used to inform 





The National Animal Health Surveillance System (NAHSS) is a network of federal, state, university, industry, 
laboratory, and other partners aimed at collaborating surveillance efforts in order to protect animal health (16).   The 
goal of the NAHSS is to integrate animal health monitoring and surveillance activities conducted by many federal 
and state government agencies into a comprehensive and coordinated system.  The information in NAHRS in one of 
the data sources the NAHSS hopes to utilize (16).  In addition the NAHSS hopes to incorporate information from 
the National Animal Health Monitoring System Reports and Information Sheets (NAHMS), National Surveillance 
Unit (NSU), and the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) (16).  
 
SCS:  USDA APHIS’s Surveillance Collaboration System 
 
I.   Background 
 
Veterinary Services is part of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).  The core services provided 
by APHIS VS include surveying animals in order to estimate prevalence of disease, investigating the health status of 
animals in order to detect disease, and applying disease control measures (14, 17).  Additional core functions include 
enforcing laws and regulations that protect animal health and commercial agriculture interests, developing policies 
and plans that support animal health efforts, informing people about animal health issues, and mobilizing and 
linking animal health service providers to identify and solve health problems (17).   
 
II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
The APHIS-VS conducts disease surveillance and monitoring for several diseases across multiple species.  Because 
of differences in existing industry standards, disease pathogenesis, and potential prevention and control measures; 
each disease is typically managed by a separate APHIS activity unit.  As a result, animal disease data has historically 
existed in several separate databases, preventing a complete understanding of disease status at a national level.  The 
Animal Health and Surveillance Management (AHSM) System is VS’s enterprise-level animal health and 
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surveillance electronic information management system which aims to manage surveillance data for numerous 
species and diseases; however, AHSM identified the need for a comprehensive and integrated animal health 
management commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) surveillance software product (17).   
 
In December 2011 the USDA APHIS VS began an initiative aimed at integrating all state level animal disease data 
into one comprehensive system; the Surveillance Collaboration System (SCS) (17, 18).  Using a commercial off-the-
shelf product (CoreOne), the purpose of the system is to provide a platform for the integration of field level 
activities related to surveillance across species (17, 18).  Specifically, the objectives of the system are 1) provide a 
repository for core animal health data and manage regulatory work, 2) increase the speed, accuracy, and efficiency 
of laboratory data through the use of Mobile Information Management (MIM) which captures specimen collection 
data as it is collected from the field, 3) track laboratory diagnostics electronically from submission through results 
reporting, 4) provide e-mail alerts of laboratory results to appropriate animal health officials, 5) support data 
analysis such as pattern recognition, spread rate, emergence of threats for animal populations, and 6)  provide 
critical data collection and support to investigations such as recording responses taken and scheduling future 




A. Operating Case Definitions 
 
The SCS serves as a central repository for animal disease data collected at the state level, to include the granularity 
and details of the actual filed report (17, 18, 19).  The system does not impose specific case definitions, but rather 
provides a standardized template for data collection (19).  The specific diagnostic modality used or control measures 
employed remain at the discretion of the operating veterinarian and animal health officials, but the system’s drop-
down menus ensure consistency of data-entry and therefore facilitates a more accurate assessment of overall disease 





B.  Target Population  
 
The aim of the SCS is to collect all data pertinent to the monitoring of animal diseases throughout the United States; 
however, utilization of the SCS at the state level is completely voluntary (18).  In an attempt to encourage its use, 
the USDA offered the software at no cost to all relevant veterinary activities throughout the United States.  Currently 
thirty-five states are using the system.   
 
C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems  
 
Data sources for SCS can be divided into two broad categories:  test charts, forms, or other documents without 
animal details and reports with animal details (19).  Examples of charts, forms, or other documents without animal 
details include herd level testing summaries, herd level vaccination summaries, and premise history summary 
reports.  A case report tracking an individual animal is an example of a test chart, form, or other document with 
animal details.  Access to SCS is granted by the USDA APHIS-VS Chief Information Officer.  There are several 
levels of access.  Listed hierarchically they are: read only, data entry, data extractor, and data manager. The data 
manager is the only one who can change data already entered.  Data is generally entered into the SCS by animal 
health officials at the state level (17, 18).  The system also has the capability to use MIM to receive near real-time 
data from the mobile devices used by animal health officials in the field (18).  In addition, the SCS system is (or 
hopes to become)  integrated with the following VS data systems:  Animal Health and Surveillance Management 
System (AHSM), Emergency Management Response System (EMRS), National Animal Health Laboratory Network 
(NAHLN), Animal Disease Traceability, National Veterinary Services Logistic System (NVLS), National 
Veterinary Services Automated Information Management System (AIMS), National Veterinary Services Laboratory 
Information Management System (NVSL-LIMS), User Fee System (UFS), and Veterinary Services Process 
Streamlining (VSPS) (17).  States that opt to employ the system are able to migrate data from their earlier systems 






D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
Data entry into the SCS is menu-driven, which helps ensure consistency and overall uniformity of the data (18, 19).  
While SCS has many drop-down windows, there are free text and numeric fields available too.  Data categories are 
dictated by the specific report being entered (19).  For example, a Herd Brucellosis Test Summary Charts includes 
premise name, identification, state, herd number, species, submission reason, submitter’s name/identification, test 
accession number, sample collection date, and total number tested.  By selecting the specific accession number one 
may further review the details of the individual animals tested.  In addition, SCS has the capability of maintaining 
scanned copies of original test charts, forms, or other documents, which permits users to further investigate the 
details of the data (18, 19).   
 
The data in the SCS is an up-to-date representation of the surveillance activities of those using the system (17, 19).  
Data may include premise visits, laboratory testing, and disease outbreak investigations (17, 19).  There are no 
externally imposed validations or quality assurance processes inherent in the SCS; the data captured is in the raw, 
user submitted form.  The advantage of this approach is the depth of the data captured; reports are not limited to 
those with positive test results or specific case definitions.  Another advantage is that a complete picture of 
surveillance efforts and activities in a state or related to a species or specific disease can be observed as a whole.  
Both of these support the aim of the SCS; to serve as a surveillance collaboration system for the purpose of disease 
monitoring, investigation and management (17, 18).    
 
E.  Data Analysis  
 
The data collected in SCS is used to describe the workflow associated with animal health surveillance within the 
United States (18).  The organizational units used to describe these workflows range from the lowest granularity 
(Task) to the highest (Service) (18).  A ‘task’ is a discrete action or piece of work such as drawing a blood sample or 
assessing a caudal fold test.  A group of tasks which achieve an objective are an ‘activity’; a tuberculosis caudal fold 
herd test includes the tasks of scheduling the test, coordinating the resources, injecting the animals with the 
tuberculin, recording the premises and animal information, assessing the response, and recording and reporting the 
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results.  An ‘activity’ is equivalent to a reportable event and is often recorded on an official form.  An ‘activity 
group’ is a set of related activities for the purposes of either evaluation or management of a place (premise or zone) 
or thing (animal group, individual animal, product, fomite, or vector) (18).  The service, activity and task workflow 
units are intended to provide the proper context for accurate interpretation of the data collected in SCS.   
 
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
The SCS software provides the infrastructure needed to operate a comprehensive and integrated animal information 
platform.  The broad functionality of the system supports the collection of data that can be used by all levels of 
animal health surveillance activities; ranging from the routine management of herd health practices to the 
investigation of an outbreak.  There are no recurring reports created or routine data disseminated directly from the 
SCS; rather, all reports are user-driven.  The data in SCS is maintained in “sessions”, individual groupings of data 
by state.  Those with access can see the data in their own state but not from other states unless they are in a multiple 
state area. Queries of SCS are drop-down menu driven and include (but are not limited to) details on premises, herds 
and animals, tests, treatments, or vaccination and other activities (18, 19).  User-defined reports and other analyses 
can be output into Microsoft Excel format, as overlays on Google Maps, or as thematic maps (14, 18, 19).   
 
To get access you must submit a form signed by your supervisor stating what kind of access you need. That goes to 
the Vet Services Chief Information Officer for final approval. Data entry people can see the data in their own state 
but not from other states unless they are in a multiple state area. There are several levels of access. Read Only, Data 
Entry, Data Extractor, and Data Manager. Those are in hierarchical order. The Data Manager is the only one who 
can change data already entered. Each state has a session of SCS so each approval is limited to a state or group 




Table 3.1:  Comparison of Key Aspects of Global  and US Data Systems Used in Public Health Surveillance  
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The information in Table 3.1 is not meant to be all inclusive, rather the review was limited to data systems used by some of the best known international and 
national public health organizations:  The World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Scientific Commission for 
Animal Disease (OIE), and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  In order to be included in the review, information on each organization’s 




Table 3.1:  Comparison of Key Aspects of Global  and US Data Systems Used in Public Health Surveillance (continued) 
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Section II:  Military Data Systems Used in Public Health Surveillance 
Public Health Surveillance in the Military 
 
Prior to the Civil War, medical care in the military was provided mainly by regimental surgeon and surgeons mates 
(20).  Although there were attempts to establish a centralized medical system, primitive communication and 
transportation efforts made this difficult (21).  In World War I, the U.S. Army Medical Department expanded and 
developed greater organization and structure (20).  Medical care that began on the battlefield was successfully 
transferred to facilities of greater medical capabilities away from the front.  After World War II, the Executive 
Branch of the U.S. Government underwent significant reorganization (20, 21).  The separate Department of War and 
Department of the Navy were re-aligned under a single Department of Defense (DoD) (20, 21).  There were 
significant growing pains under this reorganization as both the Army and the Navy had independently developed 
their own medical systems.  In addition, the Air Force, part of the Army until 1947, also had its own medical system 
(21). 
 
Post-Cold War downsizing of the U.S. military, with a simultaneous increase in geographically dispersed overseas 
operations forced the military to focus on maximizing the health, fitness, and medical preparedness of the forces 
being deployed (22).   This shift in focus from reactionary medicine to preventive medicine was the corner stone of 
the post-Cold War military medical support strategy (22).  Following the Persian Gulf War there were a number of 
medical complaints from Gulf war veterans, but investigation into potential causes was hindered because relevant 
records were often inaccessible or nonexistent, those that were accessible lacked uniformity and accuracy, and those 
that were uniform and accurate were generally not automated, making investigation and analysis cumbersome.  
These short-comings made it evident that “deployment medical surveillance” needed to become a DoD priority (22). 
 
According to Department of Defense Directive 6490.20E (2), public health surveillance in the military shall be 
conducted to enable early intervention and control strategies to prevent adverse effects on mission accomplishment 
and to provide information for shaping commanders’ decision making.  The primary objectives of these systems in 
the military are timely and proficient public health response to medical events that ultimately reduce morbidity and 
mortality, estimation of the distribution, trends, and risks associated with significant medical events, and the 
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development and assessment of policy and resource allocation for the prevention and control of communicable 






Descriptions of each medical data systems were compiled utilizing a standardized outline adapted from the CDC 
Guidelines for Evaluating a Public Health Surveillance System (Appendix A-3).  Information on each system was 
collected through a combination of pertinent literature reviews, online user training modules, as well as interviews 
with subject matter experts or end users of each system.  When authorized, live demonstrations of how to use the 
system were conducted.  All information was then entered into the standardized outline and forwarded back to the 
subject matter experts for content review, clarification, and eventual approval.   
 
MDR:  Military Health System Data Repository 
 
I.   Background 
 
In the DoD, the Military Health System (MHS) is the framework for global health information exchange (23). 
Within the MHS are the DoD global health information network and common services utilities, some of which 
include medical, personnel, deployment, and financial data from all branches of military service (24).  Specific 
hospital and personnel data is then further consolidated into the MHS Data Repository (MDR) (25).  The MDR 
serves as the central repository for medical data such as outpatient visits, inpatient admissions, and laboratory orders 
(and some results) (25).  It also compiles population and personnel data for Service members, dependents, retirees, 
and other beneficiaries (25). Lastly, the MDR captures financial (claims) data (25).  This central repository of data 
can be used as an electronic data stream for disease surveillance purposes.  Several of the military human disease 




II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
The purpose of the MDR is to serve as the centralized data repository for the Department of Defense’s MHS (25).   
The justification for the system is its utility in health related financial and administrative management.  As the single 
point for health data integration, data quality edits, online data storage and healthcare data transfers, the MDR 
captures and validates data from more than 260 DoD health data networks worldwide giving it the ability to quantify 
resource needs and associated costs (23, 25).  The system has four main objectives 1) preserve historical “raw” data 
by type and by year, 2) normalize and process all data types against specific business rules, 3) assure controlled 
access to privacy protected data, and 4) supply interagency data sharing with the Department of Veterans Affairs 




A.  Operating Case Definitions 
 
Cases in the MDR may be identified using International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes entered in the 
medical record (25, 26).  Because each time an ICD code is associated with a record it has the potential to be 
counted as a case, it is very important for analysts to define inclusion criteria when conducting system queries based 
on these codes.  Examples of inclusion criteria are incidence rules (i.e. a person can be considered a case once in 
their lifetime) and health encounter criteria (outpatient vs. inpatient, number of visits, time between visits) (26).  The 
MDR contains “raw” unedited health event data; data quality assurance is the responsibility of the individual 
conducting the query.  The system does not automatically incorporate Reportable Medical Event reports. 
  
B.  Target Population  
 
The MDR population includes Service members (SM) from all branches of Service to include active duty, 
Reserve/Guard Component (while on orders), and retirees; SM dependents (military family members) and other 
eligible beneficiaries (23, 25, 26).  Complete medical and personnel data from both military Medical Treatment 
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Facilities (MTFs) and civilian medical facilities who accept/file Tricare Managed Activities (TMA) health insurance 
claims are available for this population (23, 25, 26).  Data from Veteran Affairs hospitals is currently not available. 
    
C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems  
 
MDR serves as the central repository for the Military Health System (MHS) receiving information from more than 
260 DoD health data network systems worldwide (23, 24).  Briefly, data types include medical, population, and 
fiscal (24).    
 
The MDR is a fully integrated database with tools for accessing and managing health related data from both MTFs 
and MHS approved purchased care from civilian medical facilities; hereafter referred to as civilian medical facilities 
(23, 25).  In-patient data is updated monthly from Standard In-patient Data Record & Tricare Encounter Data/Health 
Care Service Record non-institutional files (SIDR & TED/HCSRI).  Out-patient (ambulatory) data is updated daily 
to monthly from Comprehensive Ambulatory/Professional Encounter Record & Tricare Encounter Data/Health Care 
Service Record non-institutional files (CAPER & TED/HCSRI) (23, 25, 26).  Data from ancillary laboratory and 
radiology files come from Composite Health Care System (CHCS) on a monthly basis (25, 26).  The MDR does not 
receive Reportable Medical Events Reports (26).   
    
Population data in the MDR comes from the Defense Eligibility Enrollment Records System (DEERS), allowing it 
to capture complete personnel records for anyone eligible to receive medical care in the military system (MTFs and 
civilian medical facilities), to include full denominator data for active duty, Reserve/Guard Component (while on 
orders), retirees, SM dependents (military family members) and other eligible beneficiaries (24, 25, 26).   
 
D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
The Defense Health Services Systems (DHSS) manages the MDR (23).  All data input for the MDR is automated; as 
the central repository for the MHS there is an extensive list of external interfaces (24, 25).  The data in the MDR is 
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cleaned by the DHSS, but, as with any passive surveillance system there is still the potential for incomplete records 
or inconsistent entries (25, 26).   
 
E.  Data Analysis  
 
The data in the MDR are extracted by experienced SAS programmers for the production of user-friendly formats 
such as frequencies, counts, and person-years (25, 26).  Because the MDR has complete denominator data for 
military beneficiaries, it is able to produce estimates of disease rates for the entire military population. Population 
query filters are extensive to include, but can incorporate gender, age, race, grade, marital status, service, 
occupation, location, and calendar year (25, 26).  In addition medical data source and method of diagnostic 
validation can be specified.  All records are maintained for person, place, and time (25, 26).  The data are routinely 
used to analyze population-based morbidity, conduct risk assessments, determine emerging threats, and monitor the 
effects of health policy (25, 26).  In addition, the data are used in health care management such as business case 
studies, inventory/supply management, and reimbursements justifications (23). 
      
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
MDR Ad Hoc Queries  
 
The DHSS issues MDR accounts to qualified individuals.  Applicants are limited to those with Common Access 
Card (CAC) identification cards and are therefore limited to active-duty military personnel, selected Reserve 
personnel, DoD civilian employees, and eligible contractor personnel (25).  Access is password protected with 
extensive physical and electronic security measures.  Because of the nature of the data contained in the MDR, access 
is further restricted to those with SAS programming expertise and functionality (25).  Local protocols dictate query 
processes, information accessed and information management storage.  Any data requests generating more than 
10,000 person level records containing Protected Health Information/Personally Identifiable Information (PHI/PII) 
must be requested directly through the DHSS and cannot be obtained through ad hoc queries.  The DHSS fulfills the 
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data requests by compiling and shipping the data on a disc (26).  The MDR itself does not generate any recurring 
reports. 
 
MDR Queries through DHSS 
 
Ad hoc requests can be submitted by system end users or directly to the DHSS; submission requirements, request 
channels, and accessibility limitations are subject to DHSS protocol.  Any data requests generating more than 10,000 
records will be compiled and shipped from the DHSS on a disc (26).  In these instances only final results are 
downloaded which eliminates the ability of the analyst to perform quality assurance or debugging checks without 




The Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) is a user friendly interface where end-
users can extract data through menu-based queries and create data outputs (27, 28).  Access is password protected 
and limited to those with CAC ID cards; physical and electronic security measures are the same as with MDR.  The 
system merges several stand-alone applications into a single platform designed for the purpose of improved business 
intelligence reporting (27, 28).  The ad-hoc query tool enables proactive healthcare management and trend analysis 
for MHS operations worldwide.  It permits the monitoring of patients’ use of services, runs patient and provider 
profiling studies, identifies opportunities to transfer health care to and from military facilities, and delivers summary 
and detailed financial data (27, 28).  In addition, it has the capability of providing summary and detailed clinical data 
on diseases specified by condition (ICD code), health related event (in-patient, out-patient, laboratory order), and 
population (26, 27, 28).  Population filters are the same as the MDR (26, 27, 28).  Also like the MDR, the M2 





Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) 
 
I.   Background 
 
In 1986, the Army established a data center to support its HIV-related screening, clinical care, and epidemiological 
research programs. In 1993, the system transitioned to the Army Medical Surveillance System, expanding its scope 
to include all illnesses and injuries of public health or military operational importance.  In 1997, the Army Medical 
Surveillance System transitioned to the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS), and the Army Medical 
Surveillance Activity (AMSA) was assigned responsibility for its operation (22).  The Deputy Secretary of Defense 
established the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC) in 2008, by partnering AMSA,  
the DoD Global Emerging Infectious Disease Surveillance and Response System (DoD-GEIS), and the 
Global Health Surveillance Activity (29).  Today, the AFHSC has the responsibility for comprehensive health 
surveillance for the DoD, which includes the monitoring and maintaining of the information in DMSS. 
 
II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
The purpose of DMSS is to serve as the central repository of medical surveillance data for the U.S. Armed Forces in 
support of population-based surveillance (22).  The justification for the system is to maximize health, fitness, and 
medical preparedness of forces being deployed and to minimize disease and injury risks during deployments.  The 
system has three main objectives 1) create longitudinal records on Service members (SMs) by documenting their 
military and medical experiences throughout their military careers, 2) document statuses of and changes in 
demographic and military characteristics of the SM population, and 3) permit the timely assessment of the morbidity 
experiences of SMs with shared characteristics, who were in specific locations, or had similar experiences on 







A.  Operating Case Definition 
Cases in DMSS are identified using ICD codes, based on either ICD codes entered in a medical records or the 
existence of a Reportable Medical Event (RME) report (30, 31).  Because each time an ICD code is associated with 
a record or RME report it has the potential to be counted as a case, it is very important to specify inclusion criteria 
when requesting case count data.  Examples of inclusion criteria are incidence rules (i.e. a person can be considered 
a case once in their lifetime) and health encounter criteria (outpatient vs. inpatient, number of visits, time between 
visits).  If the requester does not provide specific inclusion guidelines, AFHSC uses the Tri-Service Reportable 
Event Guidelines and Case Definitions or their own published case definitions (30, 31).  Records that are deemed 
invalid via DMSS’s “edit check” program process are excluded from entry into the DMSS database.   
  
B.  Target Population 
 
The target population for DMSS is Service members from all branches of service to include active duty, Reserve 
Component (while on orders), deployed contractors, and eligible retirees (22, 32).  Complete medical and personnel 
data from both military MTFs and civilian-TMAs are available for this population; denominator data comes from 
the number of SM records associated with each installation (22, 31).  The system also captures data for dependents 
(military family members) and other eligible beneficiaries, however it is limited to the medical data associated with 
health encounters and lacks the corresponding denominator data or personnel details for this population (31). Data 
from the Veteran Affairs hospitals or from non-deployed contractors is not available. 
 
C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems 
 
DMSS contains data relevant to more than 7 million individuals who have served in the armed forces since 1990 




The medical data from both MTFs and civilian-TMA facilities comes from the MDR and includes both in-patient 
and out-patient records (22, 31, 32).  Although not yet routinely used, the DMSS has had direct access to the 
laboratory data (HL7) in the MDR since 2010 (31).  The DMSS also receives RMEs from all branches of service 
(22, 31, 32).   
 
Population data in the DMSS comes from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) which includes complete 
personnel records documenting the entire “military experience” of the Service member (22).  Information includes 
demographic data, occupational history, training records, and assignment history.  In addition, DMSS incorporates 
data from the Armed Forces Medical Examiners System (AFMES) which provides casualty data for Service 
members that are deceased.  The combined data from these two systems allow DMSS to have complete records for 
all Service members from date of entry through career completion.   
 
Deployment data in DMSS is primarily in the form of deployment rosters (DMDC) and pre and post deployment 
health assessments Medical Protection System/Remote Data Entry System (MEDPROS/RIDES) (22, 31).  Disease 
and non-battle injury data from the Theater Medical Data Store (TMDS) does not feed directly into DMSS’s case 
count data, but rather must be queried separately and then is only available as aggregate data (31).   
 
The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center has operational oversight of both DMSS and the Department of 
Defense Serum Repository (DoDSR) (22, 32).  Since 1989, sera remaining after routine HIV-1 antibody testing and 
sera collected before and after major deployments have been maintained at the DoDSR for each Service member 
(22, 32).  As of this writing, DoDSR currently houses over 50 million specimens, and continues to grow by 
approximately 2.3 million specimens per year (32).  Specimens contained in the DoDSR are available to researchers 
and other investigators within the Department of Defense for the purposes of conducting militarily relevant 





D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
The data in DMSS is managed by the AFHSC.  All data input for DMSS is automated; external interfaces include, 
but are not limited to those mentioned above (MDR, DMDC, and AFMES).  DMSS does not have the capability to 
edit any of the data directly, but does have “edit check” programs in place to ensure data quality before it becomes 
integrated into the system.  Such checks include completeness (ensure all essential fields are filled in), consistency 
(birthdates remain the same for different entries), and accuracy (compliance with specified formats and within 
acceptable ranges) (31).  After processing, errors may still remain, including differential diagnoses ICD codes that 
get counted as cases or vaccinations that are counted as disease because of incorrect disease designation selection in 
the electronic medical record.  These errors, however, are not unique to DMSS, and are found in all surveillance 
systems based on ICD codes. 
 
E.  Data Analysis 
 
The data in DMSS are in table format (SQL); SAS is used to access, collect, and analyze the data requested and can 
produce frequencies, counts, person-years, rates, and various charts.  Denominator data exists, but does not include 
beneficiary data (complete denominator data exists for DMED, see below).  Population queries can include variables 
such as gender, age, race, marital status, service, occupation, location, and calendar year (31).  In addition medical 
data source can be specified.  Complete longitudinal records are created for all Service Members (22, 31).  Examples 
of historical studies that have been conducted with DMSS data include:  population-based mortality (trend analysis 
by sex and age), risk assessments (respiratory illness hospitalization compared among exposed vs. unexposed 
cohorts), emerging threats (track cases to common exposures, deployment surveillance (hospitalization rates 
between those deployed and those not), policy effects (evaluation of pre vs. post policy impacts ), serological 
surveys (nature, etiology, distribution, magnitude of disease), sero-epidemiological research (linkages of data 
relevant to individual characteristics, exposure states, medical events, an serum specimens), and routine reports and 





F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
DMSS Ad Hoc Queries 
 
All data requests must be submitted through AFHSC and will be categorized as either Operational/Public Health 
Practice or Research Support (31, 32).  Only queries categorized as Research requires additional Internal Review 
Board approval, which generally takes at least two weeks.  Requestors must specify, as a bare minimum, the disease 
of interest including a specific case definition, inclusion and exclusion criteria, incidence rules, target population, 
other applicable count clarifications (time between outpatient visits).  Data is normally provided in spreadsheet 
format and generally does not include unique identifiers unless prior approval was granted.  Because complete 
denominator data does not exist for the entire population captured in DMSS, data is generally case count in nature.  
Additional variables per case include gender, age, race, grade, marital status, service, occupation, location, and 




The Defense Medical Epidemiological Database (DMED) is a web-based application that provides remote and rapid 
(within seconds) access to data summaries in response to user-defined queries (31, 32).  The data available in 
DMED are synchronized with DMSS on a monthly basis, but is only a subset of the DMSS data that represents the 
active duty Service member population only (31, 32).  Also, data are only aggregate or summary in nature with 
queries limited to primary diagnoses only.  Population filters including gender, age, race, grade, marital status, 
service, occupation, location, and calendar year.  The data formats include frequencies, counts, person-years, rates, 
line charts, and bar charts (31, 32).  Access is limited to those with CAC ID cards and is therefore restricted to 
active-duty military personnel, selected Reserve personnel, DoD civilian employees, and eligible contractor 




Figure 3.1.  Overview of Defense Medical Surveillance System architecture, with key data sources and functional 
relationships (22) 
 
Medical Surveillance Monthly Reports (MSMR) 
 
The Medical Surveillance Monthly Reports (MSMR) is a recurring publication produced by the AFHSC (32).  The 
aim of the publication is to report frequencies, rates, and trends of ambulatory visits, hospitalization, and RMEs 
among active SMs as well as share information on cases and outbreaks of illnesses, injuries, and exposures with 







I.   Background 
 
HL7 (Health Level 7) technically refers to the standardized format used by electronic hospital information systems 
that facilitates the exchange, integration, sharing, and retrieval of electronic health data (4); the data from these 
information systems is referred to as HL7 data.  HL7 data in the military system comes from services that occur 
during or related to patient encounters such as outpatient visits, clinic appointments, pharmacy orders and fills, 
radiology exams, laboratory test orders and results, and inpatient admissions and discharges (33).  Algorithms and 
tools developed by the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center permit the interpretation of HL7 data for the 
purpose of augmenting and improving military public health surveillance activities (34).  Although all service 
branches are represented in HL7 data, it only represents health care events that occurred at fixed facility MTFs (no 
ship or temporary medical facilities) (35). 
 
II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
The purpose of HL7 is the management of electronic health data resulting from ancillary medical services and 
diagnostics such as laboratory, radiology, and pharmacology (4, 33, 36).  The justification of HL7 use in the military 
is to conform to international standards for the exchange, management and integration of electronic healthcare 
information, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of healthcare information delivery within the military health 
care system. The data can be utilized to augment and improve military public health surveillance activities by 
providing case validation through confirmation of medical encounter data with laboratory, pharmacological, and/or 
radiological data. Objectives that support health surveillance include:  1) identification of cases of reportable 
diseases (case finding of RMEs),  2) analysis of case burden (health reports and inquiry),  3) identifying illness 
trend, 4) investigation into the types and subtypes of diseases (vaccine development, multidrug resistance), and  5) 
estimation of occupational exposures as indicated by organic biomarkers (33, 35, 36). 
 





A.  Operating Case Definitions 
 
It is difficult to apply the term “case definition” to HL7 data; HL7 itself does not define cases, rather it may be used 
as a tool to augment the defining of a case.  For example, HL7 does not generate ICD codes but the data message 
may aid physicians in making a diagnosis that leads to the selection of that ICD code (36).  In this way, the data in 
HL7 can be used for identification of diseases based on Reportable Medical Events criteria listed in the Armed 
Forces Reportable Medical Events Guidelines and Case Definitions, but is not limited to this application (30).  The 
data can also be used for the identification of medical events as established by professional standards from outside 
the DoD (e.g., CDC, professional subject matter experts). 
 
B.  Target Population 
 
The HL7 captures all of the ancillary medical services that occur at fixed MTFs, therefore it represents Service 
members (SM) from all branches of service to include active duty, Reserve Component (while on orders), trainees, 
contractors, and retirees, as well as SM dependents (military family members) and other eligible beneficiaries.   It 
does not incorporate data from deployed personnel (aboard ship, in-theater) or personnel receiving care in other than 
MTF facilities (field unit,  Battalion Aid Stations), nor does it include civilian-TMA data (36).  
 
C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems 
 
The HL7 data are derived from the military’s CHCS, which manages all hospital orders, patient administration, and 
appointment scheduling.  Data types include the ancillary medical services of pharmacy, radiology, and laboratory 
departments (36).   
 
The dependency on CHCS explains why procedures performed at locations without CHCS are not automatically 
captured in the system (civilian facilities, field units, etc.).  Data on procedures performed outside of a fixed MTF 
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can be entered manually if appropriate documentation is provided (36).  Both the Disease Reporting System-internet 
(DRSi) and the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics 
(ESSENCE) routinely incorporate HL7 data in their case finding modules; however this is not done automatically, 
rather through the application of appropriate algorithms.  The DMSS system has a similar capability, but it is rarely 
used (31, 36).   
 
D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
Medical services data are either entered into CHCS manually by hospital staff ordering the service or automatically 
via the laboratory device processing the medical test.  The data are not transmitted as an HL7 message into the 
CHCS central server until they are certified; pharmacy data are certified when the transaction is completed (order 
filled and picked up), radiology data are certified when the report is filed (results/interpretations), and laboratory 
data are certified when tests are finalized.  Once data are certified an HL7 message is sent to the CHCS host where it 
is archived and batched (specific triggers are set up to send messages).  There is a one to two day lag between 
certification at the MTF level and the data’s availability to be accessed in HL7 messages (36).   
 
Data in the HL7 database are raw and unedited; duplicate records may exist.  For example the reordering of a test 
will generate more than one data entry.  Methods exist to identify and account for these duplications.  When a test is 
cancelled, inaccurate, or misread, the details are recorded in the “Test Result”, “Clinical Comments”, or “Result 
Notes” fields.  Differences in MTF capabilities (laboratory, radiology, and pharmacy) and naming conventions 
contribute to a lack of uniformity between locations and can lead to issues with data consistency.  There is also a 
potential for missing data.  As stated earlier, HL7 does not capture data from non-fixed MTF facilities, but it also 
does not capture conditions that are diagnosed without laboratory confirmation or pharmacological treatment.   Data 
entry errors can occur; for example, data from outsourced clinics may be recorded in inappropriate data fields, and 
the existence of free-text fields permit differences in formatting, abbreviations, and allow for spelling errors.  
However, algorithms have been developed to account for variation in free-text fields, including the identification of 





Figure 3.2.  Example of HL7 Data Flow Process (35) 
 
E.  Data Analysis 
 
The data in HL7 are in the raw form; extraction and compilation of data into formats suitable for public health 
analysis requires the expertise of experienced users.  For the military these personnel are located at the EpiData 
Center Department at the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (EDC NMCPHC).  All analyses are based 
on count data, as complete population data does not exist within the system.   Data are linked by social security 
number, therefore comorbidity information (based on laboratory, radiology, or pharmacology) and extensive 
demographic data can be accessed in order to perform trend analysis for known cases.  Data are collected at the 
MTF level but can be broken out by patient or branch of service; grouping of data above the MTF level (region, 
state, country) must be performed by the user.  Data can also be analyzed temporally either daily, monthly, 
quarterly, or annually.  Observing changes in case counts over time requires careful interpretation as they may 
actually reflect changes in diagnostic capabilities or physician diagnostic preferences.  Existing time fields include: 
order date, effective date, collection date, certification date, and message date.  All data can be analyzed by levels of 
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diagnostic certainty (suspect, probable, confirmed, pending).  Caution must be employed if data from HL7 are used 
alone to estimate true burden of disease; as the data are greatly influenced by provider practices, MTF specific 
capabilities, and naming conventions (35, 36).     
   
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
The batched HL7 messages are forwarded to DHSS main servers at least once daily.  On a daily basis, DHSS 
forwards raw parsed data to EDC NMCPHC.  The EDC NMCPHC manages all HL7 related reports and query 
requests (35, 36).    
 
HL7 Ad Hoc Queries 
 
All data requests must be submitted in writing to EDC NMCPHC using a specific data request form; data can only 
be provided based on established Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) or equivalent agreements (36). Accurate 
data acquisition requires knowledge both of the disease or condition of interest, as well as working knowledge of 
MTF practices and capabilities.  Therefore fairly detailed requests must be provided by the requestor to EDC 
NMCPHC.  The staff at EDC NMCPHC is skilled in searching the different datasets, querying the free-text 
windows, and searching using multiple naming conventions.  Data transfer to the requestor requires a secure CAC 
enabled connection (36).  
 
Recurring Reportable Medical Events Reports 
 
Daily Reportable Medical Events Case Finding Reports are automatically generated and sent to Air Force, Army, 
and Navy Preventive Medicine personnel.  The reports include case count data for 53 Reportable Medical Events 
including details on the MTFs reporting the condition, patient demographics, disease name and diagnostic 







I.   Background 
 
In the late 1990s, the DoD identified the need to create a sensitive, specific, standardized, real-time surveillance 
system for the U.S. National Capital region (4, 37).  The specific goal was to have a system that was capable of 
detecting outbreaks of emerging infections and bioterrorist attacks (37).  In 1999, a partnership between the Walter 
Reed Army Institute of Research/Department of Defense Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response 
System (WRAIR/DoD-GEIS) and Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) developed 
ESSENCE (37).  ESSENCE (Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based 
Epidemics) is a web-based medical surveillance system developed to support outbreak detection and medical 
situational awareness (38). After 11 September 2001 it was expanded to include all DoD MTFs, becoming a key 
component of the US national biosurveilalnce network in support of the CDC BioSense application 
(http://www.cdc.gov/biossense) (37).   
 
II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
The purpose of ESSENCE is to promote detection and monitoring of disease clusters and outbreaks.  The 
justification for the system is its unique potential for early disease detection based on surveillance of syndromic 
groups, which allows it to deliver actionable health information to decision makers before an outbreak occurs.  The 
system has four main objectives: 1) sentinel event detection, 2) disease outbreak detection 3) forecasting or 
predicting health related events before they happen, and 4) health event monitoring (e.g., injury prevention, chronic 










A. Operating Case Definitions 
 
Although ESSENCE has the ability to mine data based exclusively on ICD codes, the system’s strength comes from 
its ability to monitor unusual changes in groups of diagnostic categories that represent specific syndromes or disease 
categories of concern, these are referred to as syndromic groups (4, 37, 38).  There are ten broad syndromic groups 
already established in ESSENCE:  neurological, botulism-like, shock/coma/death, rash, localized cutaneous lesion, 
gastrointestinal, influenza specific, influenza-like illness (ILI), ILI- alternative case definition, fever-unexplained, 
and hemorrhagic illness (37, 39). These syndrome groups are made up of various de-identified data fields including 
laboratory/radiology order codes (Current Procedural Terminology or CPT), pharmaceutical order codes (Categories 
of Pharmaceuticals Ordered or GC3), disease and non-battle injury data (by ICD), potential reportable medical event 
data (based on ICD), as well as patient disposition (admitted, outpatient, home) and diagnostic codes (ICD) (37).   
ESSENCE also has the unique ability to incorporate data from the free text field of patient’s chief complaint entry 
from electronic medical record.  In addition, users can create “user-defined” syndromic groups based on specific 
criteria (selected ICD codes, pharmacy codes, and radiology orders)(37).  Data are processed through algorithms 
designed to identify records that meet the appropriate criteria and are then grouped together according to the 
disease/syndrome group they fall within, by date and location. Users can then define the acceptable thresholds and 
set alerts for the detection of the syndrome above expected levels within a specified user defined location (37, 39). 
 
B.  Target Population 
 
The ESSENCE captures all beneficiaries seeking outpatient care at fixed MTFs.  This population comprises Service 
members (SM) from all branches of service to include active duty, Reserve Component (while on orders), and 
retirees; SM dependents (military family members) and other eligible beneficiaries.  The medical data, however, is 
primarily limited to outpatient or ambulatory encounters at MTF, although outpatient cases that result in admissions 




C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems 
 
The data in ESSENCE are extracted from the military’s electronic medical record (EMR) system, Armed Forces 
Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA) (37, 39).  Specifically, the majority of the data comes from 
the Ambulatory Data Module which is limited to out-patient encounters seen at MTFs (39).  The uniqueness of 
ESSENCE is its ability to monitor syndrome groups.  In addition, ESSENCE has the potential to incorporate 
information from various data fields including laboratory/radiology order codes (Current Procedural Terminology or 
CPT), pharmaceutical order codes (Categories of Pharmaceuticals Ordered or GC3), disease and non-battle injury 
data (by ICD), potential reportable medical event data (based on ICD), as well as free-text fields from patient 
records (chief complaint), and ICD based patient disposition and diagnostic codes.  Demographic data in ESSENCE 
is limited to that available in the medical record (39).   
 
D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
ESSENCE is managed by the DHSS (37).  All data input for ESSENCE is automated; most are updated on a daily 
basis (39).  The data in ESSENCE are clustered at the installation level, allowing Public Health (PH) and Preventive 
Medicine (PM) personnel to detect trends for patients seen at their MTF (39).  Although unique identifiers exist for 
each record, they are generally not available to the user unless they have a restricted access account (39).   
 
The discussion of quality assurance for a data system like ESSENCE is complicated.  Unlike surveillance systems 
that are designed to capture true cases (high specificity), the value of ESSENCE is its ability to focus attention on 
statistical anomalies that may indicate the need for further investigation by identifying possible outbreaks in very 
early stages (sacrificing specificity in order to enhance sensitivity).  By design ESSENCE has a high potential for 
over-reporting because false positives are expected with syndromic surveillance.  The determination of the 
epidemiological significance of detected trends, clusters, or alerts is the task of the trained user.  
 
By incorporating ICD data, ESSENCE is subject to the same errors as other surveillance systems that use the codes 
(differential diagnoses ICD codes counted as cases, vaccinations counted as disease). 
93 
 
E.  Data Analysis 
 
ESSENCE uses statistical algorithms to generate alerts for the ten broad syndromic groups based on daily health 
encounter data for a specific MTF or user-defined geographic location (37).  Using historical data, a prediction of 
expected daily ranges (threshold) for each of the syndrome groups is generated.  Event detection algorithms alert 
local users to aberrant values (potential outbreaks) when the observed number of cases is statistically significantly 
higher than the established threshold (37).  Tests of significance are based on one-sided 95% confidence intervals 
where no alert is generated if the p-value is > 0.05, an amber alert is generated if the p-value is between 0.01-0.05, 
and a red alert is generated if the p-value < 0.01 (37).  Algorithms are designed to account for changes in patient 
visits associated with days of the week; historical count information relies on data from the last four to twelve weeks 
(39).  Because of incomplete population data, ESSENCE cannot be used to generate information about disease or 
syndrome rates.  When “user-defined” syndromic groups are used instead, however, the user must define the 
acceptable thresholds in order to set alerts for detecting the syndrome of interest at the specific location. 
 
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
All access to ESSENCE requires CAC ID cards and is therefore limited to active-duty military personnel, Selected 
Reserve, DoD civilian employees, and eligible contractor personnel.  There are two possible access levels.  Level I 
provides a general over-view of the data, while Level II access permits detailed investigation of patient information 
at the MTF level by allowing access to personal identifiers (37).    
 
E-mail Alerts to Users 
 
ESSENCE generates e-mail alerts to users based on user-selected syndromic group or user-defined syndromes (37). 
The data generated includes graphical descriptions of the alert showing historical data, outpatient/inpatient visit 
counts, and new visit counts (14-day incidence rule) (37).  The graphs also display increasing or decreasing patterns, 
and whether peaks are remarkably different from the distribution observed over the past 12 weeks (37).  The user 
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can then choose to further investigate the data by patient category, clinic type, age range, and branch of service. The 
epidemiological significance of unusual findings and the actions needed are ultimately determined by the user.   
 
Reportable Medical Event Query based on ICD Codes 
 
ESSENCE permits users to investigate reportable disease events through ad hoc queries based on ICD codes.  There 




I.   Background 
 
For the later part of the 1990s, the US Army reported diseases and medical conditions of public health importance 
with a system called Reportable Medical Events System (RMES) (40).  The Disease Epidemiology Program of the 
U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC), responsible for conducting surveillance and follow-up of all 
reportable medical conditions within the U.S. Army, identified during the H1N1 influenza pandemic and other 
outbreaks in the early 2000s that the RMES lacks the desired flexibility, completeness, and timeliness to effectively 
monitor and report disease information (40). The operating characteristics and cost effectiveness of the Disease 
Reporting System-internet “DRSi’”; Congressional and DoD requirements to employ joint/shared technology 
solutions (Navy’s use of DRSi); and the decommissioning of RMES as part of the upgrade of the Defense Medical 
Surveillance System (DMSS), led to the adoption of DRSi Army-wide in October of 2010 and by the Air Force in 
January 2014 (40). 
 
II. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 
The purpose of DRSi is to provide a user friendly web-based reporting system for Reportable Medical Events. The 
system is justified by the need for a more flexible, complete, and timely system; Congressional and DoD mandate to 
employ joint/shared technology (Navy DRSi); and the decommissioning of previous system (RMES).  In addition, 
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the ease of operation of the new system was believed to increase the number of reports submitted and number of 
facilities reporting cases, thereby improve surveillance efforts.  The system has three main objectives 1) web-based 





A.  Operating Case Definitions  
 
Cases in DRSi are specifically defined by the Armed Forces Reportable Medical Events Guidelines and Case 
Definitions. Currently DRSi tracks 66 reportable conditions (41, 42).  Military medical facilities have the capability 
to augment the list with diseases of local concern for additional surveillance if needed.  Initially, the data in DRSi 
were driven by the ICD diagnostic codes from Medical Event Reports (MERs) (41, 42).  Since 2011, the disease 
name as specified in the Guidelines is used instead.  In addition DRSi has a case finding (CF) module that can pull 
cases based on laboratory data indicative of a reportable event from the HL7 data feeds.  DRSi data includes levels 
of certainty for each case; suspect, probable, confirmed, pending, not confirmed (41, 42).   
    
B.  Target Population 
 
The DRSi aims to collect reportable medical event data for all individuals who receive care at a MTF including all 
branches of Service, active duty, Reserve Component (while on orders), dependents, and eligible retirees.  No 
information is collected for health encounters that occur outside the military system; there is no data for reportable 
events that occur at civilian-TMA or VA hospitals (41, 42). 
 
C.  Data Sources and Integration with Other Systems 
 
DRSi does not receive any automated data from electronic medical records; all of the data is manually entered and 
uploaded (42).  There are three ways in which a health encounter can become a case in DRSi.  One way is for MTF 
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staff to submit the potential RME to the Preventive Medicine department for determination of medical event report 
status; if the case meets the criteria the PM staff converts the entry to a MER.  Another way is when the patient 
record is directly entered as a MER; PM staff typically still reviews the data before it becomes final.  Lastly, DRSi’s 
case finding module allows for the querying of laboratory data from HL7.  Then cases that meet the Armed Forces 
RME guidelines can be pulled into the case finding module in order to facilitate the creation of a MER if the case is 
determined to meet the RME case definition.  At the time of this printing, DRSi did not yet have the capability to 
automatically pull demographic data directly from DEERs (cross-referenced by patient social security number) (42). 
 
D.  Data Management and Quality Assurance 
 
The Disease Epidemiology Program of the U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) is responsible for 
conducting surveillance and follow-up of all reportable medical conditions within the U.S. Army.  In order to ensure 
the appropriate capture of RMEs, all MTFs are required to have at least two trained DRSi users within their 
Preventive Medicine departments (41).   These PM DRSi users are responsible for reviewing and approving all 
RMEs before they are submitted as a MER, contacting the author of the report or consulting patient records when 
data quality concerns arise (42).   Data is hand-entered into the system and entry errors are possible; however, as 
long as the report has not been converted to a MER, editing is fairly easy and can be done at all levels.  In addition, 
all non-sexually transmitted infection cases are reviewed by Disease Epidemiology staff to ensure data quality and 
integrity.  The RMEs are required to be submitted within 48 hours of diagnosis; there is a potential 1-7 day lag time 
from submission to appearance in DRSi (42).  In order to prevent double counting of cases, the MERs  are linked to 
patient social security numbers (42).   
 
E.  Data Analysis  
 
The data in DRSi are only available as case counts; the number of MERs per identified condition.  There is no 
denominator data in DRSi, therefore it is not possible to calculate person-years and/or rates (42).  Because DRSi has 
access to all of the demographic data available in DEERS, extensive trend analysis of the data by demographic 
categories is possible.  All data can also be analyzed temporally (by year and month), spatially (by Service 
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component, MTF, or installation), and by level of diagnostic certainty (probable, suspect, confirmed)(42).  
Submission trends can also be monitored, serving as a way to track conformity to RME submission guidelines.   
 
F.  Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 
All access to DRSi requires Common Access Cards (CAC) and is therefore limited to active-duty military personnel, 
selected Reserve personnel, DoD civilian employees, and eligible contractor personnel.  There are two possible 
access levels; recorder access and supervisory access.  Clinic and hospital staff generally has recorder access, while 
the Preventive Medicine staff has supervisory access.  The system is primarily driven by pull-down windows as 
opposed to free-text fields, therefore user data entry errors are minimized (41, 42).   
 
DRSi Ad Hoc Queries 
 
Those with access (generally MTF PM and Regional Command staff) have the ability to perform queries and view 
summary reports (42).  Queries are not limited to the RMEs defined by the Tri-Service Guidelines; users can expand 
their queries to incorporate diseases of particular interest in their region or as directed by command staff.  Summary 
reports generated by DRSi can be in the form of excel spreadsheets, bar graphs, and pie-charts (42).   
 
Reportable Medical Events Summary Reports  
 
Disease Epidemiology Program staff from the U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) generate both daily 
and monthly Reportable Medical Event Reports (42).  Report recipients include all registered DRSi users.  The 
reports are limited to the RMEs as defined in the Armed Forces Reportable Medical Events Guidelines and Case 
Definitions.  Daily reports include details on the reporting location, condition and diagnostic status (suspect, 
confirmed, pending, etc.) visit date, associated branch of service, service component (active duty, Reserve, retiree, 
dependent), as well as patient age and sex.   Monthly reports include year- to-date total case count comparisons for 
each RME, trend analyses on selected diseases, and a break-out of the number of RMEs by condition per installation 
for the entire month (42). 
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1. Data Systems:  MDR (Medical Data Repository); DMSS (Defense Medial Surveillance System); HL7 (Health Level 7); ESSENCE (Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of 
Community-based Epidemics); DRSi (Disease Reporting System Internet)  
2. Medical Facility Sources:  MTF (Military Treatment Facility); Civilian Facility are those approved by the Military Health System as purchased care (claims data) 
3. Target Population:  DEERS eligible includes all Service Members and Retirees as well as their dependents   
99 
 
4. Medical Data Sources:  RMEs (Reportable Medical Reports); TMDS (Theater Medical Data Store); DODSR (Department of Defense Serum Repository); CHCS/AHLTA (Composite Health Care 
System/Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application), the military’s electronic medical record system) 
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Appendix A-3:   
Standardized Outline for Evaluating Military Surveillance Systems 
Surveillance Database Description 
(Modified from CDC Guidelines) 
 
I. Purpose, Justification, Objectives 
 A. Purpose   
 B. Justification 
 C. Objectives  
II. Operations 
 A. Operating Case Definitions (inclusion/exclusion criteria, syndromic, laboratory,    
 epidemiological, levels of certainty- probably, suspect, confirmed) 
 B. System Components 
  1.   Population 
  2.   Data Sources  
  3. Integration with Other Systems  
  4. Data Management (Input, Editing, Data Quality) 
  5. Data Analysis  
  6. Data Dissemination and Reporting Options 
 C. Flow Chart of System (Collection through Reporting to include time required) 
III. Resource Requirements 
 A. Informatics Requirements (Accessibility) 
 B. Human Resource Requirement = User-friendliness, efficiency of system 





Surveillance Database Performance Evaluation 
 (Modified from CDC Guidelines) 
 
I. Utility:  Level of Usefulness (timely, appropriate estimators, trend detection) 
 A. As related to stated objectives 
 B. As determined by users 
II. Simplicity:  Structure and Ease of Operation 
 A. Method of collecting data including number and type of reporting sources 
 B. Level of integration with other systems 
 C. Method for data analysis  
 D. Method for data dissemination 
 E.  Time required to maintain and update system 
 F. Staff training requirement 
III. Flexibility:  Ability of System to Adapt and Upgrade 
IV. Accuracy:  Data Quality: Completeness and Validity of Recorded Data 
 A. Refer to Case Definition (Specificity vs. Sensitivity) 
 B. Representativeness of Data (Population Sampled, Active/Passive Surveillance, Voluntary  
 vs. Directed data collection) 
 C. Data entry (potential to make mistakes) 
V. Acceptability:  Willingness to use the System 
VI. Sensitivity 
 A. Ability to detect cases 
 B. Ability to monitor changes in number of cases over time 
 C. Sensitivity Measurement:  compared to area prevalence data and/or validation of data  
 collected 
 D. Note:  Increase sensitivity artifacts include heightened awareness of potential for disease, 
improved diagnostic testing, broadened case definitions 
VII. Positive Predictive Value:  Proportion of reported cases with actual case defined event  
 A. Historical data on accurate identification of outbreaks, trends (high PPV) 
VIII. Representativeness:  Ability to accurately describe health related event temporally, spatially and 
 demographically.   
 A. Demographic breakout 
 B. Temporal breakout 
 C. Spatial breakout 
 D. Denominator Information (same source, comparable across categories, consistent over   
 time) 
IX. Timeliness:  speed in between steps SPEED TO GENERATING USEFUL REPORT 
X. Stability:  Reliability and Availability of System- Accessability 
 A.   System Downtime, Firewall Issues 










Chapter 4:  Comparison of the Human Medical Data Systems Most 






Effective 22 July 2011, under the direction of the U.S. Army Surgeon General, the former U.S. Army Veterinary 
Command (VETCOM) joined with the former U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine 
(USACHPPM) to create the new U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) (1).  The mission statement for 
this new Command is: “Promote health and prevent disease, injury, and disability of Soldiers and military retirees, 
their Families, and Department of the Army civilian employees; and assure effective execution of full spectrum 
veterinary service for Army and Department of Defense Veterinary missions”(2).  The command combines the 
technical skills of multiple disciplines, including veterinarians, physicians, entomologists, laboratory specialists, 
epidemiologists, and many others in order to achieve the USAPHC mission. 
 
In 2011, the Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio, Disease Epidemiology Program within the USAPHC 
initiated development of a Zoonotic Disease Report (ZDR) to provide U.S. Army public health personnel with 
critical health information regarding the presence and spread of zoonotic pathogens and to create opportunities for 
improved preventive medicine strategies. The audience of the ZDR is U.S. Army Public Health Command Regional 
and District level Commanders, as well as veterinarians and public health and preventive medicine professionals 
throughout the Army. The report combines zoonotic disease information from diverse sources, including: extant 
Army/DoD human disease databases, data generated by the Laboratory Services Portfolio for arthropod borne 
disease surveillance as well as rabies specimen testing, and animal data from intergovernmental organization’s 
public access databases.  The goal is that the animal data will eventually include zoonotic diseases diagnosed at U.S. 
Army Veterinary Treatment Facilities once the web-based electronic medical record known as the Remote Online 
Veterinary Record (ROVR) is fully deployed.  Because of the existence of multiple human health and disease 





The aim of this study was to conduct a systematic comparison of the human medical data systems most commonly 





In accordance with Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 6490.02E (8 Feb 2012) military public health 
surveillance shall be conducted to enable early intervention and control strategies to prevent adverse effects on 
mission accomplishment and to provide information for shaping commanders’ decision making (3).  The primary 
objectives of these military medical surveillance systems are timely and proficient public health response to medical 
events to reduce morbidity and mortality, to estimate the distribution, trends, and risks associated with significant 
medical events, and to aid in the development and assessment of policy and resource allocation for the prevention 
and control of communicable diseases (3).   
 
The collection of medical event data is a cornerstone of public health surveillance.  The use of existing electronic 
data streams associated with hospital and provider systems is one option for the collection of such data (4).  In the 
DoD, the Defense Health Agency (DHA), previously the Military Health System (MHS), is the overarching 
enterprise that provides health care to all military beneficiaries (5).   Within the DHA are multiple electronic data 
streams, to include medical, personnel, deployment, and financial data for all branches of the military (6).  Specific 
hospital and personnel data are consolidated into the MHS Data Repository (MDR).  MDR serves as the centralized 
data repository for DoD beneficiaries, containing both personnel and medical data such as outpatient visits, inpatient 
admissions, and laboratory orders (6).  The MDR also integrates business, customer, and financial data, to include 
purchased care claims for services received outside of the DHA.  Several military human medical data systems 
utilize the available data in MDR; however, exactly which data are used and how the collected data are then 
analyzed varies greatly between these systems. For example, the focus of Defense Medical Surveillance System 
(DMSS) is medical surveillance in Service members and therefore the system compiles data on their medical events, 
medical readiness , and overall “military experience” (7).  In contrast, the Military Health System Management and 




clinical, and financial data (specifically claims, eligibility, and enrollment data) (8, 9, 10).  Because the goal of the 
Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) is the 
automated detection of epidemic outbreaks based on syndromes, the system uses outpatient and inpatient encounter 
data from MDR (11, 12, 13). 
 
Evaluating Military Human Medical Data Systems 
 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the purpose of evaluating public health 
surveillance systems is to ensure that problems of public health importance are being monitored efficiently and 
effectively (14).  In 2001, the CDC published updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems 
and in 2004 a framework for evaluating public health surveillance systems for early detection of outbreaks (3, 14).   
Although the current study is evaluating medical data systems rather than health surveillance systems, the tasks 
detailed in these reports are still applicable and guided the military human medical data system comparison.  The 
CDC reports emphasized the importance of establishing a standardized framework when conducting an evaluation 
comparing multiple data systems. The framework used should include the following three components: 1) detailed 
system descriptions, 2) a comparison of specific data systems attributes, and 3) an evaluation of each system’s data 
completeness.   
 
Chapter three of this document provides detailed descriptions of the five most commonly used military human 
medical data systems.  The reader is referred to this chapter for more details.  Each medical data system is described 
briefly below.   
 
A Brief Description of the Human Medical Data Systems Most Commonly Used by the U.S. Army 
 
The Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) system 
is a syndromic web-based surveillance system that uses clinical data from the DHA to monitor and generate alerts 




categories of concern such as Influenza-like illness, hemorrhagic illness, and botulism-like (11, 13).  The ESSENCE 
system is designed to utilize not only health encounter diagnoses, but also chief complaint information entered as 
free text, and ancillary hospital data from pharmacy, laboratory, and radiology departments (11, 12, 13).  All of the 
data in ESSENCE come from electronic medical records from fixed military treatment facilities (MTF).  
Information is clustered at the installation level; all branches of Service are represented (11, 13). 
 
The Disease Reporting System-internet (DRSi) system is the Army’s web-based reporting system for Reportable 
Medical Events (RMEs) (15, 16).  The RME case definitions are described in the Armed Forces Reportable Medical 
Events Guidelines and Case Definitions; currently 66 RMEs are reportable within DRSi. All RME case reports are 
generated by personnel at (MTFs); therefore cases diagnosed outside of the military health system (e.g., purchased 
care) are typically not captured (15, 16).  Once initiated, the case report can be reviewed by hospital preventive 
medicine personnel and personnel from the Disease Epidemiology Program at the USAPHC Army Institute of 
Public Health (15). Data in DRSi are used to identify and track disease outbreaks and perform RME trend analysis at 
the installation and regional level (15, 16).   
 
Health Level 7 (HL7) technically refers to the standardized format used by electronic hospital information systems 
that facilitates the exchange, integration, sharing, and retrieval of electronic health data (17); the data from these 
information systems are referred to as HL7 data.  The HL7 data in the military system come from services related to 
patient encounters such as outpatient visits, clinic appointments, pharmacy orders and fills, radiology exams, 
laboratory test orders and results, and inpatient admissions and discharges (18).  Algorithms and tools developed by 
the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (NMCPHC) permit the interpretation of this text string HL7 data 
to augment and improve military public health surveillance activities (19, 20).  Although all Service branches are 
represented in HL7 data, it only includes health care events that occurred at fixed facility; off-shore (Navy fleet 
hospital) or temporary MTF data are not captured (20). 
 
The Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) is the designated central repository of medical surveillance data 
for the U.S. Armed Forces (7). The target population for DMSS is Service members; data for dependents (military 




objectives is to create longitudinal records on service members, documenting their military and medical experience 
throughout their military career (7).  In addition to direct data feeds from MDR, DMSS receives Reportable Medical 
Event data from all Service branches and is linked to the Department of Defense Serum Repository (DoDSR), a 
central archive of sera drawn from service members specifically for medical surveillance purposes (21). Although 
not yet routinely used, DMSS has had direct access to laboratory data (HL7) since 2010 (7, 21).   
 
The Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) merges several stand-alone health care 
management applications into a single platform (8, 9).  Although the purpose of M2 was improved business 
intelligence reporting, the completeness of the system’s medical data feeds and sources makes it well-suited for 
health surveillance purposes as well (10).  The M2 captures data equally for service member and beneficiary 
populations from both military and purchased care from civilian health care facilities (8, 9, 10).    
 
When comparing specific medical data systems, the focus should be on how well the data systems operate to meet 
the stated purpose and objectives of the given public health program.  The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to 
the last two components of the medical data system evaluation framework: a comparison of specific data systems 
attributes (Section I), and an evaluation of each system’s data completeness (Section II).  The evaluations done in 
each of these sections are sequential; based on the findings of Section I, some data systems did not proceed to the 
evaluation conducted in Section II.   
 
Section I:  A Comparison of Military Medical Data System Attributes 
 
Medical data systems vary in their purpose and objectives, thus their attributes of each system vary. To conduct this 
evaluation, the specific goals of the ZDR were used to determine which data system attributes to focus on for 
comparison purposes.  The goal of the ZDR is to provide commanders and preventive medicine and public health 
personnel with timely and accurate zoonotic disease data relevant to their military communities that can be refined 




matched the specific ZDR criteria of population source, data source, and data types, 2) how well each system met 
the specific ZDR query requirements, and 3) how well each system truly performs when queried. 
Zoonotic Disease Report Criteria  
 
The attributes of medical data systems are a reflection the particular data system’s purpose, objectives, or goals; 
therefore an understanding of each system’s goals is important in determining its suitability for use in the ZDR.  
Systems with goals similar to that of the ZDR, as stated above, may be most appropriate.  To best represent the full 
military community, the target population should include Service members, dependents, and other beneficiaries.  To 
accurately reflect the burden of disease, the data should be as comprehensive and complete as possible with data 
sources including both military medical treatment facilities and civilian care facilities (purchased care), and data 
types including those of inpatient, outpatient, ambulatory, laboratory, and demographic records.   
 
Zoonotic Disease Report Query Requirements 
 
The ZDR will be generated from the portfolio level, the level that advises regional commands, USAPHC 
Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance (EDS) Portfolio personnel should have direct access to the data.  Being able 
to conduct an agreed upon query themselves ensures the quality, reliability, accuracy, and timeliness of each data 
extract.  In addition, this access must include visibility of unique identifiers for each case.  This level of access 
ensures the quality of each query, as it provides USAPHC with the ability to validate the data.  In order to provide 
accurate health information for the target population, the population data should include details on Service members, 
dependents, and beneficiaries.  Lastly, in order to be as representative and accurate as possible assess disease 




The medical data system used must meet certain performance criteria in order to provide the ZDR stakeholders with 




minimal “down time” or system glitches that serve as barriers to the system’s ability to fill query requests.  In order 
for the data to be timely, data retrieval should be quick and relatively simple to operate (if accessed directly) or 




Ability to Meet ZDR Criteria 
 
A standardized template adapted from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Guidelines for 
Evaluating a Public Health Surveillance System was created in order to compile information gathered about each 
system.  The template emphasizes the objectives and criteria of the U.S. Army Public Health Command Zoonotic 
Disease Report.   
 
Specific categories include: system goals, target population, data sources, and data types.   
 
 1.  System goals refers to the stated purpose, objectives, and goals of the particular medical data system. 
• The goals of the ZDR are timely and accurate zoonotic disease data for the desired military 
community that can be refined both spatially and temporally. 
 2.  Target population refers who the particular medical data system is able to gather complete data from. 
• The target population for the ZDR includes Service members, their dependents, and other 
beneficiaries for all branches of service. 
 3.  Data sources refers to the electronic data streams the particular medical data system has accesses. 
• To be a comprehensive as possible, the medical data system for the ZDR should include medical 
and personnel data for the full target population. 
 4.  Data types refers to the specific data product the medical data system uses; for example ICD codes,  
  laboratory results, hospital orders, or medical event reports. 
• To be a comprehensive as possible, the medical data system for the ZDR should use a variety of 




In order to construct a balanced and reliable description of each system, the following sources of information were 
used:  interviews with system end-users, published literature, and personal database exploration.  
 
Ability to Meet ZDR Query Requirements 
 
System queries were conducted in order to objectively assess each system’s ability to meet the query requirement of 
the ZDR.  In order to assure equal comparability each system was queried for the same time period (1 April 2011 to 
30 April 2012) and for the same four zoonotic diseases.    
 
Zoonotic Disease Selection:  Stakeholder Survey 
 
In an effort to determine the disease information and reporting needs of both military and civilian organizations 
working to improve human health, the USAPHC Zoonotic Disease Monitoring Working Group created stakeholder 
survey.  Of the 25 individuals that responded to the survey, 13 were military, 11 were civilian, 4 were from the CDC 
Zoonotic Disease Working Group, and 1 was of unknown affiliation. Sixteen of the 25 (64%) of the respondents 
were veterinarians, making up the majority of the population.  The survey was distributed using the online survey 
using Vovici Survey Software, version 5.5, and was conducted from 11 May 2012 at 1500 until 31 May 2012 at 
1700.  Results were compiled by the USAPHC Zoonotic Disease Monitoring Working Group.  Questions ranged 
from overall satisfaction with current zoonotic disease monitoring and reporting practices to recommendations for 
improved reporting methods and practices.  The sections geared towards determining the zoonotic pathogens of 
highest concern both regionally and globally were used to aid in selecting the four zoonotic diseases for use in the 
systems queries conducted in this study.   
 
Each of the five military human medical data systems were queried for case count data on the following four 
zoonotic diseases: leishmaniosis, hantavirus, leptospirosis, and borreliosis.  All four diseases are considered 
reportable medical events by the Armed Forces Reportable Medical Events Guidelines (22).  For the purposes of 
comparison, attempts were made to make the queries as standardized as possible within each system.  However, 




Query Process  
 
The USAPHC Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio personnel have direct access to the DRSi, M2, and 
ESSENCE data systems.  This permitted query requests to remain informal and internal to the study team.  
Obtaining the data contained within the DMSS and HL7 systems required formal request processes.  Case 
definitions were based on the Armed Forces Reportable Medical Events Guidelines (22).  A detailed listing of these 
case definitions is located in Appendix A-4.   
 
In addition, the following parameters were applied to all data queries performed or requested: 
 1.  All cases of hantavirus, leptospirosis, leishmaniosis, and borreliosis that met the case definition. 
 2.  Population to include all Service members and other beneficiaries. 
 3.  Limit cases counts to those associated with Army installations. 




The information gathered from the query process was used to assess each system’s ability to satisfy the ZDR’s query 
requirements.  Specifically, the following query traits were evaluated: accessibility, ability to validate, population 
data, and medical data.  Accessibility refers to the ability of a system to support USAPHC personnel regularly 
successfully constructing and running queries, and exporting the resultant data. Unique Identifiers refers to the 
ability of USAPHC personnel to retrieve medical data retaining some form of a Personal Identifier (i.e., a form of 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)) that is unique to the patient such as a social security number.  Population 
data refers to the capability of the system to produce denominator data that represent the ZDR target population: 
Service members and other beneficiaries obtaining care at both military and civilian medical facilities.  The last 
category, medical data, refers to the comprehensiveness of the medical data sources (laboratory, inpatient records, 
outpatient records, reportable medical event case reports) specifically in relation to the ZDR target population.   
Weighting of query trait categories was performed in order to appropriately emphasize traits that are critical to the 




therefore each assigned weights of six.  Because the population data category is made up of four subcategories 
(Service members at military medical facilities, Service members at civilian medical facilities, other beneficiaries at 
military medical facilities, and other beneficiaries at civilian medical facilities), the number of points each system 
received in this category represents the number of subcategories the system represents.  The medical data category 
also uses these four subcategories as they apply to laboratory, inpatient, outpatient, and reportable medical event 




The medical data systems queries were used to assess the performance of each system.  Assessment criteria included 
ability of system to fill the query request, speed at which the query was able to be completed, and the amount of 




Ability to Meet ZDR Criteria 
 
Each medical event data collection system has a unique purpose, justification, and objective.  These differences 
impact how data are collected, compiled, analyzed, and extracted.  However, in order to produce a successful 
Zoonotic Disease Report, each system was evaluated based on its ability to meet the specified system criteria of the 
ZDR (Table 4.1).   None of the systems met all four of the ZDR criteria.  ESSENCE was able to meet three of the 
four, having similar goals, capturing the target population and employing the largest range of data types.  However, 
as discussed further below, ESSENCE was unable to perform the requested queries, which prevented its 
recommendation for inclusion in the ZDR.  DMSS satisfied three of the four ZDR criteria; however, the target 
population for DMSS is the Service member (data may not be complete for other beneficiaries), which does not 
match the full ZDR target population, making its future use in the ZDR questionable.   M2 also met three of the four 
ZDR criteria; however, it lacks reportable medical event case report data which is a necessary component of the data 




system.  Although the data compiled from HL7 laboratory data sources can be used to augment and improve military 
public health surveillance activities, the data are not intended to serve as a stand-alone medical surveillance system.  
As such, it was not surprising that HL7 did not meet most of the criteria of the ZDR; however, the uniqueness of the 








1.  System goals refers to the stated purpose, objectives, and goals of the particular medical data system. 
 The goals of the ZDR are timely and accurate zoonotic disease data for the desired military community that can be refined both 
 spatially and temporally. 
2.  Target population refers who the particular medical data system is able to gather complete data from. 
 The target population for the ZDR includes Service members, their dependents, and other beneficiaries for all branches of service. 
3.  Data sources refers to the electronic data streams the particular medical data system has accesses. 
 To be a comprehensive as possible, the medical data system for the ZDR should include medical and personnel data for the full target 
 population. 
4.  Data types refers to the specific data product the medical data system uses; for example ICD codes, laboratory results, hospital orders, or 
medical event reports. 
 To be a comprehensive as possible, the medical data system for the ZDR should use a variety of data types.    
 
Ability to Meet ZDR Query Requirements 
 
The point allocation displayed in Table 4.2 mirrors the ability of each data system to meet ZDR query requirements.  
The inability of either DMSS or HL7 to be independently queried by USAPHC personnel greatly inhibits their 
usefulness in creating the ZDR.  Although the DMSS data did eventually include unique identifiers, the initial lack 
of unique identifiers and the subsequent effort required to obtain them further reduced the system’s utility for use in 
the ZDR.  ESSENCE has the potential to meet several of the ZDR query criteria; however, the requested query was 
never completed because of system issues such as geographic limitations, data range limitations, and internal query 
errors.  Although these issues eliminated it from further analysis and prevented its recommendation for inclusion in 
the ZDR, anticipated future updates to the ESSENCE system may render it a viable an option that could be 
reassessed at a later date. The M2 data system is noted to have the highest point allocation.  Furthermore, the two 
Table 4.1:  Meets Zoonotic Disease Report (ZDR) Criteria 
 HL7 DMSS DRSi M2 ESSENCE 
System Goals1 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Target Population2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Data Sources3 No Yes No Yes No 




areas of deficiency with M2 (laboratory data and reportable medical event case report data) could be supplemented 
with uniquely identified data supplied by HL7 and DRSi.   
 
Table 4.2:  Ability to Meet Required  Zoonotic Disease Report Query Traits  
 HL7 DMSS DRSi M2 ESSENCE 
Ability to Query Data Independently* (Accessibility) 0 0 6 6 6 
Unique Identifier Data * (Ability to Validate Data) 6 0 6 6 6 
Representativeness of Denominator Data+ (Population Data) 0 2 2 4 2 
Laboratory Data^ (Medical Data) 2 0 0 0 0 
Inpatient Data^  (Medical Data) 0 4 0 4 4 
Outpatient Data^  (Medical Data) 0 4 0 4 4 
Reportable Medical Event Data^   (Medical Data) 0 4 4 0 0 
Total 8 14 18 24 22 
*“Accessibility” and “Ability to Validate” categories, were assigned weights of 6 reflecting the relative importance of these system attributes;          
systems meeting the requirement received 6 points, those that did not received 0 points. 
+ Population Data are comprised of 4 subcategories (Service members (SM) at military medical facilities, SM at civilian medical facilities, 
beneficiaries at military medical facilities, and beneficiaries at civilian medical facilities); each subcategory receives 1 point.  
^ Medical Data are comprised of  4 subcategories (SM at military medical facilities, SM at civilian medical facilities, beneficiaries at military 
medical facilities, and beneficiaries at civilian medical facilities) as they apply to the laboratory, inpatient, outpatient, and reportable medical 
event report  data sources (for a total of 16 points).   
 
Assessment of System Performance 
 
ESSENCE 
Because ESSENCE was unable to successfully run the requested queries it was not included in this phase of the 
evaluation     
 
HL7 
HL7 cases are those that were confirmed positive via laboratory methods and identified via pre-existing case-finding 
algorithms; although the query request required formal submission to and approval by NMCPHC, the process was 
very easy and the data were provided within a timely manner.  In addition, the amount of details provided in the data 








By design, DRSi cases only include reportable medical event case reports that are generated and submitted within 
the DRSi system. Data retrieval was performed internally by USAPHC and was supplied very quickly.  Because of 
the ease in retrieving DRSi data and the uniqueness of this data source, DRSi was retained for further analysis. 
 
DMSS 
Although accessing data from DMSS requires a formal request process, the protocol is very clear and support staff is 
very helpful and informative.  However, as issues arose, the formal process became cumbersome.  One of the most 
significant issues noted was the incompleteness of data as identified by the large number of missing RMEs.  This 
issue had been recognized earlier and was thought to have been rectified; however, this issue remained unresolved at 
the time of our query.  This issue coupled with the initial lack of unique identifiers and the inability of USAPHC 
personnel to perform the system queries led to the elimination of the DMSS system from further consideration as a 
data source for the ZDR.   
 
M2 
The M2 data retrieval was performed internally by USAPHC personnel.  The data available in M2 are extensive and 
the system is complex. Thus, the query process was fairly time consuming, though this may be reduced with further 
training and increased experience with the system.  Because of the extensive nature of the data source and the ability 




The purpose of this section of the study was to determine which military human medical data system to include in 
the USAPHC ZDR.  This focus of this section was to evaluate each system’s ability to meet the goals of the ZDR by 




source, and data types, 2) how well each system met the specific ZDR query requirements, and 3) how well each 
system performed when queried. 
 
According to published CDC guidelines (14), a thorough evaluation of data systems should focus on how well the 
systems operate to meet the stated purpose and objectives of the given surveillance program, or in this case the 
stated purpose and objectives of the Zoonotic Disease Report.  On a purely descriptive level, it appeared that both 
ESSENCE and DMSS would be well suited for inclusion in the ZDR.  However, further evaluation through the use 
of system queries revealed several concerns.  Because ESSENCE was unable to produce query results in a timely 
manner it was unable to be included in further analysis.  This raised significant questions about the utility of the 
ESSENCE system for use in the ZDR at this time.  Although DMSS was able to produce the requested query, 
several issues were revealed during the query process that eliminated it from being included in the next stages of 
analysis.  The first issue arose when our request for social security numbers (SSNs) for use as unique identifiers was 
denied.  Although with additional justification SSNs were provided, the time involved in the formalized query 
request process made the timeliness of DMSS data questionable.  Next, during the matching procedures we 
discovered that the SSNs associated with each case represented the sponsoring service member, not the actual 
patient.  Eventually we received the appropriate unique identifier (SSN for the patient) for each case, but the 
multiple data requests and justifications involved in obtaining the appropriate unique identifiers- reaffirmed the 
necessity of USAPHC being able to conduct system queries themselves. Additionally, the cumbersome data request 
process the overall utility of the DMSS system for use in the ZDR questionable.  As outlined in chapter 3, the data in 
DMSS are very extensive and extremely valuable, especially when conducting longitudinal studies on service 
members.  The exclusion of DMSS for use in the ZDR should not be viewed as a judgment on the data source.  
Rather it highlighted potential issues involved with relying on external sources to fulfil data requests.  
 
Of the three remaining data systems, M2 appeared to be best suited for use in the ZDR.  Although it was created to 
improve business intelligence reporting, the sources used and the completeness of the medical data feeds allows it to 
capture data equally for service member and beneficiary populations from both military and civilian medical 
facilities.  Also, USAPHC personnel can obtain direct access to M2, which will enable them to not only conduct the 




not automatically receive laboratory data or reportable medical events data, which could result in some missed 
cases.  HL7 provides laboratory data, but because not all diagnoses require laboratory confirmation, many cases may 
be missed if HL7 alone were used as the sole data source.  However, as discussed in the background section of this 
document, HL7 is not designed to serve as a standalone disease surveillance system; rather the utility of HL7 is as a 
tool to augment existing surveillance systems through the confirmation of existing medical event data.  DRSi 
captures reportable medical event data, but also has limitations by design.  The system was created to capture 
Medical Event Reports filed at Army installations as mandated by the Armed Forces Reportable Medical Events 
Guidelines and Case Definitions.  But because only 66 conditions are currently identified as reportable, and because 
medical event reports must be filed independently in addition to the regular electronic medical record, DRSi should 
not be viewed as a standalone surveillance system.  Again, the utility of this system is as a way to augment data in a 
more robust medical data system. 
Conclusions 
 
This study recommends the use of M2 as the primary source of military human medical data for use in the Public 
Health Command Zoonotic Disease Report.  The data system represents the most comprehensive and reliable source 
of both medical and population data; capturing not only the entire target population, but also having the potential to 
capture cases from both military and civilian healthcare facilities.  In addition, M2 can be directly queried by 
USAPHC personnel which greatly improves not only the quality of the data but also the timeliness of the 
information received.  Lastly, because the data in M2 retains unique identifiers, queries can be cross referenced and 
supplemented with information from DRSi and HL7.   
Section II:  An Evaluation of Data System Quality 
Capture-Recapture Methodology 
 
Capture-recapture (CR) techniques have long been used in wildlife biology to estimate population numbers.  
Because capturing an entire wildlife population is impractical, an estimation of the true population size is 
determined mathematically based on repeat samples drawn from the population (23).  The basic approach involves a 




produces the first sample, the “capture.”  These animals are counted, tagged, and released back into the population.  
The second trapping event produces the second sample.  In addition to counting the total number captured in this 
second sample, the number of previously tagged animals is also counted.  These previously tagged animals trapped 
in the second sample are the “recaptured” animals.    
 
The pictorial below illustrates the application of capture-recapture techniques in wildlife biology (24).  The four 
black birds in the top flock represent the “capture” sample.  The one black bird in the lower flock represents the 
“recapture.”  From the 1:4 dilution of marked birds, the total population size is determined to be four times that of 
the sample size.  
 
 






The table below depicts capture-recapture in a 2 x 2 format. 
 




 Yes No Total 
Yes a b Z 
No c x  
Total Y  N 
  Figure 4.2: Capture-Recapture in Wildlife Populations 
 
For a closed population, with equal catchability: 
 
Y = number of animals marked in the original sample (a + c) 
Z = the total number of animals captured in the second sample (a + b) 
a = the number of animals from the first sample re-captured in the second sample 
 
x = the number of animals missed by all trapping  
N = the unknown population size (a + b + c + x) 
 
Using the same logic as the bird example above, the ratio of recapture to full second capture is equal to the ratio of 
the first capture to the full (unknown) population.  This formula is shown by: 
 
 a/Z = Y/N 
 
The full population size can then be calculated by: 
 





CR methods in epidemiology are attempts to estimate or adjust for incomplete case ascertainment using information 
from overlapping lists of cases from distinct sources (23).  Potential uses include 1) estimation of population 
effected when the investigator has incomplete data available from two or more sources; 2) refinement of prevalence 
or incidence estimates derived from attempted exhaustive population surveys; 3) attempted evaluation of 
completeness of sources when data are received from many different sources; and 4) attempts to derive plausible 
upper or lower limits on estimates of the total population affected by an affliction (18, 23, 25).   
 
There are several underlying assumptions when determining if CR methodology is appropriate for data source 
comparisons.  Several of these are implicit, such as ensuring that the sources cover the same geographic area and 
time period, the case definitions used are consistent across data sources, and matching of cases from different 
sources is done appropriately (23).  More explicit assumptions include:  1) equal “catchability” of cases, that for any 
single source, each case in the population has the same probability of ascertainment; 2) independence of sources, 
that for two sources comparisons, ascertainment of any case by the sources is independent; and 3) closed 
populations, that the population being sampled does not have any additions or losses during the study period (23). 
 





 Yes No Total 
Yes a b Z 
No c x  
Total Y  N 
Figure 4.3 Capture-Recapture in Data Source Comparisons 
Y = number of cases in the original sample (a + c) 
Z = number of cases in the second sample (a + b) 
a = the number of cases found in both sources 
 
x = the number of cases missed by both sources  





Again, simple algebraic formulas can be done.  The full number of cases can then be calculated by: 
 
 N = YZ/a  
 
The number of cases missed by both sources can be estimated by: 
 
 x = bc/a 
 
Lastly, the completeness of each data source can be calculated by: 
 
 S1completeness = a/Z 




 S1completeness = Y/N 
 S2completeness = Z/N 
 
As seen above, calculating CR estimates using only two sources is easily done by hand. The same concepts apply 
when comparing “k” sources, producing a table with 2k cells; however the computations become too complicated to 






General linearized models (GLMs) allow linear modeling to be applied to non-continuous (discrete) count or rate 




be more than the mean (27, 26).  Components of GLM include a linear component, a link function (how the 
expected value is related to the linear predictor), and a variance function which represents the relationship between 
the variance of responses as they relate to the mean (27).  Log-linear models are a form of GLM that model the 
association and interaction patterns among categorical variables or the conditional relationship of the categorical 
variables (26). There is no distinction made between independent and dependent variables in log-linear modeling; all 
are treated as “response” variables (26).  The outputs of such modeling are estimates of the cell frequencies for each 
response variable and their interaction variables.   For clarity, one can consider the independent variable the 
estimated frequency.   
 
Consider a contingency table with “i” and “j” categories, both being binomial categorical data and the frequency of 
the observation is the conditional data within the table. 
 
The basic premise is that estimates of cell probabilities can be derived from the product of marginal probabilities of 
two independent variables (26).  Where π is the probability of cell ij: 
 
 πij =  πi-. π.-j   
 
In terms of estimating the expected cell frequencies (μij), given cell ij where n is the observed cell frequency:  
 
 μij =  nπij = n(πi+ π+j)  
 
Taking the natural logarithms gives the log-linear model of independence: 
 






In a more standard notation, where A and B are two categorical variables: 
 
 log(μij) =  λ + λiA  + λjB 
  
λ = is the overall effect, or the grand mean of the logarithms of the expected counts; it ensures that the expected cell 
counts under the fitted model add up to the total sample size n 
λiA = represent the “main” effect variable A 
λjB = represent the “main” effect variable B 
 
Including the combined effect (interaction) of two variables gives the following equation: 
 
 log(μij) =  λ + λiA  + λjB + λijAB 
 
λIA  = the main effect for variable A 
λjB = the main effect for variable B 
λijAB = the interaction effect for variables A and B 
 
The above model is considered a saturated model because of the inclusion of all possible one-way and two-way 
effects (26). Since the model has the same amount of variables as the number of cells in the contingency table, the 
expected cell frequencies will exactly match the observed frequencies since there are no degrees of freedom 
remaining to create uncertainty (26). 
 
Capture-recapture and Log-linear Modeling to Evaluate Data Systems 
 
Capture-recapture methods can be used in epidemiology as a way to estimate the total number of cases in a 
population when no complete list of cases exists.  To do so, the data from multiple incomplete lists of cases (all 
representing the same source population) are used to estimate the total number of cases in the population that were 




by multiple sources by adjusting for incomplete case ascertainment using lists of cases retrieved from sources that 
attempt to capture the same population (23).  A major concern however, is the potential for dependence between 
sources, as this would violate one of the required assumptions for the use of CR methods.  The application of log-
linear models to data from multiple sources allows for the adjustment of these potential dependencies through the 
inclusion of their interaction terms.    
 
The below is an example of the lay-out for a contingency table for three sources: 
 
  Source 3 
 
 
 Yes No 
 Source 2 
 Yes No Yes No 
Source 1 Yes a c e g 
No b d f x 
Figure 4.4:  Three-way Contingency Table for Log-linear Modeling 
a = number of cases identified by all three sources 
b = number of cases identified by sources 2 and 3 
c = number of cases identified by source 1 and 3 
d = number of cases identified by source 3 only 
e = number of cases identified by sources 1 and 2 
f = number of cases identified by source 2 only 
g = number of cases identified by source 1 only 





By using “1” to represent sources that contributed to the number of cases and “0” to represent sources that did not 
contribute to the number of cases the data can be rearranged into the below table: 
 
Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Cell Letter 
1 1 1 a 
0 1 1 b 
1 0 1 c 
0 0 1 d 
1 1 0 e 
0 1 0 f 
1 0 0 g 
0 0 0 x 
Figure 4.5: Dichotomized Identification of Cell Data 
 
The strategy of log-linear modeling is to fit models to observed frequencies.  Main effects models assume all sources 
are independent and that no interactions exist, whereas models containing interaction terms evaluate dependence 
between variables.  Because the number of cases missed by all sources, denoted as x, is unknown, the three-way 
interaction is not included in the model.  Instead the model is used to estimate that situation and x will equal μ, the 
expected frequency of missing cases.  The number of observations is therefore 2k-1, where k is the number of 
sources.  Because 2k-1 is equal to the number of variables in our model with all two-way interactions plus μ, and 
thus has zero degrees of freedom, the model may be called “saturated” but to avoid confusion it will be called “full”.   





Model Variables Degrees of freedom 
1, 2, 3* 3 
1, 2, 3, 1-2 2 
1, 2, 3, 1-3 2 
1, 2, 3, 2-3 2 
1, 2, 3, 1-2, 1-3 1 
1, 2, 3, 1-2, 2-3 1 
1, 2, 3, 1-3, 2-3 1 
1, 2, 3, 1-2, 2-3, 1-3** 0 
1 = Source 1, 2 = Source 2, 3 = Source 3 
1-2 = interaction term for Source 1 and 2, 1-3 = interaction term for Source 1 and 3, etc. 
* Main Effects Model  
** Full Model 
Figure 4.6: Three Source Models 
 
Each model produces a set of expected cell frequencies that may or may not resemble the observed frequencies.  
These expected frequencies are used to aid in selecting the preferred model.  Typical model selection techniques, 
such as forward or backward selection, can be employed to identify the most parsimonious model that fits the data 
according to pre-specified criteria.  Other techniques used to identify the best model may include simply running all 
potential models and choosing the one that best fits the data.  It is important to note, however, that a hierarchy of 
models exists and that the incorporation of any interaction term in the model necessitates the inclusion of each main 
effect variable involved.  The use of non-hierarchical modeling is not recommended because it provides no 
statistical procedure for selecting the best model.  For log-linear modeling the specified criteria for model fit 
generally includes formal goodness-of-fit statistics such as the likelihood-ratio test statistic (G2), the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), chi-square statistic (χ2), or the change in 
deviance. In addition, the investigator may have knowledge of known dependence between sources, and therefore 





The purpose of this part of the project was to use log-linear modeling with capture-recapture case count data to 
estimate the number of cases not captured within any of the data systems, and subsequently determine completeness 




Based on the analysis of the medical data system attributes conducted in Section I of this chapter, the remaining 




Case Count Data Collection 
 
Case count data from Section I were used to select the most suitable disease for use in the subsequent capture-
recapture analysis.  Because of the low numbers of leishmaniosis and leptospirosis cases, the complete lack of HL7 
reported hantavirus cases, and the large number of borreliosis cases, capture recapture was done using only the 
borreliosis data.  The initial case count data showed a larger discrepancy between data sources than expected, with 
almost thirteen times the number of cases from M2.  Further investigation revealed a large portion of the M2 cases 
came from civilian medical facilities through purchased care claims data.  Because M2 is the only system that has 
complete access to purchased care records, the inclusion of these cases in capture recapture would violate the “equal 
catchability” assumption; therefore these cases were removed from the M2 case count data.  A two week outpatient 
rule was applied to all cases found in each data system, so that two or more Lyme disease outpatient medical 




Case count data used social security numbers (SSN) as unique identifiers. Each dataset was assigned an indicator 




a single data source, all of the data associated with the case were merged into one case and the first date of diagnosis 
was retained.  Next, data from all sources were merged into a single database using the merge function in SPSS.  
Capture-recapture methods were applied to the combined dataset using SAS 9.3 (SAS), wherein a recapture event 
was defined as a case appearing in more than one data source.  The SAS code used to conduct capture-recapture 
matching can be found in Appendix B-4 along with the associated output.  These steps were conducted by the U.S. 
Army Public Health Command, Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio’s Disease Epidemiology Program 
personnel. 
 
Data Source Over and Underlap Analysis 
 
The capture-recapture data were used to conduct an analysis of data source over- and underlaps.  Overlap and 
underlap between data sources was calculated based on the following equations, where “a” through “g” represents 
observed (Figure 4.5): 
    
 Nobs = a+b+c+d+e+f+g  
 NDRSi = a+c+e+g  NHL7 = a+b+e+f  NM2 = a +b+c+d  
 
 Overlap  
 % DRSi data simultaneously captured by HL7 = (a+e)/ NDRSi  
 % DRSi data simultaneously captured by M2 = (a+c)/ NDRSi  
 
 % HL7 data simultaneously captured by DRSi = (a+d)/ NHL7  
 % HL7 data simultaneously captured by M2 = (a+b)/ NHL7  
 
 % M2 data simultaneously captured by DRSi = (a+c)/ NM2  







 % DRSi data missed by HL7 = (c+g)/ NDRSi  
 % DRSi data missed by M2 = (e+g)/ NDRSi  
 
 % HL7data missed by DRSi = (b+f)/ NHL7  
 % HL7data missed by M2 = (e+f)/ NHL7  
 
 % M2data missed by DRSi = (b+d)/ NM2  
 % M2data missed by HL7 = (c+d)/ NM2  
 




Capture-recapture data were converted into the format illustrated in Appendix D-4 to allow for its use in log-linear 
modeling.  The PROC GENMOD procedure in SAS version 9.3 was then used to perform log-linear modeling; this 
SAS code is described in Appendix E-4.  In order to facilitate the comparison of the three medical data systems, all 
three were included in each model (main effects).  Since the model with all three two-way interactions was 
significant the best model was chosen by comparing all models to it.  With three potential data sources there were 
eight possible models (using all of the data) excluding the three-way interactions, seven of which data existed for.  
The model for absence from all data sources was the unknown being determined.   Taking into account potential 
over-dispersion, modeling was done using both Poisson and negative binomial distributions.  The negative binomial 
distribution was found not to be appropriate for this data because the variance differed between all of the models 
making them incomparable which was also demonstrated by the inability of the procedure to estimate the dispersion 
parameter by maximum likelihood; therefore the Poisson distribution was identified as the appropriate distribution.  
Model selection was based on several Goodness of Fit tests, to include χ2, deviance, and AIC.  In addition, the 




Review of Existing Data Sources”, Chapter 3) allowed the incorporation of known dependence between data sources 
and further aided in the final model selection. 
 
Reporting Completeness Calculations 
 
Once the appropriate model was selected, completeness reporting to each data source was calculated based on the 
following equations: 
 
 N = a + b + c + d + e + f + g + x    
 
N = total number of observed cases 
x = the number of missing cases predicted by the model 
 
Therefore, reporting completeness to each data system is as follows: 
 
 DRSi = (a + c + e + g)/ N  
 HL7 = (a + b + e + f)/ N  
 M2 = (a + b + c + d)/ N  
 






The results of the capture-recapture are listed in Table 4.4 below.  Only nine percent of the total cases were captured 




that were captured by any single source, 55% were captured by M2 alone, 15% by HL7 alone, and 2.5% by DRSi 
alone.  Of the 763 total cases captured in one data source, 79% of the cases were captured by M2, 38% were 
captured by HL7, and 18% were captured by DRSi.  
 
Table 4.4:  Borreliosis Capture-Recapture Events   (M2, DRSi, HL7) 
 DRSi HL7 M2 Cases 
Cases Captured in all 3 Data Sources x x x 95 
Cases Captured in 2 Data Sources 
 x x 112 
x  x 42 
x x  28 
Cases Captured in 1 Data Source 
  x 575 
 x  161 
x   27 
Subtotal  192 396 824  
Total Number of Borreliosis Cases Observed                                                                          1040 
 
In addition, the capture-recapture data were used to conduct an analysis of data source over- and underlap.  Table 
4.5 shows the underlap between the sources.  The table is read as the percent of cases from the column data source 
that were missed by the row data source.  For example, of the cases captured by DRSi 36% were not found in HL7 
and 29% were not found in M2.  A table of the overlaps is available in Appendix C-4. 
 
Table 4.5:  Capture-Recapture Underlap 
 Cases Captured by 
Cases Missed by HL7 DRSi M2 
HL7 NA 36% 75% 
DRSi 69% NA 83% 
M2 48% 29% NA 






The results of the log-linear modeling are shown in the tables below.  Table 4.6 shows the number of observations 
associated with each data source or combination of data sources, both actual and predicted.  The italicized model 
containing both DRSi-HL7 and M2-DRSi interaction terms appear to most closely fit the observed CR data.   
 





























HL7 161 161 138 161 158 127 161 161 130 
DRSi 27 27 56 40 27 32 20 27 27 
M2 575 575 507 503 517 575 575 514 575 
HL7, M2 112 112 203 184 173 146 112 173 143 
DRSi, M2 42 42 82 100 101 37 49 103 42 
DRSi, HL7 28 28 22 15 31 57 35 28 59 
DRSi, 
HL7, M2 95 95 33 37 34 66 88 34 64 
Each row specifies the source of data and each column in the “Predicted” section specifies the interaction terms included in the model. 
All models include each data source (3 main effect variables).  
The Main Effects model, aka independent model does not include any interactions. 
The Full model includes all main effects and all two way interactions. 
Each subsequent model includes the 3 main effects in addition to the interaction terms listed in the table. 
 
Table 4.7 summarizes the three criteria used to assess model fit. Based on these criteria, the italicized model 






























Degrees of Freedom 0 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Deviance 0 182.17 164.64 149.46 48.34 5.67 46.58 149.09 
x2 0 208.08 181.56 174.04 46.44 5.79 44.56 170.88 
AIC 0 234.13 218.60 203.42 102.30 61.63 203.42 205.05 
Deviance, where smaller deviance indicates better model fit, or smallest variance left unexplained. 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) compares log-likelihoods of two models taking into account complexity of the model; where smaller AIC 
values indicate better model fit. 
 
Table 4.8 shows the estimated number of missing cases predicted by each model.  This estimation was then used to 
calculate the estimated total number of borreliosis cases by each model. 
 























Missing Cases 1803 345 441 1 139 827 155 370 
Total Cases 2843 1385 1481 149 1179 1867 1195 1410 
Estimate of total number of Lyme borreliosis cases = Nobs + model estimate for missing cases; from Table 4 Nobs = 1040. 
 
The parameter estimates for the selected model (Appendix G-4) is represented by the below equation where y is the 
estimated number of cases missed by the respective source or source combinations (29).    
     
log(y) = 6.7173 -3.7333(DRSi) -1.6359(HL7) - 0.3629 (M2) + 2.2139 (DRSi-HL7) + 1.2756 (DRSi-M2)  




In order to interpret these coefficients, one must take the natural log of the estimates to find the incidence risk 
associated with the use of the data source (29).  The resulting transformation produced the following equation: 
 
 y = 826.58 -0.024(DRSi) -0.195(HL7) – 0.695 (M2) - 9.150 (DRSi-HL7) - 3.580 (DRSi-M2)    
 
Reporting Completeness Calculations 
 
The selected model estimates that from the period of April 1, 2011 to April 30, 2012, 827 cases of Lyme borreliosis 
at Army medical facilities worldwide were missed by the combined data sources of M2, DRSi, and HL7.  This 
estimate brings the total number of cases for this time period up to 1867.  Based on this, the estimated reporting 
completeness of each data source alone and in combination were calculated.   
 
Table 4.9:  Summary of Selected Data Source Completeness 




DRSi and HL7 25 
DRSi and M2 47 
M2 and HL7 54 




Again, the overall purpose of this study was to determine which military human medical data system to include in 
the USAPHC ZDR.  The focus of this section was to evaluate each system’s data completeness through the use of 




Capture-recapture methods in epidemiology are attempts to estimate the extent of incomplete case ascertainment 
from distinct sources, using information from overlapping lists (23).  Although it always relates to estimations of the 
population, there are many different potential applications of the method in epidemiology, including: 1) estimation 
when the investigator has clearly incomplete data available from two or more sources; 2) refinement of prevalence 
or incidence estimates derived from attempted exhaustive population surveys; 3) attempted evaluation only of 
source completeness or of completeness of a registry that receives reports from many different sources; and 4) 
attempts to derive only plausible upper or lower limits on the total affected (23).   We used capture-recapture in the 
third application of evaluating source completeness in order to assist USAPHC in determining the most complete 
human medical data (collection) system for use in the ZDR. 
 
Implicit in capture-recapture analysis are three basic assumptions.  The first assumption is the correct diagnosis of 
each case.  Only once we are confident in this first assumption can we move onto the next two assumptions: 
appropriate matching of cases across data sources and assurance that all cases included are of the same time and 
space unit (23).  In other words, the investigators must have a high level of confidence in the case count data used.  
As mentioned in the methods section, this level of confidence was not achieved with the DMSS case count data at 
the time of this analysis.   
 






































DRSi 26 69 NA 83 2 10 
HL7 15 NA 36 75 20 21 




Analysis of the capture-recapture data shows us that M2 is the most comprehensive single data source, with 55% of 
total captured cases coming from this data source alone.  It also showed that the percent of cases missed by M2 was 
lower than the percent of cases missed by the other sources, again indicating that M2 is the most comprehensive data 
source.  More specifically, M2 only missed 48% of the HL7 cases and 29% of the DRSi cases, whereas DRSi 
missed 69% of the HL7 cases and 83% of the M2 cases, and HL7 missed 36% of the DRSi cases and 75% of the M2 
cases.  This analysis showed that there is substantial underlap between these sources, and that reliance on a single 
data source will lead to underestimation of total cases.   
 
Log-linear modeling was then done to get a better estimate for the total number of cases missed by all three data 
sources.  Model selection was based on comparing each model individually to the full or ‘saturated’ model.  Because 
the ‘saturated’ model includes all main effects and all two-way interactions, it has a separate parameter for each 
observation, and therefore should fit the data most completely.  Model fit was done by assessing the deviance, where 
smaller deviance indicates better model fit, or smallest variance left unexplained.   In addition, the AIC was also 
assessed.  The AIC compares the log-likelihoods of the two models, but also takes into account the complexity of 
the model and/or sample size.  Smaller AIC values indicate better model fit. The goodness of fit was not adequate 
for any of our models, but this is likely due to our small sample size (n = 7), meaning that any deviation seems 
significant as the test is not very robust.  Model predicted case count values were compared to the observed values; 
models that more closely predicted the observed values were considered better fits.  Model complexity (number of 
variables) was also considered, with the ultimate goal of finding the simplest possible model that explains the most 
variability in the data (the most parsimonious model).  
 
Applying the above mentioned methods led to the selection of a model that included the main effects of M2, HL7, 
and DRSi and the interaction terms of DRSi-M2 and DRSi-HL7. According to this model, the number of cases 
missed by all data sources (when all parameters are held at zero) is 827.  The parameter estimates for the model are 
interpreted (29) as the impact each variable has on determining the number of missed cases.  Therefore, the model 
predicts that using the case count data from DRSi alone decreases the number of missed cases by 2.4%.  Using HL7 




When both DRSi and HL7 are used the number of missed cases decreases 9 fold, and when both DRSi and M2 are 
used the number of missed cases decreases by more than 3 fold.   
 
Based on the estimated number of missing Lyme borreliosis cases, the reporting completeness of M2 was 
determined to be forty-four percent; this was twenty-three percent higher than that of HL7 and thirty-four percent 
higher than DRSi.  Because all three systems theoretically encompass the same population, and because we limited 
the M2 data sources to only those at military treatment facilities, the differences in reporting completeness are likely 
due to differences in data types.  Since DRSi data only include reportable medical events, the observed low 
reporting completeness of DRSi may reflect poor compliance with medical event reporting policy or it may be 
because not all physician entered ICD entries are associated with confirmed diagnoses that would require an 
associated reportable medical event report.  The HL7 data only include laboratory confirmed diagnoses of Lyme 
borreliosis.  In contrast to DRSi data, HL7 data come directly from the electronic hospital information system; 
therefore it does not require any additional reports to be filed.  The lower reporting completeness of HL7 may be 
explained by the fact that Lyme borreliosis cases do not require laboratory confirmation in order to be considered a 
case. The M2 cases, in comparison, are neither limited to those diagnosed via laboratory methods nor to those with 
an accompanying RME record.  For the purpose of this study, the cases reported to M2 included all inpatient and 
outpatient medical event encounters associated with a diagnosis of Lyme borreliosis at military treatment facilities.  
 
Expanding completeness calculations to include more than one data source (Table 4.9), indicates the combined use 
of all three data sources produces the most completely captures the number of Lyme disease cases in this population.  
Specifically, the use of all three data sources simultaneously improves the reporting completeness by 12% as 










Table 4.11:  Capture-Recapture Overlap 
 Cases Captured by 
Cases Captured by HL7 DRSi M2 
HL7 NA 64% 25% 
DRSi 30% NA 17% 
M2 52% 71% NA 
Table is read as % of cases from column data source that were also captured by row data source. 
 
The inclusion of interaction terms in the selected model implies conditional independence of sources.  Specifically, 
DRSi is not independent of HL7 and DRSi is not independent of M2, but HL7 and M2 are independent of each other 
given DRSi. Applying what we know about these data sources and looking at the overlap analysis done in Table 
4.11, this relationship may be explained by the fact that DRSi has a case finding module with the capability to 
incorporate existing HL7 laboratory data (30% of the HL7 cases were also found in DRSi).  Also, because DRSi 
tracks reportable medical events, it is possible that physicians want to be certain of their diagnosis before submitting 
their medical event report, making laboratory confirmation of these cases more likely (64% of the DRSi cases were 
also found in HL7).  The DRSi to M2 interaction is interesting, as we know that M2 does not receive direct data 
feeds of the medical event reports contained in DRSi.  In this case these two sources would show negative 
dependence if the cases in DRSi did not have a chance of entering the M2 data source.  However, this is not the 
case, as DRSi reports exist separately from patient’s regular electronic medical records.  Therefore the 17% of the 
M2 cases that are also represented in DRSi and the 71% of the DRSi cases that are also in M2 probably represent 
chance overlap in cases.  
Conclusions 
 
Based on these findings this section of the study recommends the use all three data sources in combination when 
assessing the number of cases associated with a particular disease.  This study finds M2 to be the most 
comprehensive military human medical data source, but because of substantial underlap between all three sources, 
and as indicated by log-linear modeling, it recommended that data from all three sources are incorporated in order to 




Overall conclusion  
 
The aim of this study was to conduct a systematic comparison of the human medical data systems most commonly 
used for public health surveillance in the U.S. Army in order to recommend the one(s) most suited for use in the 
USAPHC ZDR.  This is the first comprehensive assessment of military human medical data systems for the purpose 
of zoonotic disease reporting.  Although the study is geared towards meeting the specific goals of the U.S. Army 
Public Health Command Zoonotic Disease Report, the approach used to evaluate and compare the data systems can 
be adapted for use in evaluating data systems in general.  One of the primary strengths of the study was the 
comprehensive approach used to conduct the assessment.  The approach included the following three phases: 1) 
detailed system descriptions, 2) a comparison of specific data systems attributes, and 3) an evaluation of each 
system’s data quality.  As listed in chapter 3, the study started with detailed system descriptions based on a 
combination of literature reviews, interviews with system administrators and end users, and one-on-one 
demonstrations of system use.  The knowledge acquired about each system during this phase of the study permitted 
the informed assessments of each data system’s attributes conducted during the next two phases, as outlined in this 
chapter.  In addition, the use of a standardized framework based on the specific goals and objectives of the ZDR, 
was critical to the successful comparison of the different data systems.  Due to significant differences between the 
systems, a direct comparison could not have otherwise been conducted.  A great deal was learned by conducting the 
case count queries.  The queries not only permitted the subsequent capture-recapture and log-linear modeling 
analysis, but also a determination of data system  “user-friendliness” such as simplicity, flexibility, timeliness, and 
stability.  In fact, had the analysis ended with the data system attribute comparison, a completely different data 
system would have been recommended.  The capture-recapture and log-linear modeling analysis permitted a 
quantitative assessment of the data quality of the data sources for the remaining data systems.  The findings, in 
combination with the background knowledge of each system, facilitated the selection of final three data sources.  
Another strength was the selection of a disease with a case definition listed in the Armed Forces Reportable Medical 
Event Guidelines.  This eliminated arbitrary variation in case definition from the list of reasons for differences in 
case counts, and allowed us to focus on the differences attributed to target populations, data sources, and data types.  
Lastly, because the overarching objective of the ZDR is to improve force health protection, a goal common to all of 




This study was conducted with the very specific goals of the ZDR in mind, focusing more on external validity than 
internal validity.  In other words, the data systems that were found to best suit the goals of the ZDR are merely that, 
better sources of data for the specific purpose of the ZDR.  This does not mean that the other systems are inadequate, 
only that the other systems did not meet the needs of the ZDR at this time.  In addition, the results of the capture-
recapture and subsequent log-linear modeling had several limitations.  Due to the lack of reliable case count data 
from DMSS and ESSENCE during the study period, it was not possible to fully assess all five of the original data 
systems.  In addition, because the credibility of any estimate is only as good as the accuracy of the information used, 
the issue of data accuracy must be discussed.  Although all sources used case definitions based on the Armed Forces 
Reportable Medical Event Guidelines, each individual case was entered in the system by a person, therefore 
mistakes in data entry are always possible.  Because we did not have access to individual records, we were unable to 
confirm the accuracy of the data contained in our queries.  Also, although social security numbers were used as 
unique identifiers for case matching, mistakes in data entry related to these numbers could lead to inaccurate 




This study recommends the combined use of M2, HL7, and DRSi as the data sources of military human medical data 
for use in the Public Health Command Zoonotic Disease Report.  Although the M2 data system represents the most 
comprehensive and reliable source of both medical and population data, substantial underlaps with the other two 
data sources and the results of log-linear modeling indicate the most reliable predictor of case count data to be the 
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Query Process:  Specific Case Definitions 
 
The USAPHC Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio, Disease Epidemiology Program personnel has 
direct access to the DRSi, M2, and ESSENCE data systems.  This permitted query requests to remain “informal” and 
internal to the study team.  Obtaining the data contained within the DMSS and HL7 systems, on the other hand, 
required “formal” request processes. 
 
The following parameters were applied to all data queries performed or requested: 
 1.  All cases of hantavirus, leptospirosis, leishmaniosis, and borreliosis that met the case definition. 
 2.  Population to include all Service members and other beneficiaries. 
 3.  Limit cases counts to those associated with Army Installations. 
 4.  Limit to cases reported or diagnosed and laboratory tests between 1 April 2011 to 30 April 2012. 
 
In addition, the following system specific criteria were applied: 
 
DMSS-  Formal request to Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center for all cases of leptospirosis, leishmaniosis, 
 borreliosis, and hantavirus with the following case definitions based on the Armed Forces 
 Reportable Medical Events Guidelines (22): 
 
 Leptospirosis: Case definition includes all ICD-9 codes associated with leptospirosis (100.0, 100.8, 
 100.9) in any of the diagnostic positions; 1 inpatient encounter, 1 reportable event, or 2 outpatient visits 
 within 2 weeks. Incident rule of 1 case per lifetime; inclusion in this study required the diagnosis to occur 
 between 1 April 2011 to 30 April 2012. 
 
 Borreliosis: Case definition includes ICD-9 code 088.81 associated with borreliosis   
 in any of the diagnostic positions; 1 inpatient encounter, 1 reportable event, or 2 outpatient visits   
 within 2 weeks. Incident rule of 1 case per lifetime; inclusion in this study required the diagnosis to occur 
 between 1 April 2011 to 30 April 2012. 
 
 Leishmaniosis: Case definition includes all ICD-9 codes associated with leishmaniosis (085.0-  
 085.9) in any of the diagnostic positions; 1 inpatient encounter, 1 reportable event, or 2 outpatient  
 visits within 2 weeks. Incident rule of 1 case per lifetime; inclusion in this study required the diagnosis to 
 occur between 1 April 2011 to 30 April 2012.   
 
 Hantavirus: Case definition includes ICD-9 code 079.81 associated with hantavirus in any of the   
 diagnostic positions; 1 inpatient encounter, 1 reportable event, or 2 outpatient visits within 2 weeks.  
 Incident rule of 1 case per lifetime; inclusion in this study required the diagnosis to occur  between 1 April 
 2011 to 30 April 2012. 
 
HL7-      Formal request to Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (EpiData Center) for all laboratory 
 confirmed cases of leptospirosis, leishmaniosis, borreliosis, and hantavirus as defined in the Armed 
 Forces Reportable Medical Events Guidelines (22): 
 
 Leptospirosis:  Any of the following  
 • Fourfold or greater increase in Leptospira agglutination titer between acute and convalescent serum 
 specimens obtained ≥ 2 weeks apart and studied at the same laboratory;  
 • Demonstration of Leptospira in a clinical specimen by immunofluorescence;  
 • Isolation and typing from blood or other clinical materials by culture of pathogenic leptospires;  
 • Positive serology, preferably by the Microscopic Agglutination Test (MAT). Ideally, the panel of 




 • Detection of leptospiral DNA by PCR.  
 
 Leishmaniosis 
 1. Cutaneous and Mucosal/Mucocutaneous:  
 • Positive parasitology (stained smear or culture from the lesion); or  
 • PCR-positive.  
 
 2. Visceral: 
 • Positive parasitology (stained smears from bone marrow, spleen, liver, lymph node, blood or culture of 
 the organism from a biopsy or aspirated material); or  
 • Positive serology (rK39 assay).  
 
 Borreliosis:   
 For the purposes of surveillance, the definition of a qualified laboratory assay is   
 • Positive Culture for B. burgdorferi; or 
 • Two-tier testing in accordance with CDC Notifiable Infectious Diseases criteria where: 
  -Positive IgM is sufficient only when ≤30 days from symptom onset  
  -Positive IgG is sufficient at any point during illness  
 
 • Single-tier IgG immunoblot seropositivity in accordance with CDC and DoD criteria; or  
 • CSF antibody positive for B. burgdorferi by Enzyme Immunoassay (EIA) or  Immunofluorescence 
 Assay (IFA), when the titer is higher than it was in serum 
 
 Hantavirus:  
 • Detection of hantavirus-specific IgM or rising titers of hantavirus-specific IgG; or 
 • Detection of hantavirus-specific RNA sequence by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in clinical 
 specimens; or  
 • Detection of hantavirus antigen by immunohistochemistry.  
 
DRSi-    Informal request to USAPHC Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio personnel for all 
 confirmed Medical Event Reports based on the Armed Forces Reportable Medical Event case 
 definitions for leptospirosis (reference ICD-9s:100.0, 100.8, 100.9), borreliosis (reference ICD-9 088.81), 
 leishmaniosis (reference ICD-9s: 085.0-085.9), and hantavirus (reference ICD-9 code 079.81) (22). 
 
 Leptospirosis:  Case definition includes a clinically compatible case that is laboratory-confirmed. 
 
 Laboratory confirmation includes any of the following:  
 • Fourfold or greater increase in Leptospira agglutination titer between acute and convalescent serum 
 specimens obtained ≥ 2 weeks apart and studied at the same laboratory;  
 • Demonstration of Leptospira in a clinical specimen by immunofluorescence;  
 • Isolation and typing from blood or other clinical materials by culture of pathogenic leptospires;  
 • Positive serology, preferably by the Microscopic Agglutination Test (MAT). Ideally, the panel of 
 Leptospira strains used for antigens should be representative of the locally occurring strains; or  
 • Detection of leptospiral DNA by PCR.  
 
  Borreliosis:   Case definitions include 
 • A case that meets the clinical criteria for diagnosis of EM with a known exposure;  
 • A case of EM with laboratory evidence of infection and without a known exposure; or  
 • A case with at least one late manifestation that has laboratory evidence of infection.  
 
 Laboratory evidence of infection includes any of the following: 
 • Positive Culture for B. burgdorferi; or 
 • Two-tier testing in accordance with CDC Notifiable Infectious Diseases criteria where: 




  -Positive IgG is sufficient at any point during illness  
 
 • Single-tier IgG immunoblot seropositivity in accordance with CDC and DoD criteria; or  
 • CSF antibody positive for B. burgdorferi by Enzyme Immunoassay (EIA) or Immunofluorescence 
 Assay (IFA), when the titer is higher than it was in serum.  
 
 Exposure is defined as having been (≤ 30 days before onset of EM) in wooded, brushy, or grassy areas 
(i.e., potential tick habitats) in a county in which Lyme disease is endemic. A history of tick bite is  not required. 
 
 Leishmaniosis:  Any of the following 
 1. Cutaneous and Mucosal/Mucocutaneous:  
 A case that has a clinically compatible lesion with parasitological confirmation of the diagnosis (positive 
 smear or culture).  
 2. Visceral:   
 A case exhibiting clinical signs with serological and/or parasitological confirmation of leishmaniosis.  
 
 Hantavirus:  Case definition includes a clinically compatible case that is laboratory-confirmed.  
 
 Laboratory confirmation includes any of the following: 
 • Detection of hantavirus-specific IgM or rising titers of hantavirus-specific IgG; or 
 • Detection of hantavirus-specific RNA sequence by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in clinical 
 specimens; or  
 • Detection of hantavirus antigen by immunohistochemistry.  
 
 
M2-        Informal request to USAPHC Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio personnel using case 
 definitions in accordance with the Armed Forces Reportable Medical Events Guidelines (22) for 
 leptospirosis, borreliosis, leishmaniasis, and hantavirus as outlined in the DMSS section (see above). 
  
 
ESSENCE- Informal request to USAPHC Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio personnel. 
 
 The initial intent was to use groups of syndromes to perform a syndromic query.  However, without access 
 to unique identifiers it would not be possible to apply incidence rules or confirm diagnoses and therefore 
 the data would not be comparable to the other sources.  Instead the query was performed with user-defined 
 syndrome groups based on the following ICD-9 codes: 
 
 Leptospirosis: Case definition includes all health encounter entries listing ICD-9 codes associated with 
 leptospirosis (100.0, 100.8, 100.9).  Inclusion in this study required the entry occurred between 1 April 
 2011 to 30 April  2012. 
 
 Borreliosis: Case definition includes all health encounter entries listing ICD-9 code 088.81 associated with 
 borreliosis.  Inclusion in this study required the entry occurred between 1 April  2011 to 30 April  2012.  
 
 Leishmaniosis: Case definition includes all health encounter entries listing ICD-9 codes associated with 
 leishmaniosis (085.0-085.9).  Inclusion in this study required the entry occurred between 1 April 2011 to 30 
 April 2012.  
 
 Hantavirus: Case definition includes all health encounter entries listing ICD-9 code 079.81 associated with 












SAS Code for Capture Recapture 
 
proc freq; 




SAS Output from Capture Recapture (PROC FREQ) 
 





1 1 1 95 9.13 95 9.13 
0 1 1 112 10.77 207 19.90 
1 0 1 42 4.04 249 23.94 
0 0 1 575 55.29 824 79.23 
1 1 0 28 2.69 852 81.92 
0 1 0 161 15.48 1013 97.40 








Over and Underlap Analysis 
Capture Recapture Data 
DRSi HL7 M2 Cell Letter Frequency 
1 1 1 a 95 
0 1 1 b 112 
1 0 1 c 42 
0 0 1 d 575 
1 1 0 e 28 
0 1 0 f 161 
1 0 0 g 27 
Cells a through g represents observed data. 
Cell x represents the expected or estimated number of missing cases given the selected model. 
    
Nobs = a+b+c+d+e+f+g = 1040 
NDRSi = a+c+e+g = 192  NHL7 = a+b+e+f = 396  NM2 = a +b+c+d = 824 
 
Percent of data capture simultaneously by DRSi and HL7 = (a+e)/ Nobs = (95 + 28)/1040 = 12% 
Percent of data capture simultaneously by DRSi and M2 = (a+c)/ Nobs = (95 + 42)/1040 = 13% 
Percent of data capture simultaneously by HL7 and M2 = (a+b)/ Nobs = (95+112)/1040 = 20% 
 
Overlap  
Percent of DRSi data simultaneously captured by HL7 = (a+e)/ NDRSi = (95 + 28)/192 = 64% 
Percent of DRSi data simultaneously captured by M2 = (a+c)/ NDRSi = (95 + 42)/192 = 71% 
 
Percent of HL7 data simultaneously captured by DRSi = (a+d)/ NHL7 = (95 + 28)/396 = 30% 
Percent of HL7 data simultaneously captured by M2 = (a+b)/ NHL7 = (95 + 112)/396 = 52% 
 
Percent of M2 data simultaneously captured by DRSi = (a+c)/ NM2 = (95 + 42)/824 = 17% 
Percent of M2 data simultaneously captured by HL7 = (a+b)/ NM2 = (95 + 112)/824 = 25% 
 
Capture-Recapture Overlap 
 Cases Captured by 
Cases Captured by HL7 DRSi M2 
HL7 NA 64% 25% 
DRSi 30% NA 17% 
M2 52% 71% NA 
Table is read as % of cases from column data source that were also captured by row data source. 
 
Underlap 
Percent of DRSi data missed by HL7 = (c+g)/ NDRSi = (42 + 27)/192 = 36% 
Percent of DRSi data missed by M2 = (e+g)/ NDRSi = (28 + 27)/192 = 29% 
 
Percent of HL7data missed by DRSi = (b+f)/ NHL7 = (112 + 161)/396 = 69% 
Percent of HL7data missed by M2 = (e+f)/ NHL7 = (28 + 161)/396 = 48% 
 
Percent of M2data missed by DRSi = (b+d)/ NM2 = (112 + 575)/824 = 83% 






 Cases Captured by 
Cases Missed by HL7 DRSi M2 
HL7 NA 36% 75% 
DRSi 69% NA 83% 
M2 48% 29% NA 









Borreliosis Capture Recapture Data in SAS PROC GENMOD Format 
 
DRSi HL7 M2 w r 
1 1 1 1 95 
0 1 1 1 112 
1 0 1 1 42 
0 0 1 1 575 
1 1 0 1 28 
0 1 0 1 161 
1 0 0 1 27 
0 0 0 0  
 
The above table is used to import the data into SAS.  With k = 3 sources there are 2k data points or observations or 8 
observations, yet, in the case of capture-recapture there is only seven as we are estimating the final observation.  
Number of cases is designated by ‘r’ and ‘w’ designates the weight.  The number of cases missed by all data sources 
will be ‘0’, as this observation is unknown.  Weights of ‘1’ are assigned to all observed data points and ‘0’ to the 
unknown number of missed cases.  This weighting ensures that the unknown number of missed cases will not be 























Appendix E-4  
 
Using SAS 9.3 PROC GENMOD for Three Source Analysis 
 
It is necessary to specify the response (y) and weight variables; here they were respectively designated as 'r' and 'w'.  
Also, the error distribution must be specified; for our model selection this distribution was specified as Poisson.  
Type 3 analysis does not depend on the order in which the terms for the model are specified, which is appropriate.  
The class statement used in the saturated model (and subsequent models) specifies the classification variables to be 
used in the analysis.  The ‘ref= ‘0’ param = ref’ specifies one-way comparisons with ‘0’ as the referent group.   
 
The below coding was used to create the eight log-linear models for this three source analysis. 
 
/* Main Effects Model*/ 
title 'Main Effects Only'; 
proc genmod; 
class DRSI (REF = '0' param = ref) HL7 (REF = '0' param = ref) M2 (REF = '0' param = ref); 
weight w; 
model r= DRSi HL7 M2/p dist = poisson type3; 
output out=predicted p=pred;  
run; 
 
/* Saturated Model*/ 
title 'Saturated Model-p2';  
proc genmod; 
class DRSI (REF = '0' param = ref) HL7 (REF = '0' param = ref) M2 (REF = '0' param = ref); 
weight w; 
model r= DRSi HL7 M2 DRSi*HL7 DRSi*M2 HL7*M2/p dist = poisson type3; 
output out=p2 p=pred;  
run; 
 
/* Model with DRSi*HL7 Intx-p3*/ 
title 'Model with DRSi*HL7 Intx'; 
proc genmod; 
class DRSI (REF = '0' param = ref) HL7 (REF = '0' param = ref) M2 (REF = '0' param = ref); 
weight w; 
model r= DRSi HL7 M2 DRSi*HL7/p dist = poisson type3; 
output out=p3 p=pred; 
run; 
 
/* Model with DRSi*M2 Intx-p4*/ 
title 'Model with DRSi*M2 Intx'; 
proc genmod; 
class DRSI (REF = '0' param = ref) HL7 (REF = '0' param = ref) M2 (REF = '0' param = ref); 
weight w; 
model r= DRSi HL7 M2 DRSi*M2/p dist = poisson type3; 
output out=p4 p=pred; 
run; 
 
/* Model with HL7*M2 Intx-p5*/ 
title 'Model with HL7*M2 Intx'; 
proc genmod; 
class DRSI (REF = '0' param = ref) HL7 (REF = '0' param = ref) M2 (REF = '0' param = ref); 
weight w; 
model r= DRSi HL7 M2 HL7*M2/p dist = poisson type3; 
output out=p5 p=pred; 
run; 
 
/* Model with DRSi*HL7 and DRSi*M2 Intx-p6*/ 
title 'Model with DRSi*HL7 and DRSi*M2 Intx'; 
proc genmod; 
class DRSI (REF = '0' param = ref) HL7 (REF = '0' param = ref) M2 (REF = '0' param = ref); 
weight w; 
model r= DRSi HL7 M2 DRSi*HL7 DRSi*M2/p dist = poisson type3; 
output out=p6 p=pred; 
run; 
 




title 'Model with DRSi*HL7 and HL7*M2 Intx'; 
proc genmod; 
class DRSI (REF = '0' param = ref) HL7 (REF = '0' param = ref) M2 (REF = '0' param = ref); 
weight w; 
model r= DRSi HL7 M2 DRSi*HL7 HL7*M2/p dist = poisson type3; 
output out=p7 p=pred; 
run; 
 
/* Model with DRSi*HL7 and HL7*M2 Intx-p8*/ 
title 'Model with DRSi*M2 and HL7*M2 Intx'; 
proc genmod; 
class DRSI (REF = '0' param = ref) HL7 (REF = '0' param = ref) M2 (REF = '0' param = ref); 
weight w; 
model r= DRSi HL7 M2 DRSi*M2 HL7*M2/p dist = poisson type3; 








Completeness Calculations  
 
Capture Recapture Data 
DRSi HL7 M2 Cell Letter Estimated Data 
1 1 1 a 95 
0 1 1 b 112 
1 0 1 c 42 
0 0 1 d 575 
1 1 0 e 28 
0 1 0 f 161 
1 0 0 g 27 
0 0 0 x 827 
Cells a through g represents observed data. 
Cell x represents the expected or estimated number of missing cases given the selected model. 
    
Nobs = a+b+c+d+e+f+g = 1040 
NDRSi = a+c+e+g = 192   NHL7 = a+b+e+f = 396   NM2 = a +b+c+d = 824 
 
The selected model predicts the number of missed cases, x, is 827.  Therefore, the actual total number of cases 
predicted by the model is: 
 




Reporting Completeness to DRSi = (a+c+e+g)/N = 192/1867 = 0.103 or 10.3% 
Reporting Completeness to HL7 = (a+b+e+f) /N = 396/ 1867 = 0.212or 21.2% 
Reporting Completeness to M2 = (a+b+c+d) /N = 824/1867 = 0.441 or 44.1% 
 
Summary for Data Source Reporting Completeness Analysis 









Appendix G-4  
 
Selected Output from Log-linear Modeling 
 
Predicted Capture-Recapture Data by Model  
Each row specifies the source of data  
Each column in the “Predicted” section specifies the interaction terms included in the model 
Actual  Predicted 
Data 






















HL7, M2 95 95.00 32.64 36.63 33.72 65.86 87.77 34.42 64.30 
HL7, M2 112 112.00 202.91 183.67 173.28 146.19 112.00 172.58 142.70 
DRSi, 
M2 42 42.00 81.56 100.37 100.50 36.95 49.23 102.58 42.00 
M2 575 575.00 506.89 503.33 516.50 575.00 575.00 514.42 575.00 
DRSi, 
HL7 28 28.00 22.24 14.70 30.78 57.14 35.23 28.00 58.70 
HL7 161 161.00 138.21 161.00 158.22 126.81 161.00 161.00 130.30 
DRSi 27 27.00 55.55 40.30 27.00 32.05 19.77 27.00 27.00 
 x 1802.83 345.26 441.21 138.76 498.8 826.56 155.25 369.64 
All models include each data source (3 main effect variables).  
The Main Effects model, aka independent model does not include any interactions. 
The Full model includes all main effects and all two way interactions. 
Each subsequent model includes the 3 main effects in addition to the interaction terms listed in the table. 
X represents the estimated number of missing cases based on the model. 
 
 
Log-Linear Parameter Estimates  
for Model with DRSi-HL7 and M2-DRSi 
  Wald 95% CI 
  
  




Limit Wald x2 pr>x2 
Intercept 1 6.72 0.1299 6.46 6.97 2673.27 <0.0001 
DRSi 1 -3.73 0.2106 -4.15 -3.32 314.3 <0.0001 
HL7 1 -1.64 0.1033 -1.84 -1.43 250.86 <0.0001 
M2 1 -0.36 0.123 -0.60 -0.12 8.7 0.0032 
DRSi-HL7 1 2.21 0.1825 1.86 2.57 147.24 <0.0001 






Chapter 5:  A Model Using Service Member Pet Dogs as Sentinels in Zoonotic 






American Veterinary Medical Association One Health Imperative  
 
In 2008 the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) published the One Health: A New Professional 
Imperative (1).  The stated vision of the document is “to promote and improve the health of humans, animals and 
our environment, individually and collectively, by encouraging and ensuring the acceptance and adoption of One 
Health and its associated activities”.  It defines One Health as the collaborative effort of multiple disciplines-
working locally, nationally, and globally – to attain optimal health for people, animals and our environment.  The 
seventy-one page document discusses how the health of people, animals, and the environment are interconnected.  It 
highlights that of the approximately 1,500 diseases recognized in humans; almost 60% are due to multi-host 
pathogens characterized by their movement across species lines and that over the last 3 decades, nearly 75% of the 
new emerging human infectious diseases have been zoonotic.  The document also mentions how the degradation of 
the environment creates favorable settings for the expansion of existing infectious diseases for both human and 
animal health.   The AVMA One Health Imperative is dedicated to finding a holistic, collaborative approach to 
contemporary health issues through the convergence of human, animal, and environmental domains (1).   
  
One Health in the Military 
 
The AVMA also discusses the numerous organizations that have already recognized the need to integrate human, 
animal, and environmental health and have taken steps to develop new programs and partnerships to support that 
integration. Some such organizations include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Wildlife Conservation 




linking health operations in monitoring, surveillance, and laboratory systems.  Briefly, in 1986, the Army 
established a data center to support its HIV-related screening, clinical care, and epidemiological research programs 
(2). By 1993, the system transitioned to the Army Medical Surveillance System, expanding its scope to include all 
illnesses and injuries of public health or military operational importance.  In 1997, the Army Medical Surveillance 
System transitioned to the Defense Medical Surveillance System, and the Army Medical Surveillance Activity 
(AMSA) was assigned responsibility for its operation (2).  In 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the 
Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC), by partnering AMSA, the DoD Global Emerging Infectious 
Disease Surveillance and Response System (DoD-GEIS), and the Global Health Surveillance Activity (3).  In 2011, 
under the direction of the U.S. Army Surgeon General, the former U.S. Army Veterinary Command (VETCOM) 
joined with the former U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) to create 
the new U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) (4).  The mission statement for this new Command is: 
“Promote health and prevent disease, injury, and disability of Soldiers and military retirees, their Families, and 
Department of the Army civilian employees; and assure effective execution of full spectrum veterinary service for 
Army and Department of Defense Veterinary missions”(5).  The command combines the technical skills of multiple 
disciplines, including veterinarians, physicians, entomologists, laboratory specialists, epidemiologists, and many 
others in order to achieve the USAPHC mission.  Although not explicitly stated as such, the mission of the 
USAPHC fully embodies the One Health concept. 
 
In 2011, the Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Portfolio, Disease Epidemiology Program within the USAPHC 
initiated development of a Zoonotic Disease Report (ZDR) to provide U.S. Army public health personnel with 
critical health information regarding the presence and spread of zoonotic pathogens and to create opportunities for 
improved preventive medicine strategies. The audience of the ZDR is US Army Public Health Command Regional 
and District level Commanders, as well as veterinarians and public health and preventive medicine professionals 
throughout the Army. The report combines zoonotic disease information from diverse sources, including: extant 
Army/DoD human disease databases, data generated by the Laboratory Services Portfolio for arthropod borne 
disease surveillance as well as rabies specimen testing, and animal data from intergovernmental organizations’ 




seen at U.S. Army Veterinary Treatment Facilities once the web-based electronic medical record known as the 
Remote Online Veterinary Record (ROVR) is fully deployed.   
The overall aim of this study was to demonstrate the utility of zoonotic disease data from pet dogs seen at U.S. 
Army Veterinary Treatment Facilities as sentinel surveillance for military human populations.  Based on feedback 
from a stakeholder survey, where USAPHC commanders and public health officials were asked to list zoonotic 
diseases of concern, Lyme disease was selected as the zoonotic disease for this pilot study.  Therefore, the specific 
aim of this study was to evaluate canine Borrelia seroprevalence data as sentinel surveillance for Lyme disease in 
military populations, serving as a model for the ZDR. 
 
Background 
Animals as Sentinels 
 
The goal of using animals as sentinels for human disease surveillance is to estimate disease risk in order to make 
informed recommendations on preventive practices and therapeutic protocols.  In order to serve as sentinels, the 
animal models must be susceptible to the pathogen and must produce a measurable symptom or response that 
indicates exposure or infection (6).  It is also important that the diagnostic samples are easily obtained and that 
accurate diagnostic tests are available (6).  Therefore, in order for dogs to serve as effective sentinels for Lyme 
disease in humans, they should be more likely to be exposed or infected than their human counterparts and/or should 
have a more rapidly detectable disease progression.  These criteria ensure the risk assessment information from the 
sentinel animals is timely and allows for protection of the human counterparts. 
 
Military Pets as Sentinels 
 
Pets are very important to military populations.  With frequent moves (every 2-3 years), the family pet is often the 
most reliable friend a military child can have.  Also, the consistency of a family pet can greatly help when a parent, 
spouse, or significant other is deployed overseas for extended periods of time.   Pets in the military are eligible for 




care at reduced rates.  Before each move these military pets receive free comprehensive health physicals in 
conjunction with mandatory health certificates from the departure site and if they move on to a military installation 
they may also be required to undergo in-processing physicals at the arrival site.  These frequent physical 
examinations and associated laboratory work provides the U.S. Army VTFs the opportunity to build a robust animal 
disease database.  Also, because they spend their time in the same geographic location and precise environmental 
areas as their owners, military pets have the potential to serve as appropriate indicators for disease than civilian 
(general population) pet dogs.   
 
One application of the animal disease data from the Army VTFs is at the group level for area prevalence and 
incidence estimates, where information about the existence of a zoonotic pathogen in the pet population may alert 
human physicians to the risk of the disease in humans.  Another application is at the individual animal level, where a 
pet may serve as a marker for environmental exposures in the owners; for example, a dog that is diagnosed with lead 
poisoning should trigger an investigation into where the dog was exposed, and may reveal lead based paints having 
been used in the house.   
 
Lyme disease and Military Relevance 
 
Lyme disease is the most commonly reported vector-borne illness in U.S. and the seventh most common Nationally 
Notifiable disease (7).  Caused by the spirochetal bacterium Borrelia burgdorferi, it is transmitted to humans 
through the bite of infected Ixodes spp. ticks.  Successful transfer of the pathogen from the invertebrate host to the 
vertebrate host requires the tick to remain attached during the 36 to 48 hour feeding time.  Typical symptoms in 
humans include fever, headache, fatigue, and a characteristic skin rash called erythema migrans (EM).  If left 
untreated, infection can spread to joints, the heart, and the nervous system.  Sixty percent of those infected develop 
chronic, severe arthritis (66).  Even with treatment, 10-20% may develop Post-Treatment Lyme Disease Syndrome 
(PTLDS) (7). In 1998, direct medical costs associated with Lyme disease were estimated to be $2,970 per case (8).  
Indirect costs, including associated non-medical costs and projected losses in productivity, were estimated to be 





For the military, the cost associated with lost man-power productivity may also be felt in disrupted military training, 
deployment, and operations.  Because of the significant impact of Lyme disease to military operations and its overall 
potential to threaten public health, a Department of Defense Lyme disease program was established.  The program, 
overseen by the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC), involved listing Lyme disease as one of the 
Department of Defense Tri-Service reportable events (9).  In addition, AFHSC is required to compile an Annual 
Lyme Report, which provides information for cases of Lyme disease diagnosed during the last 10 years. The report 
presents the total cases of Lyme disease, by calendar year, and also provides detail by Service, for active component, 
Reserve/Guard and other beneficiaries.  In 2011 the report showed that Lyme disease cases increased over 1.5 times 
from 2001 to 2007 (10).   A detailed analysis of the communities affected showed that the majority of cases come 
from military sites in the Northeastern United States and Germany (11).   
 
Dogs as Sentinels for human Lyme disease 
 
Human Lyme disease is diagnosed based on symptoms, physical findings (e.g. EM lesion), and the possibility of 
exposure to infected ticks (7, 9).  Laboratory testing is based on antibody testing but can be problematic as results 
merely indicate exposure and not current infection.  Treatment is most successful if implemented in the early stages 
of disease, but many believe PTLDS exists, where even with treatment symptoms may persist for extended periods 
or may never resolve (7, 9).  Due to concerns over side effects and lack of efficacy, human Lyme disease vaccines 
were withdrawn from the market in 2002 (7).  Currently prevention strategies are limited to avoiding exposure such 
as using insect repellent, applying pesticides, reducing tick habitat, and if bitten, promptly removing the tick (7).  
Given the difficulty in diagnosing human Lyme disease, its potential to become a chronic condition, and its 
significant economic impact, it is clear that efforts must be focused preventing exposure. In order to do this one must 
be knowledgeable about the presence of the risk.   
 
There have been many studies (12, 13, 14, 15) exploring the utility of dogs as sentinels for Lyme disease in humans.  
Because of the difficulties associated with detecting the Borrelia antigen, most of these studies have used sero-
positivity as their indicator for risk.  Arguments for their use include that they develop high circulating levels of 




exposed to infected ticks than people) of infection than people (16).  One reason for their greater risk of infection is 
their higher likelihood to be in direct contact with the ticks; more time outdoors and more time running through tall 
grasses, bushes and trees.  Another reason is that attached ticks are less likely to be detected because of the animal’s 
hair coat, which allows the tick the full 36-48 hours needed to transfer the pathogen to them.   There are, however, 
some potential limitations too.  First, 95% of infected dogs remain without clinical signs; which means that they 
may not produce outwardly visible signs to warn us of the risk of disease (17).  This may not be much of an issue in 
regions where clinics practice routine annual tick titer screening, but may still be an issue in regions where Borrelia 
is less common or just now emerging.  Second, unlike their human counter parts, many dogs are on routine flea and 
tick control.  This may mean that some humans are actually at a higher risk than their canine counter parts.  Third, as 
with humans, canine sero-positivity does not indicate incident cases but rather a history of exposure and therefore 
cannot be relied upon as a definitive indicator of Lyme disease risk for a precise location or time.  Studies show that 
canine antibodies to Borrelia remain elevated for at least 69 weeks (18), which means the sero-positive dog may 
actually have been exposed more than a year earlier and potentially at an entirely different location.  For this reason, 
it is important to acquire travel history information when trying to use canine sero-positivity as a predictor of Lyme 
disease risk in a given area.   
 
The Borrelia genospecies of concern in the United States, B. burgdorferi sensu sticto (Bb) (17).  Studies using dog 
serology in sentinel surveillance for human Lyme disease in the United States are most likely detecting Bb, not one 
of the other Borreilae genospecies.  Unless otherwise indicated, for the remainder of this document, the Borrelia 
pathogen will be referred to as Bb, the most common disease causing genospecies in the United States.   
 
Structure of this Chapter 
 
Although using dogs as sentinels for Lyme disease risk in humans is not straight forward, careful consideration of 
both the advantages and limitations this approach can still make it a powerful adjunct to human Lyme disease 
surveillance efforts.    Doing so involves three specific objectives, each of which will be addressed in a separate 
section.  The first objective (Section I) is to investigate the utility of using military pet dogs as sentinel surveillance 




military human Borreliosis data.  The second objective is to compare military pet dog data to published civilian pet 
dog data in order to determine if there is a difference between Bb seroprevalence by location.  (Section II).   And 
finally, the third objective (Section III) evaluates the validity of the military pet dog Bb seroprevalence data by 
investigating potential confounders to the association between military pet dog Bb seroprevalence and test result 
location (installation).   
 
This overall approach is outlined in the below diagram.  
 
Figure 5.1:  Overall Study Approach 
  
Military Pet Dog Data 
Civilian Pet Dog Data 
Aim:  Demonstrate military pet dogs as sentinel surveillance in military populations 
Approach: 
Objective 1:  Determine correlation between military pet dog and human data. 
Objective 2:  Compare Borrelia burgdorferi (Bb) sero-prevalence in military pet dogs to 
civilian pet dogs. 
Objective 3:  Investigate potential confounding of the military pet dog Bb sero-
prevalence and location association. 
Military Human Data 
Objective 1 (Section I) 
 Objective 2 (Section II) 




Section I:  Determining the Association between Military Pet Dog and Human Borreliosis 
Data 
 
Studies Using Canine Bb Seroprevalence data in Sentinel Surveillance for Human Borreliosis in Civilian 
Populations 
 
Many studies have demonstrated canine Bb prevalence as sentinel surveillance for human Lyme disease at the state 
or regional level.  A 1991 study of pet dogs in Massachusetts showed estimates of the prevalence of Bb antibody in 
pet dog populations to be a sensitive, reliable, and convenient measure of the potential risk to people in the 
environment for the state of Massachusetts (13).  Olson et al. used both coyote and pet dog serology, to confirm that 
Bb was not enzootic in the San Diego area, finding very low or insignificant rates of infection in these canine 
populations which corresponded to low rates observed in human populations (14).  A Dutch study of hunting dogs 
and their owners showed the same order of seroprevalence of antibodies against Bb in hunters and hunting dogs, 
indicating that estimates of seroprevalence among hunting dogs are predictive of the risk of LB in humans (19).  A 
2004 study showed that both canine seroprevalence and human case count data showed fewer Lyme diseases cases 
from North Carolina as compared to Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, supporting the utility of dogs as a 
sentinel to characterize the risk of Bb transmission to humans in a defined geographical location (15).  
 
In 2009 a national clinic-based serologic survey of pet dog prevalence and geographic distribution for four vector-
borne diseases (Dirofilaria immitis, Anaplasma phagocytophilum, Ehrlichia canis, and Borrelia burgdorferi) was 
done (20).  Results showed that over 5% of tested dogs across the United States were positive for antibodies to B. 
burgdorferi.  The same study showed the highest sero-prevalence in dogs to be in the Northeastern U.S. (11.6%) 
which correlates with the etiologic foci of development for the disease in humans.  In September of 2011 the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention published an article that further discussed this correlation, investigating whether 
or not canine serology could be used as an adjunct to human surveillance for Lyme disease (12).  The study 




suggested that surveillance using dogs as sentinels may be a sensitive marker for increased risk of Lyme disease for 
humans.   
 
The Utility of Military Pet Dog Seroprevalence data in Sentinel Surveillance for Human Borreliosis in 
Military Populations 
 
Equivalent studies had never been performed in military populations, but rising concerns over the continued increase 
in Lyme disease cases in military populations in 2011 provided the motivation to do so (21).  In the military, a 
diagnosis of Lyme disease is a Tri-Service Reportable Event (9).  This means that although all branches of service 
are responsible for implementing their own reporting system, data collection, and quality assurance, the collected 
data are all integrated into the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) database.  Once in DMSS the data 
from all branches of services are available for further analysis.  At the initiation of this study, according to DMSS, 
there appeared to be an increase in the number of reported human cases of Lyme disease at installations both in the 
northeastern part of the United States and in Germany.  In addition, the 2011 creation of the USAPHC and their 
subsequent release of monthly ZDRs set the stage for exploring the use of military pet dogs as sentinel surveillance 
for zoonotic disease in military personnel, specifically in the case of Lyme disease. 
 
In order to determine if military pet dogs can serve as sentinel surveillance for Lyme disease for  military human 
populations, the correlation between canine Bb seroprevalence and human Lyme disease case counts must be 
investigated.  Thus the aim of this phase of the study is to estimate the correlation between Bb seroprevalence in 













Military site selection was based on the rate of Lyme disease by military installation in the human active duty 
population for the ten years before the onset of this study, 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2011.  Case count data 
derived from DMSS where cases of Lyme disease were defined as health encounters with an ICD-9 of 088.81 in any 
diagnostic position, including one  inpatient encounter, one  reportable event, or two outpatient encounters within 60 
days of each other;  limited to incident cases (the earliest encounter defining the case).  Denominator data (person-
time) was based on the number of active duty assigned to the installation on an annual basis.  The resulting rate data, 
cases per 1,000 person-years, allowed for the adjustment of unequal population sizes across the different locations. 
Because population data per installation is only obtainable for active duty personnel in DMSS, this rate data was 
limited to the active military component.   
 
Installation selection was based on calculated cumulative human Lyme disease rates and then weighted (2 x 2011 
cases) rates for all of the installations.  The purpose of the weighting was to place greater emphasis on installations 
with recent increases in Lyme disease; this was used to define emergent installations.  Installations were then sorted 
on the weighted rates and a list of 20 installations with rates higher than 15/100,000 and 15 installations with rates 
less than 6/100,000 were then compiled in order to guide the selection of military veterinary treatment facilities.  In 
order to have 95% confidence in detecting an average seroprevalence of 7% across all installations, it was 
determined that each location should be able to provide data on at least 280 dogs over the course of the one year 
study (19).  The final list of participating military veterinary facilities was determined by working directly with 
USAPHC Veterinary Animal Medicine Program personnel, where only facilities with sufficient workload and 










Human Military Lyme Disease Data 
 
Sources 
Military human case count data derived from two different sources.  For consistency purposes, DMSS was again 
queried for Lyme disease case count data.  In addition, based on data from a separate study that indicates M2 
(Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool) is a more suitable source of human military 
data for zoonotic disease reporting, a query for Lyme disease cases from M2 was also submitted.  There are two 
main difference between the systems; M2’s ability to collect data from civilian medical facilities (non-military 
referral clinics) and M2’s ability to pull data from all military health system beneficiaries; active duty Service 
members and retirees and the dependents of both populations.  Both systems were queried by third party personnel; 
M2 by the U.S. Army Public Health Command and DMSS by the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center 
(AFHSC).  Queries were conducted based on written requests containing identical case definitions. 
 
The data provided from DMSS were in the form of counts and rates.  Case count data was determined by the number 
of cases of Lyme disease in the active duty population per military installation for the one year period from 1 
November 2012 to 31 October 2013. Rate data was calculated using annual person-time by installation as 
determined by number of active duty records on file for that installation in the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) for the one year period.  The DMDC serves to collate personnel, manpower, training, financial, and other 
data for the Department of Defense, cataloguing it for purposes of healthcare, retirement funding and other 
administrative needs (22).   In order to adjust for unequal population sizes across the different locations, the rate data 
were calculated as the number of cases per 100,000.   
 
In order to be comparable, the data from M2 data were also in the form of counts and rates.  Cases count data were 
again determined by the number of cases of Lyme disease per military installation for the one year period from 1 
November 2012 to 31 October 2013. However, because the population data in M2 comes from the Defense 




computerized database that maintains personnel and benefits information for active, retired, and reserve service 
personnel as well as their family members and DoD civil service personnel and eligible contractors (23).   The 
enormity of this potential population exceeded he capabilities of the M2 query module, therefore the data was 
instead retrieved directly from the Military Health System Repository (MDR).  The MDR case count data included 
active duty, retirees, and their dependents.  In order to adjust for unequal population sizes across the different 
locations, rates were calculated.  In order to adjust for unequal population sizes across the different locations, the 
rate data were again calculated as the number of cases per 100,000. 
 
Case Definition 
In both medical data systems a confirmed case of Lyme disease was documented with an ICD-9 code of 088.81 and 
was clinically defined based on Armed Forces guidelines and case definition as 1) a diagnosis of erythema migrans 
(EM) by an experienced clinician with a known exposure (history of time spent in endemic area), 2) a diagnosis of 
EM with laboratory evidence (culture, IgG, IgM) of infection and without a known exposure, or 3) a case with at 
least one late manifestation (neuromuscular, neurologic, cardiovascular) that has laboratory evidence of infection.  
Case count data for both medical data systems were based on a surveillance definition of a health encounter with the 
ICD-9 code of 088.81 in any diagnostic position, including 1 inpatient encounter, 1 reportable event, or 2 outpatient 
encounters within 60 days of each other; each one applied a rule of one diagnosis per life time.   
 
Canine Military Borellia burgdorferi Seroprevalence Data 
 
Source 
Military canine Bb seroprevalence data were collected from selected military veterinary facilities from 1 November 
2012 through 31 October 2013.  Although both government-owned Military Working Dogs (MWDs) and privately-
owned pet dogs are seen at military veterinary facilities, this study was restricted to only the pet dog population.  
This restriction was done for several reasons; 1) MWDs are on a very high level of flea and tick control, therefore 
are at a reduced risk for tick bites, 2) MWDs receive daily grooming, therefore any tick that does bite is likely to be 
removed before the Bb pathogen is transferred, 3) MWDs generally train and live in well maintained environments 




duty Service members, retirees and Reservists on orders.  All participating veterinary facilities were provided the 
same Letter of Instruction (LOI) explaining the study details.  Although owner participation was voluntary, 
participants were offered a discount if they agreed to fill out in a short survey before their pet’s examination; owners 
were limited to only one pet per household.  Details of the survey are provided in Section III of this chapter.  Upon 
completion, the survey was handed to veterinary facility staff, who then annotated the IDEXX 4Dx Plus® test 
results on the last page of the survey along with the date and facility name.   
 
Case Definition 
Canine Borrelia sero-positivity was determined utilizing the in-house IDEXX 4Dx Plus® serological test already 
routinely used in all military veterinary facilities. The test is designed to detect the presences of serum antibody to 
C6, a synthetically produced peptide that is encoded by specific surface lipoproteins of B. burgdorferi.  The genes of 
this surface lipoprotein (IR6) are only expressed during infection and replication of the spirochete in the mammalian 
host therefore; the presence of serum antibodies to C6 indicates host invasion and infection with B. burgdorferi 
allowing differentiation between vaccination and true infection (24, 17).  In addition, the IR6 surface protein is 
genetically, structurally, and antigenically highly conserved among many B. burgdorferi strains.  Experimentally, 
the C6 antibody response is detectable three to five weeks post infection and stays positive for at least 69 weeks.  
This is earlier than with conventional assays and even before the onset of clinical lameness.  Most importantly 
perhaps, unlike previous ELISA tests, the C6 antibodies detected in the SNAP 4DX are not increased in dogs 
infected with Dirofilaria spp., Babesia spp., Ehrlichia spp., Rickettsia spp., or Leptospira spp.  (25, 17).  The 
IDEXX 4Dx Plus® is a qualitative test that claims a sensitivity of 98.8% and a specificity of 100%.  Both diagnostic 
test results (with clinical signs) and routine health screening test results (without clinical signs) were included in this 
study.  Seroprevalence status was associated with the date and location of the current test, there was no way to 




Since military human hospitals and military veterinary facilities have different catchment areas, analyses of the 




veterinary facilities in the military than there are human hospitals, therefore the catchment areas associated with 
veterinary facilities tend to be much larger, encompassing more than one military installation.   
 
The following diagram depicts the differences in catchment areas between military human hospitals and veterinary 
facilities. 
 
Figure 5.2:  Explanation of Catchment Areas:  MTF = Medical Treatment Facility providing human care,  
VTF = Veterinary Treatment Facility providing animal care 
Catchment Area Difference: 

















B.  Installation and Catchment Area 
  
















The installation only analysis means the human data were limited to that specified by the human medical facility 
location (Figure 5.2A).  The installation and catchment analysis expanded the human data to include the installations 
reflected by the veterinary clinic catchment area (Figure 5.2B).   
 
The above mentioned approach created two different data sets for the human rate data.  Each data set was first 
checked from normality using MiniTab.  The correlation of military pet dog and military human Borreliosis data 
was estimated using the Spearman Rank Correlation since the data were not normally distributed as part of the 
assumption to calculate bivariate correlation (26).  First both the human and dog data sets were ranked from 1 to 15 
by installation or catchment area, with 1 signifying the area with the highest incidence rate (human) or 
seroprevalence (dog).  The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient was then calculated. 
Results 
 
Human Military Lyme Disease Data 
 
DMSS Data (1 November 2012 through 31 October 2013) 
There were only 20 confirmed cases of human Lyme disease resulting from the DMSS query.  The highest rates of 
Lyme disease were reported from Germany (Stuttgart) and the Northeastern United States (Virginia, New York, and 
Virginia).  Overall, eight of the installations (53%) reported having no cases over the one year period; two of which 
came from locations with a high expected prevalence based on previous years.  The low rates of disease reported by 
this data system for this period of time made conclusion based on the data questionable; therefore it was decided to 
also perform the remaining analyses on the initial ten year DMSS query used to select study site locations.   
 
MDR Data (1 November 2012 through 31 October 2013) 
The MDR query resulted in 91 confirmed cases of human Lyme disease.  Again the highest rates of Lyme disease 
came from installations in Germany and the Northeastern United States.  It is unclear why no cases were reported 
from Walther Reed Medical center, but it is suspected that the site was somehow missed in the query process.   
Table 5.1 shows the case count and disease rate data for the two human data sources for the one year study period.  




installations in the catchment area (indented but not bold), however, analysis by catchment area was not performed 
due to the lack of rate data for installations without cases.   
 
Table 5.1:  Comparison of Lyme Disease Data for two Military Human Medical Data 
Systems 
(2011 to 2012) 
Installation 




Lyme Disease Rate 




MDR DMSS MDR 
Dog Center Europe     
     Kaiserslautern  0 3 0.0 88.6 
     Landstuhl  0 2 0.0 26.0 
     Ramstein AB  0 2 0.0 41.2 
Stuttgart  1 9 89.4 120.8 
Spangdahlem AB  0 3 0.0 38.1 
Fort Belvoir  2 4 50.1 14.8 
     Pentagon/Navy Annex  0 5 0.0 70.7 
     Aberdeen Proving Ground  0 3 0.0 50.6 
     NAWC Patuxent River  0 5 0.0 49.5 
     MCB Quantico  4 6 63.3 37.3 
     Walter Reed  0 0 0.0 0.0 
Fort Drum  5 10 34.0 30.0 
     USMA West Point  0 6 0.0 56.5 
MCB Camp Lejeune  3 6 10.6 20.4 
Fort Lee  2 3 29.7 15.4 
NAS Sigonella  0 0 0.0 0.0 
NS Rota  0 0 0.0 0.0 
Fort Bragg  2 10 4.9 9.2 
Fort Carson  0 1 0.0 1.6 
Fort Hood  1 4 2.8 4.1 
MCB Camp Pendleton  0 1 0.0 3.0 
McChord AFB  0 1 0.0 1.0 
     Fort Lewis  0 0 0.0 0.0 
NTC Great Lakes  0 1 0.0 57.0 
TOTAL 20 91   










DMSS Data (1 January 2001 to 31 December 2011) 
There were 1390 confirmed cases of human Lyme disease reported DoD wide from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 
2011; 322 (23.17%) of these cases from installations included in this study.  The highest rates of Lyme disease came 
from Germany and the Northeastern United States while the lowest rates came from Southern Europe (Spain and 
Italy) and Western, Southwestern, and Midwestern U.S. (Washington, California, Texas, Illinois).   
 
Table 5.2:  Human Military Lyme Disease Data from 2001 to 2011:  DMSS Data Source 
Installation 
Confirmed Lyme 
Disease Cases  (#) 
Lyme Disease Rate 
(per 100,000 person-year) 
Installation Catchment 
Dog Center Europe   77.9 
     Kaiserslautern  13 114.8  
     Landstuhl  8 63.1  
     Ramstein AB  37 55.7  
Stuttgart  13 89.8 89.8 
Spangdahlem AB  14 43.4 43.4 
Fort Belvoir  9 32.9 41.3 
     Pentagon/Navy Annex  1 53.8  
     Aberdeen Proving Ground  16 51.8  
     NAWC Patuxent River  12 42.1  
     MCB Quantico  24 33.8  
     Walter Reed  10 33.2  
Fort Drum  29 21.2 100.6 
     USMA West Point  24 179.9  
MCB Camp Lejeune  46 18.0 18.0 
Fort Lee  10 17.8 17.8 
NAS Sigonella  0 0.0 0.0 
NS Rota  0 0.0 0.0 
Fort Bragg  25 5.3 5.3 
Fort Carson  8 4.0 4.0 
Fort Hood  12 2.5 2.5 
MCB Camp Pendleton  2 0.8 0.8 
McChord AFB  1 2.6 2.4 
     Fort Lewis  6 2.2  
NTC Great Lakes  2 1.1 1.1 









Canine Military Lyme Disease Data 
 
Overall there were 3776 Bb seroprevalence test results collected from 3996 surveys during the one year study 
period.  There were 109 sero-positive dogs contributing to an average sero-positivity of 2.89% study-wide; 3.30% 
seroprevalence (31/937) in Europe and 2.75% seroprevalence (78/2839) in the U.S.  Approximately 5% of the 
submitted surveys were missing the requested test results, with nearly twice as many of the missing results coming 
from areas of expected high prevalence.  The highest Bb seroprevalence came from Germany (Kaiserslautern, 
Stuttgart) and the Northeastern United States (Virginia, New York) while the lowest rates came from Southern 
Europe (Italy) and Western, Southwestern, and Midwestern U.S. (Washington, California, Texas, Illinois, 
Colorado).   
 
 
Table 5.3:  Canine B. burgdorferi Seroprevalence by Military Installation (Highest to 
Lowest) 
Installation 
Sero Negative Sero Positive Total 
n % n %  
Fort Drum, NY 304 90.8% 31 9.3% 335 
Fort Belvior, VA 204 95.3% 10 4. 7% 214 
Stuttgart, DE 204 96.2% 8 3.8% 212 
Kaiserslautern, DE 313 96.3% 12 3.7% 325 
Greaty Lakes. IL 244 96.8% 8 3.2% 252 
Rota, ES 65 97.0% 2 3.0% 67 
Spangdahlem, DE 298 97.1% 9 2.9% 307 
Camp Pendelton, CA 42 97.7% 1 2.3% 43 
Fort Carson, CO 280 98.3% 5 1.8% 285 
JBLM, WA 345 98.3% 6 1.7% 351 
Camp Lejeune, NC 355 98.3% 6 1.7% 361 
Fort Lee, VA 297 98.3% 5 1.7% 302 
Fort Bragg, NC 520 99.1% 5 1.0% 525 
Fort Hood, TX 170 99.4% 1 0.6% 171 









Comparison of Canine to Human Lyme Disease Data:  Sensitivity of the Canine Model 
 
Using sero-positivity alone, far more dogs tested positive for exposure to Borrelia  burgdorferi than incident human 
cases were captured both by the MDR and DMSS data systems.  Comparing canine sero-positivity data (sero-
positivity for every 100,000 dogs tested) by installation with human rate data, canine estimates were between 42 to 
272 and 42 to 1672 times greater than reported DMSS and MDR human data for the same time period, and 45 to 
4660 times greater than the reported DMSS data for the ten year period. 
 
Estimating the Association 
 
Animal Data to Human Data from DMSS:  1 November 2012 through 31 October 2013 
Because DMSS reported no cases of human Lyme disease for this one year period for over half of the sites (8/15 or 
53%), the correlation between military pet dog and military human Borreliosis data using the Spearman Rank 
Correlation only pertains to 46.7 % (7/15) of the data and therefore does not give a complete picture.  This 
estimation, is limited to these seven locations showed a very strong positive correlation between human Lyme 
disease rate and military pet dog Bb seroprevalence by military installation (rs = 0.821).  Because of the lack of rate 
data for the installations without cases, it was not possible to expand the human disease data to reflect the catchment 
area of the veterinary facilities.  
 
Animal Data to Human Data from MDR:  1 November 2012 through 31 October 2013 
The MDR data source reported two sites with no cases of human Lyme disease for this one year period, therefore the 
association between animal Bb seroprevalence and human Borreliosis data using the MDR data source only pertains 
to 87 % (13/15) of the data and therefore also does not give a complete picture.  The resulting correlation was strong 
(rs = 0.538).  It was not possible to expand the human disease data to reflect the catchment area of the veterinary 







Animal Data to Human Data from DMSS:  1 January 2001 to 31 December 2011 
There was a strong positive correlation between human Lyme disease rate and military pet dog Bb seroprevalence 
by military installation (rs = 0.525).  When expanding the human disease data to reflect the catchment area of the 
veterinary facilities the correlation was slightly higher (rs = 0.664).  Both approaches indicate consistency in the 
rankings of Lyme disease in humans and Bb seroprevalence in dogs; the similarity in the resulting correlation 






*Because installations with no human Lyme disease cases were not included in this analysis, calculated estimates have varying 




There have been several studies exploring the potential to use dogs as sentinels for Lyme disease risk in humans. 
Dogs are well suited for this role for the following reasons.  First, they are susceptible to the causative agent and 
when exposed produce an easily sampled antibody response, sometimes accompanied by clinical signs similar to 
those in people.  Second, they have a greater likelihood of being in tick habitats and therefore a greater tendency for 
tick exposure.  Third, because of their hair coat, an attached tick is more likely to be permitted to feed the full 36-48 
hours required to transmit the Borrelia spirochete.   
 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the utility of pet dogs belonging to service members as 
sentinels for Lyme disease risk in military populations.  Estimates showed that there is a strong positive association 
between human incidence rates of Lyme disease and canine Bb seroprevalence in military human and canine 
populations.  In addition, Bb sero-positivity per 100,000 dogs was consistently much higher than Lyme disease 
incidence per 100,000 regardless of human data source used, indicating that dogs are a more sensitive indicator of 
pathogen presence than their human counterparts. Because of a concurrent study investigating the differences 
Table 5.4:   Correlation of Human Lyme Disease Rate to Military Pet Dog B. burgdorferi 
Seroprevalence 
Comparison Applicability* Spearman’s rho (95% CI) 
DMSS 1 year data 46.7 %   (7/15) 0.821 (0.178, 0.972) 
MDR 1 year data 87 %     (13/15) 0.538 (-0.018, 0.839) 
DMSS 10 year data (Installation Only) 100%    (15/15) 0.525 (0.018, 0.817) 




between existing military human disease data sources, this study utilized two different human data sources to 
evaluate the association between canine and human Lyme disease.  One difference between the two is how each 
system receives its population (denominator) data.  DMSS pulls its population data from DMDC, Defense 
Manpower Data Center, limiting the personnel data to that of active duty service members only.  MDR on the other 
had pulls its population data from DEERS, Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System, which captures 
anyone eligible to receive medical care in the military system to include but not limited to active duty, retirees, and 
their beneficiaries.  Another difference is that DMSS is generally limited to cases seen at military treatment facilities 
(MTFs), whereas MDR is able to incorporate those cases seen at associated civilian medical facilities.  These 
differences may explain why both the number of cases and the overall incidence rates from the MDR query are so 
much higher than those resulting from the DMSS query.  In fact, the extremely low number of cases resulting from 
the one year DMSS query limited the usefulness of the data in this study, as the calculated correlation coefficient (rs 
= 0.821) only applies to 7 of the 15 study sites.  Analysis using the MDR data, on the other hand, didn’t produce as 
high of an association (rs = 0.538), but because it used all 15 sites it is more representative of the true relationship 
between military human Lyme disease and canine seroprevalence data.  The differences in samples (specific 
installations compared) and sample sizes (number of installations compared) between the one year DMSS and MDR 
data may have led to either over and/or underestimation of these estimates, making direct comparison of the 
correlation coefficients inappropriate.  The ten year DMSS data estimated a similar association (rs = 0.524) as the 
MDR data.  This may indicate that, especially for low prevalent diseases, MDR is a more sensitive data source.  
There was not a notable difference between the straight by installation association and one done incorporating the 
catchment areas (using the ten year DMSS data).  This is likely due to the fact that VTFs are generally located on 
larger installations which also happen to have the larger MTFs.  These larger MTFs are also more likely to see the 
more complicated cases and have more advanced diagnostic capabilities, making them more likely to be the location 
where regional Lyme disease cases are diagnosed.   
 
This study compared two different measures of disease, human incidence and canine prevalence.  This was 
unavoidable due to differences inherent in the data sources used.  The human data came from queries of existing 
medical systems, where it was possible to limit the search to incident cases by location for the given study period.  




such data system currently exists on the animal side; therefore, the canine data was actively collected during the 
study period.  In order to have the smallest impact on current clinic operations, and maintain comparability to 
studies in the literature, this study utilized the extant in-house canine serological Bb antibody test, the IDEXX 4Dx 
Plus®.  As discussed above, this antibody test is qualitative, where a positive test result merely indicates the dog has 
had a history of exposure to the Bb pathogen.  For this reason it was not possible to determine whether or not a sero-
positive dog was recently exposed (incident case) or if they were exposed several months ago; canine incidence was 
not possible.  Canine seroprevalence was calculated as the number of sero-positive results per total number of tests 
run by installation.  Using canine seroprevalence to indicate the presence of Borrelia risk has several limitations, 
however.  Because exposed animals may have elevated antibodies for more than a year, sero-positivity at one 
location may actually result from exposure from another.  Other animal and owner factors too have been associated 
with canine Bbseroprevalence; such as dog breed, preventive medicine practices, recreational activities, and canine 
living environment.  All of these variables are potential confounders to the canine sero-prevalance to installation 
association and therefore must be considered when drawing conclusions on human Lyme disease risk based on 
canine seroprevalence alone.  Section III of this chapter investigates the impact of these and several other potential 
confounders in much more detail.   
Conclusions 
 
This study found that seroprevalence estimates in military pet dogs not only reflect incidence rates in military human 
populations, but they also appear to be a more sensitive indicator of B. burgdorferi presence then their human 
counter parts. The findings recommend the use of service member pet dogs as a sensitive, reliable, and convenient 





Section II:  A Comparison of Borrelia burgdorferi Seroprevalence in Military and 
CivilianPet Dogs 
 
Civilian Pet Dog Borrelia burgdorferi Seroprevalence 
 
From 2001 to 2007 IDEXX Laboratories, in conjunction with marketing new in-house ELISA tests, conducted a 
rebate driven national clinic-based serological survey aimed at documenting canine infection with, or exposure to, 
four vector-borne disease agents, Dirofilaria immitis, Borrelia burgdorferi, Ehrlichia canis, and Anaplasma 
phagocytophilu (20).  The data were compiled into a comprehensive database that was then analyzed to assess 
geographic trends in rates of positive tests for all four disease agents, finding that percent positive test results varied 
by agent in different regions of the United States.  Looking exclusively at the B. burgdorferi (Bb) data, they found a 
significant difference in sero-positivity at the regional level where titers to Bb were most common in the Northeast 
(11.6%) as compared to the Midwest (4.0%), West (1.4%), and Southeast (1.0).  The findings were published in 
Veterinary Parasitology in 2009, and included percent positive data at the state level (12).  The data from this 
publication was used to represent the civilian pet dog Bb seroprevalence for the comparison study conducted in this 
chapter. 
 
In 2011, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted a study investigating the use of this canine 
serology as adjunct to human Lyme disease surveillance (12).  The study indicated canine Bb seroprevalence to be a 
sensitive but nonspecific marker of human risk.   
 
Military Pet Dog Borrelia burgdorferi  Seroprevalence 
 
Currently, there is no equivalent comprehensive pet dog database in the military.  The expectation is that observed 
geographical distributions of Bb sero-positivity in military pet dogs will be similar to those seen in the Bowman 
study; however, there are several things about the military pet dogs that have the potential to make this population 




these dogs in sentinel surveillance.  Just like their human owners, military pet dogs are subject to frequent moves.  
These moves are generally every two to three years and involve massive relocations, generally to different states and 
often to completely different countries.  Also, military owners often deploy to locations “unaccompanied”, meaning 
without family members or pets.  During these unaccompanied moves military pets are often fostered out to families 
or friends, potentially in other states or countries.  Another significant difference is that  military pets are eligible to 
receive inexpensive veterinary care at military operated veterinary facilities, making flea and tick prevention 
affordable and potentially contributing to a pet population with a higher than expected level of preventive medical 
care.  The extensive travel history of military pet dogs along with the high potential for flea and tick prevention 
raises concerns over the potential to use these dogs as sentinels for human Lyme disease.   
 
In order to determine the potential variation between military and civilian pet Bb seroprevalence, population 






Civilian Pet Dog Borrelia burgdorferi Data 
 
Civilian pet dog Bb seroprevalence data came from the article published by Bowman et al. in 2009 (20).  The data 
analyzed came from a comprehensive sero-survey of U.S. veterinary clinics conducted by IDEXX Laboratories, 
Westbrook, ME from 2001 to 2007.  Participating clinics received rebates for using a commercial in-house ELISA 
assay when they submitted a log of all test results.   The assay was designed to simultaneously detect qualitatively 
canine antibodies to multiple vector-borne diseases.  From 2001-2006 all dogs were tested with the IDEXX 3DX 
SNAP test, a commercial in-house C6-based assay for simultaneous qualitative detection of canine antibodies to E. 
canis and B. burgdorferi, and to D. immitis antigen, in canine serum, plasma, or whole blood. In 2006 IDEXX added 
a fourth analyte for the detection of A. phagocytophilum antibody and changed the name of the test to the IDEXX 




dogs were tested for B. burgdorferi antibody nation-wide.  Percent positive test results were calculated by dividing 
the number of dogs reported positive for each agent by the total number of dogs tested.  Data were collated by 
county of residence of each dog tested according to postal zip code provided with each record, and then assembled 
into state and regional groups.  Data from the state level was used in this comparative study.     
 
Military Pet Dog Borrelia Data 
 
The military pet dog Bb seroprevalence data for this study were actively collected from participating military VTFs.  
Due to funding constraints it was not possible to survey all VTFs, instead 15 sites were selected based on human 
incident Lyme disease data (described in detail in Section I), and ensuring VTFs with both high and low expected 
prevalence were selected.  The military pet dog data were collected from questionnaires designed specifically for 
this study from November 1, 2012 through October 31, 2013.  Facilities were asked to provide data from at least 25 
dogs a month, restricted to military-owned companion dogs and only one pet per household.  Canine Bb 
seroprevalence was determined utilizing the IDEXX 4Dx SNAP test routinely used in VTFs. Test results from both 
wellness exams and diagnostic screening were utilized. B. burgdorferi seroprevalence was calculated as the total 
number of positive test results divided by the total number of dogs tested per site.  The VTF level data represents the 
canine seroprevalence for that particular military installation or community; this installation level data was then used 
in the subsequent comparative study.   
Analysis 
 
Differences in Bb seroprevalence between military pet dogs and civilian pet dogs were examined through the use of 
the chi-squared test for proportions with a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparison (p-values less than 0.005 
considered statistically significant).  
Results 
 
European locations were not represented in the Bowman study, and were therefore removed from this analysis.  For 




owned vs military owned pet dogs.   However, for two of the locations there is a significant difference.  Specifically, 
the military pet dog prevalence at Fort Lee, VA was lower than expected for the state of Virginia and the military 
pet dog prevalence at Great Lakes, IL was higher than expected for the state of Illinois.   
Table 5.5:  Comparison of Civilian Pet Dog to Military Pet Dog  Borrelia burgdorferi Seroprevalence by 
Location 
Location 
Civilian Prevalence by 
State 
Military Prevalence by 
Installation p-value 
Fort Belvoir, VA  6.7 4.7 0.240 
Fort Drum, NY 7.1 9.3 0.128 
MCB Camp Lejeune, NC 1.3 1.7 0.505 
Fort Lee, VA  6.7 1.7 0.000* 
Fort Bragg, NC 1.3 1.0 0.525 
Fort Carson, CO 0.4 1.8 0.010 
Fort Hood, TX 0.2 0.6 0.159 
MCB Camp Pendleton, CA 1.8 2.3 0.81 
McChord AFB, WA  0.0 1.7 0.982 
NTC Great Lakes, IL  1.0 3.2 0.000* 




The overall aim of this phase of the study is to demonstrate the utility of service member pet dogs in sentinel 
surveillance for military populations.  There have been several studies (12, 13, 14, 15) in civilian populations 
showing the use of canine B. burgdorferi seroprevalence in sentinel surveillance for human Lyme disease risk, but to 
date none done looking at this relationship in military populations.  In order to justify the investment in establishing 
a zoonotic disease surveillance program using service member pet dogs, one must demonstrate that there is a 
meaningful difference between existing civilian pet dog and military pet dog data.    
 
For eight of the ten study locations there was no significant difference; military pet dog seroprevalence matched that 
of the civilian pet dogs.  This finding suggests that service member pet dogs, like their civilian counterparts, are 
sensitive markers for Lyme disease risk and indicates their potential use in surveillance.  Five of the military 
locations were overseas, and therefore did not have civilian data available for comparison.  Because military 




civilian pet data available at the U.S. level is insufficient for risk projections for military populations at the global 
level.  The study also indicated significant difference for two of the U.S. locations, specifically Fort Lee as 
compared to state of Virginia and the Great Lakes Naval Air Station as compared to the state of Illinois.  
Investigation into reasons for these discrepancies highlight why military pet dog data are a more appropriate 





Figure 5.3 overlays these locations on a map depicting the geographic distribution of Lyme disease cases reported to 
the CDC in 2012 (7).  From this map one can see the Great Lakes Naval Air Station is located in the area of Illinois 
with the highest number of reported cases.  The fact that the military pet dog data was restricted to samples taken 
from this exact location, not diluted by averaging Bb seroprevalence with data from the lower risk areas in the 
southern part of the state, explains why the prevalence is higher than expected.  The number of Lyme disease cases 
in the Midwest has been increasing, with the southern movement of deer ticks from Michigan and Wisconsin (27).  
Great Lakes NAS 
Fort Lee 
Figure 5.3:  Map showing location of military installations where significant difference between military 




The data obtained from the military pet dog population at this location is not only a more specific indicator of the 
risk for the military population, but it may also be predictive of the southern creep in this area, serving as an early 
warning for cases in human service members in the area.  A similar, but opposite, phenomenon may be occurring at 
Fort Lee, VA where the military pet dog seroprevalence was lower than expected for the state of Virginia.  Looking 
at Figure 5.7 one can see that the military installation is located in an area of the state with fewer reported cases of 




This study found reassuring similarities between military pet dog and civilian pet dog B. burgdorferi seroprevalence 
data for 8 of the 15 study locations.  In addition, it showed that there is a meaningful difference between 2 of the 
locations.  Furthermore, investigation into the difference appear to indicate that military pet dogs may be more 
appropriate indicators of Lyme disease risk for military populations than civilian pet dog data.  It is recommended 
that the military utilize data from their pet animal populations as opposed to extant data from civilian pet 
populations, in sentinel surveillance for zoonotic diseases. 
 
Section III:  Evaluating the Military Pet Dog Borellia burgdorferi Seroprevalence and 
Location Association: Investigation of Confounders  
 
Risk Factors for Borrelia burgdorferi 
 
Lyme borreliosis is the most prevalent human vector-borne disease of temperate zones of the northern hemisphere, 
with notable hot spots in the eastern United States and Central Europe (28, 29).  [85,000 cases reported annually in 
Europe in 2006; 15-20,000 annually in US in 2006 (WHO)].  The bacterial pathogen is maintained in a horizontal 
transmission cycle between is vector, hard bodied Ixodes spp. ticks, and vertebrate reservoir hosts.  Although the 
specific Borrelia genospecies, Ixodes species, and vertebrate host vary between geographic locations, the overall life 




otherwise indicated, for the remainder of this document, the Borrelia pathogen will be referred to as Bb.  The slow-
feeding Ixodes ticks have a life cycle that lasts two years and involves three separate blood feeding events, one per 
life stage (30).  The first feeding is on birds and small mammals by the larvae in the summer, then the following 
spring/summer the nymph feed on rodents and larger mammals, and lastly the adults feed on large mammals again 
in the fall.  Nymphs are the most likely source of infection in both dogs and humans (17, 31, 32).  Favored habitats 
for questing (host-seeking) nymphs include meadows and fallow land, (31), dense wood-land, and areas with dense 
shrubs or bushes (32).  Exposures can be either peridomestic (interface between neighborhoods and wilderness 
areas) or recreational (32).  An example of a peridomestic exposure would be an animal or human that is bitten when 
spending time in their backyard which adjoins a wooded area of public land.  Recreational exposures generally 
involve traveling to a natural area that harbors the ticks.   
 
Previous studies investigating the use of dogs as sentinels in Lyme surveillance have discussed various risk factors 
for infection such as breed, recreational use/activity, living environment/residence lifestyle, sex, age, and 
knowledge/evidence of tick exposure (12, 13, 14, 15).  Many of these factors make intuitive sense, for example, dog 
breeds with long, dark hair coats may be less likely to have an attached tick detected and removed. Animals that 
recreate outdoors or live in certain environments may have a higher likelihood tick exposure.  At least one study has 
indicated that male dogs may be predisposed to exposure (33).  The age of the dog at the time of sampling may be a 
proxy for cumulative time of exposure (13).  In the diagnosis of human Lyme disease a history of tick exposure in a 
known endemic area can be sufficient to confirm a clinical diagnosis.  Although this is not enough in canine 
diagnosis, the knowledge of tick exposure and/or the lack of tick prevention can be helpful.    
 
The aim of this section is to investigate if the observed associations between seroprevalence and location 
(installation) are confounded by other risk factors for canine Bb seroprevalance.  To do this the relationship was 
evaluated with regard to potential Lyme disease risk factors to include travel history as a proxy for the true origin of 








The methods for selecting participating military veterinary treatment facilities have been described in detail in 
Section I of this Chapter.  Briefly, VTFs were selected to ensure equal representation of both high and low expected 
Bb seroprevalence based on the rate of Lyme disease in the human active duty population.  In order to have 95% 
confidence in detecting an average Bb seroprevalence of 7% across all selected installations, it was determined that 
each location should be able to provide data on at least 280 dogs over the course of the one year study (20).  Only 
facilities with sufficient workload and manpower, as determined by USAPHC Animal Medicine Program personnel, 




Pet Health Questionnaire 
Although U.S. Army VTFs are in the process of establishing a web-based electronic medical record system, at the 
time of this study, one was not yet in place.  Without this capability, it was not possible to mine animal disease data 
from the headquarters level, therefore active surveillance of each participating VTF was undertaken in the form of a 
questionnaire instead.  The use of the questionnaire served two purposes, one was to collect the military pet dog Bb 
seroprevalence data and the other was to collect the risk factor data from pet owners.  The staff of all participating 
VTFs was provided the same Letter of Instruction (LOI) explaining the study protocol.  Specifically, that the study 
was restricted to pet dogs (no government-owned working dogs), that eligible pets included both symptomatic and 
asymptomatic dogs requiring the IDEXX 4Dx Plus ® test, and that owners volunteering for the study were to 
receive a $5 discount, but were limited to one pet per survey and one survey per household.  In addition, staff was 
instructed to offer study participation to all eligible owners upon arrival at the VTF on a first come first served basis 
at a rate of approximately 25 questionnaires per month.  Once the questionnaire was completed the survey was 
handed to facility staff, who then annotated the IDEXX 4Dx Plus® test results on the last page along with the date 




31 October 2013.  Questionnaires were collected on a monthly basis and physically mailed to the researchers for 
manual entry into an EXCEL spreadsheet designed for the study.  All questions were multiple choice. 
 
Military Pet Dog B. burgdorferi Seroprevalence Data 
Canine Bb sero-positivity was determined utilizing the qualitative in-house IDEXX 4Dx Plus® serological test 
already routinely used in all military VTFs.  No additional training or instruction on test use was provided.  Both 
diagnostic test results (symptomatic) and routine health screening test results (asymptomatic) were included in this 
study.  Seroprevalence data for all four vector-borne diseases included in the IDEXX 4Dx Plus® test was collected 
simultaneously.  Test results (positive or negative) were annotated on the last page of the questionnaire by VTF staff 
along with date and location of the current test.   
 
Military Pet Dog B. burgdorferi Risk Factor Data 
Questions on risk factors came both from a review of current literature and a survey of both military and civilian 
veterinarians.  All questions were limited to multiple choice answers. Owners were blinded to the specific goal of 
the survey, only being told that the information  they were providing would lead  to a better understanding of 
military pet dog populations and ultimately in better health care for their pet.  They were also told that all questions 
pertained to the pet receiving the current IDEXX 4Dx Plus® test (Heartworm, Lyme, Ehrlichiosis, Anaplasmosis) 
and that participation was limited to only one dog per family.  Specifically, the questionnaire included 23 multiple 
choice questions broken into 6 broad categories; Sponsor, Sponsor Residency History, General Pet Care 
Information, Pet Demographics (General Information About Your Pet), Dog Residency History, and General Pet 
Activity Information.  The resulting questionnaire produced 84 total variables and one dichotomous outcome. The 
complete questionnaire is available in Appendix A.-5   
 1.  Sponsor (service member associated with the pet) service component.  Owners were asked the service 
component of the pet’s sponsor; active duty, Reserve component, National Guard, retired, or other.  It is expected 
that animals belonging to active duty service members move more frequently and may be less representative of the 
prevalence of the area they are living in. 
 2.  Sponsor Residency History.  Owners were asked to select places they have lived for more than a three 




used in a study looking at civilian pet dog seroprevalence across the U.S. (20), whereas the European regional 
breakdown was based on a project funded by the European Commission (28). Three months was selected as the 
minimum cut off because it is not uncommon for service members to spend up to this time period in a location for 
the purpose of temporary duty or training; periods longer than this are more likely to involve true relocations.  The 
question is geared towards capturing the owner’s attitudes about flea and tick prevention use.  Owners from Lyme 
endemic areas are suspected to be more likely to use such preventatives on their pets, and therefore we may expect 
lower prevalence from dogs that belong to owners that have lived in Lyme endemic areas. 
 3.  General Pet Care Information.  The first question asks about where the pet receives his/her primary 
preventive medicine care in order to determine how useful the information gathered from military VTFs will be in 
sentinel surveillance for zoonotic diseases in military populations.  This section also asks question about the tested 
dog’s history of heartworm and flea/tick prevention.  The heartworm questions were partially so the owners 
wouldn’t figure out the true focus of the survey, but it also investigates the assumption that dogs belonging to 
owner’s that follow veterinary recommended preventive medicine practices will have lower seroprevalence.  
Questions on flea/tick preventative use also investigated this assumption, but the main reason for these questions 
was to determine the potential impact of their use on seroprevalence.  Lastly, owners were asked whether a tick had 
ever been found on their dog. 
 4.  Pet Demographics (General Information About Your Dog).  Although sex was not suspected to impact 
sero-prevelence, in order to be consistent with current literature, the question was included in the survey.  Because 
age may be a proxy for cumulative time of exposure, pet age was asked.  Age categories included less than 1 year, 1-
3 years, 3-6 years, 6-8 years, and more than 8 years.  Because of hair coat factors, certain breeds may be more prone 
to prolonged tick attachment.  Breed may also serve as a proxy for potential occupational and/or recreational 
exposure, therefore owners were asked to select the one breed category their dog best fit in.  Breed groupings were 
based on AKC guidelines; each choice included an extensive list of examples.  Lower seroprevalence may be 
expected in small, less athletic breeds or in breeds with certain hair coats.  Dog weight was asked as a potential 
proxy for breed; weight categories were aimed at reflecting breed categories as closely as possible. 
 5.  Dog Residency History.  Owners were asked to select places that their dog had lived first in the last 5 




questions.  The 5 year versus 2 year break down was based on the knowledge that canine antibodies to B. 
burgdorferi remain elevated for at least 69 weeks (18), therefore true origin of exposure may be better determined 
with this level of detail.  In addition owners were asked how old the dog was when it joined their family, and if the 
dog had ever lived outside of the immediate family.  These questions were geared towards assessing the reliability of 
the owner answers about the dog’s potential for exposure. 
 6.  General Pet Activity Information.  Owners were asked questions geared towards determining the 
potential for their dogs to be in direct contact with ticks:  the number of hours spent outdoors, because primarily 
outdoor dogs are expected to have higher seroprevalence; the type of environment,  because dogs exposed to 
environments that support tick habitats (bushes, shrubs, forests) are expected to have higher seroprevalence;  and 




SAS 9.3 was used to conduct the data analysis in this section.  Potential confounders to the association between 
military pet dog seroprevalence and test result location were first investigated by using chi-squared tests for 
proportions to identify statistically significant associations (p-value < 0.05) between study variables and 
seroprevalence and then study variables and installation.  In addition, univariate analysis identified variables as 
significant based on ORs, 95% CIs and p-values (< 0.25 as significant).  A chi-squared test for proportions was used 
to evaluate how strongly potential confounders are related to each other in order to avoid redundancy in the model 
(p-value < 0.0001).  Bivariable logistic regression, with the installation variable constant, was then performed to 
further investigate potential confounding by these risk factors.  Each bivariate model (adjusted) was compared to the 
installation alone (crude) model.  Changes in ORs of more than 10% ([ORcrude-ORadjusted)]/ORadjusted) signified 
potential confounding by the variable necessitating its inclusion in the multivariable regression analysis.  
Multivariable logistic regression was then performed with Bb seroprevalence as the outcome of interest, installation 
as the exposure of interest, and the potential confounders identified through the descriptive statistics and bivariable 
logistic regression as the covariates.  The most parsimonious model was determined by removing covariates from 
the model one at a time and evaluating the resulting impact on installation ORs.  Once again, changes in more than 




necessitating its inclusion in the final multivariable regression analysis.  The covariates in the final model where 






Participation in the study was voluntary and clinics were not asked to record data for pet owners that declined 
participation, therefore response rates were not calculated.  Overall, 3996 total surveys were collected, 94.5% (3776) 
of which included Bb sero-positivity results.  All 15 selected installations participated, but nine fell short of the full 
one year study period.  The calculated sample size for the full study period was 278/installation; seven of the 
locations fell short of this goal and eight exceeded it.   
 
Military Pet Dog B. burgdorferi Seroprevelence Data  
 
Table 5.6 shows the overall seroprevalence for the study population.  There were 109 sero-positive dogs 




Analysis by installation shows 3.30% seroprevalence (31/937) in Europe and 2.75% seroprevalence (78/2839) in the 
U.S.  The highest Bb seroprevalence came from the Northeastern  and Midwestern United States (New York, 
Virginia, Illinois) and Germany (Kaiserslautern, Stuttgart) while the lowest rates came from Southern Europe (Italy) 
and Western, Southwestern, and Midwestern U.S. (Texas, North Caroline, and New Jersey).  Table 5.7 shows 
seroprevalence by installation in addition to the number of observations for each category.  It is important to note the 
Table5. 6:  Military Pet Dog B. burgdorferi  Seroprevalence Summary 
Statistics 
Overall  2.89% (109/3776) 
Average (standard deviation) 2.74% (+/- 2.21) 
Median  2.33% 




lack of seropositive results for the Signoella installation.  Because the intent is to conduct a by installation analysis 
of sero-positivity, it would be inappropriate to combine this installation with any others and the addition of a “1” in 
order to include it in further modeling would be inaccurate, therefore the Sigonella installation was removed from 
further analysis.   
 
Table 5.7:  Military Pet Dog  B. burgdorferi Seroprevalance by Installation 
Installation Sero Negative                               Sero Positive  Total 
 n % n %  
Fort Drum  304 90.8% 31 9.3% 335 
Fort Belvior  204 95.3% 10 4.7% 214 
Stuttgart  204 96.2% 8 3.8% 212 
Kaiserslautern 313 96.3% 12 3.7% 325 
Great Lakes 244 96.8% 8 3.2% 252 
Rota* 65 97.0% 2 3.0% 67 
Spangdahlem 298 97.1% 9 2.9% 307 
Camp Pendelton* 42 97. 7% 1 2.3% 43 
Fort Carson 280 98.3% 5 1.8% 285 
JBLM 345 98.3% 6 1.7% 351 
Camp Lejeune 355 98.3% 6 1.7% 361 
Fort Lee 297 98.3% 5 1.7% 302 
Fort Bragg 520 99.1% 5 1.0% 525 
Fort Hood* 170 99.4% 1 0.6% 171 
Sigonella** 26 100.0% 0 0.0% 26 
*Sparse cells for Sigonella, Fort Hood, Camp Pendelton, and Rota 
**“0” cell for Sero+ from Sigonella forced to removal of this installation from further analysis 
 (collapsing with other installation is inappropriate and adding “1” would be inaccurate. 
 
Military Pet Dog B. burgdorferi Seroprevalence Risk Factor Data (Characteristics of the Study Population) 
 
The majority of those surveyed were Active Duty (73%).  Overall 97% of owners reported living in the United 
States with the highest percent of owners (71%) claiming a history of living in the SE region.  Forty-five percent 
reported living in Europe, with 37% claiming a history of living in Central Europe.  Eighty-six percent of those 
participating in the survey claimed the surveying VTF as the location where the pet receives his/her primary 
preventive medicine care.  More than eighty percent of pet owners claimed a history of flea, tick and heartworm 
preventative use and over sixty percent claimed their pets were current on these same preventives.  Over fifty 
percent stated they had never seen a tick on their dog.  The dog population was equally split between male neuter 




come from one of four breeds; toy, sporting, herding, or working.   The majority of owners reported their dogs lived 
in either wooded or brushy environments and spend between one to eight hours outside a day.  The most commonly 
reported recreational activity was neighborhood walks.  More than 80% of dogs were reported to have lived in the 
US within the last 5 years with the majority reporting a history of time in the SE US.  Almost 75% reported a history 
of living in Europe within the last 5 years, with the most commonly reported region being Central Europe. Only 
thirty-two percent of owners reported their pets had prior ownership and 47% reported their dogs were more than 
three months old when joining the family.  Sero-positivity for the three other vector borne diseases included in the 
commercial test were 8.26% for Anaplasma spp. (A. platys and/or A. phagocytophilum), 11.01% for Ehrlichia spp. 
(E. ewingii and/or E. canis), and 4.59% for Dirofilaria immitus.  Analysis of each variable by seroprevalence 
resulted in cell sparcity (<5) for 31 of the variables, eight of which resulted in zero cells. A complete listing of study 
variable distribution by seroprevalence can be found in Tables A-M in Appendix B-5.   
 
Univariate Analysis:  Potential for Risk Factors to be Confounders to the Installation-Bb Seroprevalence Association 
 
Based on this analysis 15 potential confounders were identified.  A complete listing of Odds of Bb Sero-positivity 
by risk factor (ORs and 95% CIs) can be found in Tables I-XII in Appendix C-5.   
 
Table 5.8:  Significant Risk Factors Associated Military Pet Dog B. burgdorferi  
Seroprevalence  
(ORs, 95% CIs, and p-values) 
 
Characteristic OR* 95% CI p-value 
Owner Lived in Northeastern U.S. Region 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.282 (0.192, 0.414) <0.0001 
Owner Lived in Central European Region 
     Yes 1.000   
    No 0.674 (0.460 , 0.987) 0.0427 
History of Tick Exposure                                                                              <0.0001 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.236        (0.147, 0.379) <0.0001 
     Not Known 1.619        (0.878, 2.987) 0.1227 
Breed Group                                                                                                    <0.0001 
    Sporting* 1.000   




    Working 0.721 (0.400, 1.299) 0.2758 
    Hound 0.424 (0.195, 0.922) 0.922 
    Terrier 0.122 (0.029, 0.509) 0.0039 
    Toy 0.210 (0.100, 0.438) <0.0001 
    Non-Sporting 0.496 (0.206, 1.191) 0.1168 
    Other 0.538 (0.208, 1.390) 0.2004 
Weight Group (pounds)                                                                                 <0.0001 
    56 to 75* 1.000   
    Less than 15 0.250 (0.125, 0.498) <0.0001 
    16 to 35 0.409 (0.223, 0.750) 0.0035 
    36 to 55 0.807 (0.466, 1.400) 0.4460 
    More than 75 1.041 (0.611, 1.771) 0.8835 
Dog Lived in Northeastern U.S. in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.230 (0.156, 0.341) <0.0001 
Dog Lived in Southeastern U.S. in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.538 (1.050, 2.2520) <0.0001 
Dog Lived in Central European Region in past 5 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes 0.650 (0.431, 0.982) 0.0410 
Lived in Western U.S. in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 2.379 (1.300, 4.356) 0.0050 
Lived in Northeastern U.S.  in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.214 (0.144, 0.320) <0.0001 
Lived in Southeastern U.S.  in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.807 (1.217, 2.682) 0.0033 
Prior Ownership 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.675 (0.458, 0.996) 0.0477 
Dog Lives in Wooded Environment 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 0.530 (0.345, 0.813) 0.0037 
Dog Recreates through Wilderness Walks 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 0.384 (0.262, 0.563) <0.0001 
Anaplasma 
     Yes* 1.000   








* Referent Category 
* Odds of Borrelia Sero-positivity by Characteristic 
 
 
Refining Variable Selection 
 
Quasi-complete separation (p < 0.0001) was found for breed (Bre) by weight (Wt), when the dog joined the family 
(JOIN) by previous owner status (POwn), and several different combinations of preventive medicine practices 
(current flea and tick preventive use (CFTP), history or flea and tick preventive use (HFTP), current heartworm 
preventive use (HHW), and current heartworm preventive use (CHW).  Because of the sparsity of cells in the breed 
variable, weight was selected over breed.  Previous owner status (POwn) was selected over JOIN because it was 
slightly more significant. None of the preventive medicine practice variables were significantly associated with sero-
positivity. 
 
The questions about dog residency history included overlapping time periods (within the last 5 years and within the 
last 2 years, indicating the existence of co-linearity between these two variables.  In order to determine the more 
significant risk factor, odds ratios based on proportions were calculated (Table5. 9) and the variable with the higher 
magnitude of association with sero-positivity was considered the more significant risk factor.  
Table 5.9:  Odds Ratio Estimates and 95% CI s for Identified Dog Residency Risk within 5 vs 2 
years of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity status 
Residency Location Residency Time Period* OR** 95% CI 
Northeastern U.S. 5 years 4.3408 (2.9357, 6.4187) 
 2 years 4.6613 (3.1225, 6.984) 
 
Southeastern U.S. 5 years 0.6502 (0.4440, 0.9523) 
 2 years 0.5534 (0.3729, 0.8214) 
 
Central Europe 5 years 1.5375 (1.0178, 2.3229) 
 2 years 1.4406 (0.9470, 2.1915) 
 * within last 5 years or within last 2 years 
**referent category is no history of residing in location for time period 
 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.183 (0.070, 0.480) 0.0005 
Ehrlichia 
     Yes* 1.000   




Dogs that lived in northeastern U.S. within the last 5 years were 4 times more likely to be Bb sero-positve than those 
with no history of living in the northeastern U.S. in last 5 years, and the magnitude of association is more with more 
recent residency history.  Dogs that lived in southeastern U.S. within the last 5 years were 2/3 less likely to be Bb 
sero-positve than those with no history of living in the southeastern U.S. in last 5 years, and the magnitude of 
association is less with more recent residency history; recent history of southeastern U.S.  residency is more 
protective. Dogs that lived in Central Europe within the last 5 years were 1.5 times more likely to be Bb sero-positve 
than those with no history of living in the Central Europe in last 5 yr, with the magnitude of association being more 
for the more distant exposure has stronger association.  Based on these findings it was determined to use the more 
recent residency data for northeastern and southeastern US, but the more distant residency history for the data on 
Central European residency history.  
 
In addition, sponsor and dog residency histories were found to be closely related, indicating dependence between 
these two variables.  This dependency means that dogs share the same travel and residency history as their military 
sponsors (owners).  In order to determine which risk factor to include in the modeling process, odds ratios based on 
proportions were calculated (Table 5.10) and the variable with the higher magnitude of association with Bb sero-
positivity was included in the modeling process.   
Table 5.10:  Odds Ratio Estimates and 95% CI s for Identified Residential History Risk, Dog vs 
Owner, and B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity status 
Residency Location Resident* OR** 95% CI 
Northeastern U.S. Dog (within last 2 years) 4.6613 (3.1225, 6.984) 
 Owner 3.5483 (2.4139, 5.2159) 
 
Southeastern U.S. Dog (within last 2 years) 0.5534 (0.3729, 0.8214) 
 Owner 0.6711 (0.6711, 0.4577) 
 
Central Europe Dog (within last 5 years) 1.5375 (1.0178, 2.3229) 
 Owner 1.4846 (1.0131, 2.1757) 
 * residency history for dog vs. owner 
**referent category is no history of residing in location for time period 
 
The table shows that dog residential history data shows a slightly higher magnitude of association with Bb sero-








Bivariate Models:  Installation Constant, Adjustment for Identified Risk Factors 
 
Based on the combined findings of the descriptive analyses, investigation of the associations of each risk factor with 
both Bb seroprevalence and installation, determinations of inter-variable redundancies, and evaluation of odds ratios 
the following 12 variables were identified as potential risk factors for Bb sero-positivity in the study population:  
History of tick exposure (Tick), Dog’s weight (Wt), history of previous owner (POwn), living in a wooded 
environment (Wood), recreating through wilderness walks (WWalk), history of dog living in the Northeastern US 
within the last 2 years (DgNERes2),  history of dog living in the Southeastern US within the last 2 years 
(DgSERes2), history of dog living in the Western US within the last 2 years (DgWRes2), history of dog living in the 
Central Europe within the last 5 years (DgCRes5), co-infection with D. immitus (Diro), co-infection with A.platys  
and/or A. phagocytophilum (Ana), and co-infection with E. canis and/or E. ewingii (Ehr). 
 
Because the overall goal of this study is to be able to use installation level canine Bb seroprevalence data as sentinel 
surveillance for human borreliosis, it is important to ensure that the seroprevalence reported for the installation is 
truly a reflection of the risk in the area, and not merely a reflection of the distribution of these identified risk factors.  
In order to better understand the potential impact of each variable on the installation to seroprevalence association, 
bivariate analyses were done.  Only the Diro (co-infection with D. immitus) variable was determined to NOT be a 
potential confounder, indicating the other eleven variables could be potential confounders and therefore dictating 
their inclusion in the subsequent multivariable regression analysis.  Appendix D-5 has the results of these bivariant 






Multivariate Models:  Installation Constant, Adjustment for Identified Risk Factors 
 
Eight risk factors remained potential confounders of the installation to Bb seroprevalence association.  The resulting 
logistic regression model had the following form: 
 
YBOR = β + βINST + βTICK+ βWT + βDGWRES2+ βDGNERES2+ βDGCEURES5 +  βWWALK T+ βANA+ βIEHR + e  
The χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic (log likelihood ratio) for the model was 185.014 with 25 degrees of freedom and a 
resulting p-value of <0.0001, suggesting that the model adequately explained the Bb seroprevalence outcome.  Odds 
ratios for all factors and the full regression process can be found in Appendix E-5.  Based on this final model the 








































* Adjusted for the following Dog Characteristics:  History of Tick Exposure, Weight, Recent (within 2 years) History of Living in Western, 
Recent (within 2 years) History of Living in Northeastern US, History (within 5 years) of Living in Central Europe, Recreation through 
Wilderness Walks, co-infection with A. phagocytophilumum/A.platys , and co-infection with E.canis/ E, ewingii. 
 
Table 5.11: Odds of Military Pet Dog Borrelia burgdorferi  Sero-positivity by Installation as 
Compared to Fort Drum, NY 
Installation  
     (sero-positive/total tested) 
Crude  
OR 95% CI 
Adjusted* 
OR 95% CI 
Kaiserslautern, DE  
     (12/325) 0.376 (0.190, 0.745) 0.324 (0.094, 1.116) 
Stuttgart. DE  
     (8/212) 0.384 (0.173, 0.853) 0.234 (0.062, 0.883) 
Rota, SP  
     (2/67) 0.302 (0.070, 1.292) 0.570 (0.115, 2.828) 
Spangdahlem, DE  
     (9/298) 0.296 (0.139, 0.633) 0.262 (0.072, 0.948) 
Fort Belvoir, VA  
     (10/204) 0.481 (0.231, 1.002) 0.623 (0.258, 1.505) 
Fort Bragg, NC  
     (5/520) 0.094 (0.036, 0.245) 0.177 (0.058, 0.537) 
Fort Carson, CO  
     (5/280) 0.175 (0.067, 0.456) 0.605 (0.168, 2.179) 
Fort Hood, TX  
     (1/170) 0.058 (0.008, 0.426) 0.116 (0.012, 1.084) 
Fort Lee, VA 
     (5/297) 0.165 (0.063, 0.430) 0.263 (0.085,  0.81) 
Camp Lejeune, NC  
     (6/355) 0.166 (0.068, 0.402) 0.219 (0.071, 0.68) 
Camp Pendleton, CA  
     (1/42) 0.233 (0.031, 1.755) 0.883 (0.091,  8.588) 
JBLM, WA  
     (6/345) 0.170 (0.070, 0.414) 0.724 (0.201, 2.609) 
Great Lakes, IL  




As expected, all Odds Ratios are less than one, however the wide confidence intervals bring a level of uncertainty to 




The overall purpose of this study was to demonstrate canine B. burgdorferi seroprevalence as an adjunct to sentinel 
surveillance for human Lyme borreliosis in military populations.  The focus of this section was to determine whether 
the observed installation to seroprevalence association is influenced by the distribution of identified risk factors. 
Based on the findings of this section, eight of the 83 risk factors investigated were identified to be potential 
confounders, however, given the width of the confidence intervals, meaningful conclusions about confounding are 
difficult.  This may be due to small sample sizes and overall low number of sero-positive observations.  Several of 
the installations (seven of the fifteen) produced fewer than the requested number of surveys leading to sample sizes 
that were underpowered.  This means that for these installations there may not have been enough samples taken to 
detect the true prevalence for the area.  In addition, seven of the fifteen installations had five or fewer total sero-
positive animals over the one year study period.  The low sample sizes in conjunction with the low sero-positive cell 
counts may have contributed to instability of the model estimates, and the resulting inability to make conclusions on 
the potential for confounding. In addition, this approach only allows for adjustment by identified risk factors, there 
may still be unmeasured common features at the installation level that make these dogs more likely to have the same 
seroprevalence status.   In other words, the potential for additional confounding of seroprevalence status at the 
installation level by other unmeasured risk factors may exist and therefore further contribute to the uncertainty of 
these estimates.    
Although not the purpose of this study, analysis of the characteristics of the study population revealed several 
interesting trends.  For example, the study did not find the sponsor’s service component or preferred primary pet 
care facility to be significantly associated with seroprevalence.  It also didn’t matter whether or not the dog was 
previously owned or at which age the dog joined the family.  However, the data showed that more than 84% of the 
dogs joined the family at less than a year of age and that over 65% had never had prior owners, meaning that the 




was not found to be a risk factor.  Inconsistent with the literature, however, age was not found to be associated with 
seroprevalence.  This discrepancy could not be resolved even when categories were collapsed.  With over 45% of 
study dogs fell in the high risk categories (three to six and six to eight years of age), it is not clear why age as a 
proxy for cumulative exposure was not a risk factor.   
 
Overall 80% of the study dogs were reported to have a history of flea and tick product use and over 60% were 
reported to be currently on the preventatives.  It was interesting, however, that the use of these flea and tick 
prevention products was not found to be associated with seroprevalence in this study population.  This lack of 
association may be due to inaccurate owner reporting, either intentionally or unintentionally.  It could also be due to 
owner compliance issues such as inappropriate application or use of the products.  Of greatest concern would be if 
this lack of association between flea and tick product use and Bb seroprevalence indicates true product failure.  In 
2012 a study found no significant association between a history of acaricide use and the presence of ticks in their 
study population of pet dogs brought into veterinary clinics throughout the United Kingdom (34).  These findings 
together indicate the need to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the currently recommended flea and tick preventive 
products.   
 
The number of hours spent outdoors and whether or not most outdoor activities occurred on a leash were determined 
to not be a risk factor for Bb seroprevalence, however certain types of recreational activities (walks through the 
wilderness) and the type of outdoor living environment (wooded) did.  Also consistent with the literature, breed was 
found to be a risk factor, with the highest prevalence occurring in the sporting, herding, and working breeds. 
 
Sponsor residency history data was expected to be inversely associated with Bb seroprevalence based on preventive 
medicine practices (sponsor’s from Lyme endemic areas such as the NE U.S. were suspected to have dogs with 
lower seroprevalence based on knowledge of risk), however was not.  Furthermore, the data collected on sponsor 
residency history and dog residency history was determined to co-linear with the dog data having a higher 





In order to investigate the potential impact of travel history on seroprevalence, owners were asked to select where 
their dog lived both in the last 5 years, and in the last 2 years.  The time windows were based on the knowledge that 
canine antibodies to B. burgdorferi remain elevated for at least 69 weeks (18).  It is interesting to note that for the 
U.S. regions the 2 year window has a higher magnitude of association with seroprevalence when compared to the 5 
year window, but the opposite is noticed in Europe.  This difference could reflect that the exposure that occurred in 
Europe were longer ago (declining risk in the area; higher risk more than two years ago) or differences between the 
Borreliae strains found in Europe as compared to the United States.  For example, perhaps the American strains are 
able to invade host tissues and evade serological detection more than the European strains, so that after two years 
antigen levels become low enough to produce false negative results.  Because B. burgdorferi  is transmitted by ticks, 
it is not surprising that a history of tick exposure was identified as being associated with Bb seroprevalence.  Also, 
because the Ixodes spp. ticks that carry the Bb pathogen are also known to carry Anaplasma spp., it is not surprising 
that Anaplasma spp. sero-positivity is also associated with Bb sero-positivity.  Ehrlichia canis (as tested for by the 
study test kits), on the other hand, is carried by a different tick, Rhipicephalus spp, but because these ticks have 
overlapping geographic distributions, and because factors that put dogs at risk for tick bites would put them at risk 
for all tick bites, it does make sense that E. canis sero-positivity would be associated with Bb sero-positivity.  
 
The final model indicates that eight of the 83 potential risk factors are confounders of the observed Bb 
seroprevalence to installation association.  It is intuitive that co-infection with Anaplasma spp. is confounding 
because the shared vector (and rodent reservoirs) actually leads to cases of co-exposure, making the pathogen 
associated with both the installation and Bb seroprevalence.  As discussed above, the confounding by E. canis  co-
infection is likely due to overlapping geographic distributions and shared risk factors for tick exposure.  It is also 
intuitive, then, that a history of tick exposure would only be a risk factor for Bb in regions where the pathogen 
exists, therefore making it associated with both installation and sero-positivity.  The confounding by the variables 
representing recent dog residency history (Western and Northeastern U.S. within last 2 years) may be explained by 
the fact that most of these dogs are still at the indicated location (association with installation) and that these regions 
have the highest (NE) and lowest (W) Bb risk (association with Bb seroprevalence).  A similar phenomenon may 
explain the confounding by the history of living in Central Europe, although for this variable the history or residency 




that overseas assignments tend to be for at least three years, meaning dogs with this variable are probably still in the 
indicated region (association with installation).  However, if this is the case, the owners should also have indicated 
that the dogs are in this location at the 2 year mark.  The difference is that the more recent time period does not 
appear to be associated with Bb sero-positivity to the same magnitude that the more distant time period does, 
possibly for the regional differences in Borrelea species as mentioned above.  The last two confounders are less 
intuitive and more likely to be related to regional differences in owner attitudes and behaviors.  For example, 
although one may expect dog weight, as a proxy for breed, to be associated with Bb seroprevalence, the association 
with installation is harder to understand.  Perhaps certain dog breeds are more popular in certain regions of the 
country, for example short haired breeds in hot climates and long haired breeds in cold climates.  In terms of the 
confounding by wilderness walks, this is likely more associated with regional variations in environment and climate.  
For example, Ixodes spp. ticks live in temperate climates.  People that live in temperate climates tend to participate 
in outdoor activities such as hiking, which brings them in contact with borrelia infected ticks.  High risk 
installations are found in these temperate climates.  Therefore, wilderness walks as a proxy for climate, is associated 
with both Bb seroprevalence and installation.   
Conclusions 
 
Because of the limited power of this study, there was an inability to robustly evaluate whether canine B. burgdorferi 
seroprevalence is influenced by the distribution of identified risk factors.  In order to better make this assessment, 
the study should be repeated for a longer period in order to meet the required sample size (many of the installations 
were underpowered).  In addition, because of the low overall Bb seroprevalence in this population (likely due to the 
high level of flea and tick prevention), the target sample size should be increased, or a different zoonotic disease 




The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the use of Service member pet dogs in sentinel surveillance for 




disease surveillance programs in the military.  Doing so involved three specific objectives:  1) determining the 
association between B. burgdorferi seroprevalence in military pet dogs and military human Borreliosis data, 2) 
comparing military pet dog Bb seroprevalence data to published civilian pet dog data in order to evaluate  potential 
differences in the populations and determine the most appropriate source of data for military populations , and 3) 
investigating the validity of the military pet dog seroprevalence data by evaluating potential confounders to the 
association between military pet dog seroprevalence and test result location (installation).   
This is the first study to investigate the utility of pet dogs belonging to service members as sentinels for Lyme 
disease risk in military populations.  There are many reasons to examine this relationship.  One is the fact that 
military populations are not limited to living within the United States, making reliance on pet data available at the 
U.S. level insufficient for risk projections for military populations at the global level.  Also, because military 
personnel tend to live on or around the specific military installation they are assigned to, the use of existing canine 
prevalence data at the state level may not accurately represent the risk of Lyme disease at the installation level.  
Because of the shared recreational habits, environmental exposures, and travel history that exist between pet owners 
and their pets, it is logical to assume that service member pet dogs are better able to reflect shared exposures and 
therefore better represent the risk of Lyme disease as compared to civilian pet dogs in the same location. 
Lastly, the physical exams and routine laboratory work associated with the issuing of health certificates required for 
frequent movement of the owners contributes to a robust animal disease database; capturing evidence of exposures 
in asymptomatic dogs. On the other hand, seroprevalence estimates based on military pet dogs may also have several 
potential short comings.  The high mobility of the population has the potential to lead to inaccurate geographic risk 
assessment if travel history is not controlled for.  Also, the low cost of preventive medicine products at military run 
veterinary treatment facilities has the potential decrease the prevalence of disease in these animals and therefore 
decrease the sensitivity of the sentinel surveillance.  The inclusion of stray animals that do not receive regular 
veterinary care and may not be as mobile is one approach that may increase the seroprevalence estimates and 
corresponding sensitivity, because these animals are more likely to roam free and be exposed to infected ticks.   
This study found that Bb seroprevalence estimates in military pet dogs not only reflect incidence rates in military 
human populations, but they also appear to be a more sensitive indicator of B. burgdorferi presence then their 




Lyme disease risk for military populations than civilian pet dog data.  Unfortunately, this study lacked the power to 
fully evaluate whether canine B. burgdorferi seroprevalence was influenced by the distribution of identified risk 
factors.  In order to confidently make this determination, the study should be repeated for a longer period in order to 




Although using dogs as sentinels for Lyme disease risk in humans is not straight forward, careful consideration of 
both the advantages and limitations this approach can still make this a powerful adjunct to human Lyme disease 
surveillance efforts.  This study has showed that service member pet dogs can serve as sensitive and convenient 
measures of the risk of Lyme disease in human military populations, and recommends the incorporation of service 
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Pet Dog  
Health Care Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this survey.   
The information you provide will lead to better understanding of our military pet dog population’s unique life styles 
and will ultimately assist us in providing better health care to your pet. 
 
All questions about your pet should be answered for the dog that is receiving the IDEXX 4Dx Plus® test 
(Heartworm, Lyme, Ehrlichiosis, Anaplasmosis) at today’s visit. 
 
Participation is limited to only one dog per family. 
 
Sponsor  
1.  Please circle the sponsor’s service component:  
a.  Active Duty Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine 
b.  Reserve Component 
c.  National Guard 
d.  Retired Military 
e.  Other 
 
Sponsor Residency History 
2.  Including where you currently live, which of the US regions have you ever lived in for more than 3 months? 
Circle all that apply. 
a. I have never lived in the US  
b. Mid-Western United States (IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI) 
c. South Eastern United States (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV) 
d. Western United States (AZ, CA, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY) 
e. North Eastern United States (CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT, DC)  
f. Other United States regions (AK, HI, Puerto Rico) 
 
3.  Including where you currently live, which of the European regions/countries have you ever lived in for more than 
3 months? 
Circle all that apply. 
 a. I have never lived in Europe. 
 b. Sweden, Netherland, and/or the Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) 
 c. Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, the United Kingdom) 
 d. Southern Europe and/or the Balkans (Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Turkey, Bosnia) 
 e. Eastern Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine) 
 f. Central Europe (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Switzerland, Belgium, France) 













General Pet Care Information 
All questions about your pet should be answered for the dog that is receiving the IDEXX 4Dx Plus® test 
(Heartworm, Lyme, Ehrlichiosis, Anaplasmosis) at today’s visit. 
 
4.  Where does your dog receive his/her primary preventive medical care?  (Routine exams, tests, vaccinations)  
a.  This Military Veterinary Treatment Facility 
b.  Another Military Veterinary Treatment Facility 
c.  Civilian Veterinary Facility 
 
5.  Has your dog ever been on Heartworm Prevention (for example:  Interceptor®, Sentinel®, Heartgard®, 
Heartgard Plus®)? 
a. Yes  
b. No  
c. I do not know  
 




c. I do not know 
 
7.  Has your dog ever been on Flea and Tick Prevention (for example:  Program®, Sentinel®, Frontline®, Flea/Tick 
Collars, Flea/Tick Shampoos or Dips)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I do not know 
 
8.  Is your dog currently on Flea and Tick Prevention (for example:  Program®, Sentinel®, Frontline®, Flea/Tick 
Collars, Flea/Tick Shampoos or Dips)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I do not know 
 
9.  Has a tick ever been found on your dog? 
a. Yes 
b. No 





General Information About Your Dog 
10.  What is the gender of you dog? 
a.  Male Intact 
b.  Male Neutered 
c.  Female Intact 
d.  Female Spayed 
 
11.  Approximately how old is your dog? 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1-3 years 
c. 3-6 years 
d. 6-8 years 
e. more than 8 years 
 
12.  In what breed category would you place your dog?  
Please note, these are not complete listings; select the category that best suits your dog.   
For mixed breeds select the one that you feel applies most. 
a. Sporting (Spaniels, Retrievers, Pointers, Setters, Brittany, Vizsla, Weimaraner) 
b. Herding (Collies, Cattle Dogs, Australian Shepherds, Malinois, Sheep Dogs, Corgi, German Shepherd) 
c. Working (Akita, Malamute, Mountain Dogs, Boxers, Mastiffs, Pinschers, Schnauzers, Danes, Pyrenees, 
 Newfoundland, Rottweiler, St. Bernard, Samoyed, Husky) 
d. Hound (Beagles, Hounds, Dachshunds, Whippets, Ridgebacks) 
e. Terrier (Airedale, Staffordshire, Carin, Bull, Russell, Scottish, Fox) 
f. Toy (Chihuahua, King Charles Spaniel, Italian Greyhound, Maltese, Pekingese, Pomeranian, Pug, 
Yorkie,  Shih Tzu, Poodle, Papilon) 




13.  How much does your dog weigh? 
a. Less than 15 pounds 
b. 16-35 pounds 
c. 36-55 pounds 
d. 56-75 pounds 






Dog Residency History 
14.  Including where your dog currently lives, which of the US regions has your dog lived in within the past 5 
years?   
Circle all that apply. 
a. He/she has never lived in the US  
b. Mid-West United States (IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI) 
c. South Eastern United States (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV) 
d. Western United States (AZ, CA, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY) 
e. North Eastern United States (CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT, DC) 
f. Other United States regions (AK, HI, Puerto Rico) 
 
15.  Including where your dog currently lives, which of the US regions has your dog lived in within the past 2 
years?   
Circle all that apply. 
a. He/she has never lived in the US  
b. Mid-West United States (IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI) 
c. South Eastern United States (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV) 
d. Western United States (AZ, CA, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY) 
e. North Eastern United States (CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT, DC) 
f. Other United States regions (AK, HI, Puerto Rico) 
 
16.  Including where your dog currently lives, which of the European regions/countries has your dog lived in within 
the past 5 years? 
Circle all that apply. 
 a. My dog has never lived in Europe. 
 b. Sweden, Netherland, and/or the Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) 
 c. Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, the United Kingdom) 
 d. Southern Europe and/or the Balkans (Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Turkey, Bosnia) 
 e. Eastern Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine) 
 f. Central Europe (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Switzerland, Belgium, France) 
 g. Other European countries not listed 
 
17.  Including where your dog currently lives, which of the European regions/countries has your dog lived in within 
the past 2 years? 
Circle all that apply. 
 a. My dog has never lived in Europe. 
 b. Sweden, Netherland, and/or the Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) 
 c. Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, the United Kingdom) 
 d. Southern Europe and/or the Balkans (Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Turkey, Bosnia) 
 e. Eastern Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine) 
 f. Central Europe (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Switzerland, Belgium, France) 
 g. Other European countries not listed 
 
18.a. How old was your dog when he/she joined your family?) 
a. less than 3 months old 
b. 3 to 6 months old 
c. 6 months to 1 year old 
d. more than a year old 
 









General Pet Activity Information 
19.  How many hours a day is your dog outside? 
a. Less than an hour 
b. 1 to 8 hours 
c. More than 8 hours but not all day 
d. All day but not all night 
e. All day and night 
 
20. When your dog is outside, what best describes his/her surroundings? 
Circle all that apply.  
a. Concrete, dirt, gravel 
b. Grass, field, meadow 
c. Wooded or forested  
d. Shrubs and bushes 
e. Other 
 
21.  What type of recreational activities does your dog do? 
Circle all that apply.  
a. Neighborhood walks 
b. Wilderness walks (for example hiking, fishing, hunting, camping) 
c. Dog Parks 
d. None of the above 
 























END OWNER SURVEY  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 







THE FOLLOWING SECTION  
IS TO BE COMPLETED BY  
THE VETERINARY TREATMENT FACILITY STAFF 
************************************************************************************* 
 
IDEXX 4Dx Plus® Test Results 


















28.  VTF Name and Location (Installation):____________________________________________________  
 









Appendix B-5  
Military Pet Dog B. burgdorferi Risk Factor Data (Characteristics of the Study Population) 









Sponsor’s Service Component 
     Active Duty 2667 72.7% 80 73.4% 2747 72.7% 
     Reserve Corps 15 0.4% 1 0.9% 16 0.4% 
     National Guard 6 0.2% 1 0.9% 7 0.2% 
     Retired Military 832 22.7% 23 21.1% 855 22.6% 
     Other 110 3.0% 2 1.8% 112 3.0% 
     Missing 37 1.0% 2 1.8% 39 1.0% 
 









Age of Dog When Joined Family 
     < 3 months 1813 49.44% 41 37.61% 1854 49.10% 
     3 to 6 months 800 21.82% 28 25.69% 828 21.93% 
     6 months to a year 370 10.09% 12 11.01% 382 10.12% 
     > 1 year 603 16.44% 24 22.02% 627 16.60% 
     Missing 81 2.21% 4 1.00% 85 2.25% 
Prior Ownership 
     No 2422 66.05% 63 57.80% 2485 65.81% 
     Yes 1168 31.85% 45 41.28% 1213 32.12% 
     Missing 77 2.10% 1 0.92% 78 2.07% 
 









Owner Lived in U.S.  
     No 107 2.92% 3 2.75% 110 2.91% 
     Yes 3560 97.08% 106 97.25% 3666 97.09% 
Owner Lived in Midwest Region 
     No 2591 70.66% 76 69.72% 2667 70.63% 
     Yes 1076 29.34% 33 30.28% 1109 29.37% 
Owner Lived in West Region 
     No 2101 57.29% 65 59.63% 2166 57.36% 
     Yes 1566 42.71% 44 40.37% 1610 42.64% 




     No 2700 73.63% 48 44.04% 2748 72.78% 
     Yes 967 26.37% 61 55.96% 1028 27.22% 
Owner Lived in Southeast Region 
     No 1063 28.99% 41 37.61% 1104 29.24% 
     Yes 2604 71.01% 68 62.39% 2672 70.76% 
Owner Lived in Other U.S. Regions  
     No 3229 88.06% 101 92.66% 3330 88.19% 
     Yes 438 11.94% 8 7.34% 446 11.81% 
Missing U.S. Residecy Data  
     No 3623 98.80% 107 98.17% 3730 98.78% 
     Yes 44 1.20% 2 1.83% 46 1.22% 
 









Owner Lived in Europe 
     No 2025 55.22% 53 48.62% 2078 55.03% 
     Yes 1642 44.78% 56 51.38% 1698 44.97% 
Owner Lived in Baltic Region 
     No 3634 99.10% 106 97.25% 3740 99.05% 
     Yes 33 0.90% 3 2.75% 36 0.95% 
Owner Lived in Northern Region 
     No 3545 96.67% 107 98.17% 3652 96.72% 
     Yes 122 3.33% 2 1.83% 124 3.28% 
Owner Lived in Southern Region  
     No 3378 92.12% 100 91.74% 3478 92.11% 
     Yes 289 7.88% 9 8.26% 298 7.89% 
Owner Lived in Eastern Region 
     No 3649 99.51% 109 100.00% 3758 99.52% 
     Yes 18 0.49% 0 0.00% 18 0.48% 
Owner Lived in Central Region 
     No 2303 62.80% 58 53.21% 2361 62.53% 
     Yes 1364 37.20% 51 46.79% 1415 37.47% 
Owner Lived in Other Region 
     No 3601 98.20% 108 99.08% 3709 98.23% 
     Yes 66 1.80% 1 0.92% 67 1.77% 
Missing Region European Residency Data 
     No 3567 97.27% 106 97.25% 3293 87.21% 














Primary Pet Care Facility  
     Military Facility where       
     survey completed 3148 85.85% 102 93.58% 3250 86.07% 
     Different Military Facility   
     than survey completed  50 1.36% 1 0.92% 51 1.35% 
     Civilian Facility 309 8.43% 3 2.75% 312 8.26% 
     Missing 160 4.36% 3 2.75% 163 4.32% 
History of Heartworm Preventative Use 
     No History of Use 451 12.30% 10 9.17% 461 12.21% 
     Yes History of Use 2928 79.85% 88 80.73% 3016 79.87% 
     Owner not know 247 6.74% 10 9.17% 257 6.81% 
     Missing 41 1.12% 1 0.92% 42 1.11% 
Current Heartworm Preventative Use 
     No History of Use 1303 35.53% 45 41.28% 1348 35.70% 
     Yes History of Use 2235 60.95% 60 55.05% 2295 60.78% 
     Owner not know 90 2.45% 2 1.83% 92 2.44% 
     Missing 39 1.06% 2 1.83% 41 1.09% 
History of Flea and Tick Prevatative Use 
     No History of Use 395 10.77% 8 7.34% 403 10.67% 
     Yes History of Use 3100 84.54% 96 88.07% 3196 84.64% 
     Owner not know 132 3.60% 4 3.67% 136 3.60% 
     Missing 40 1.09% 1 0.92% 41 1.09% 
Current Flea and Tick Prevatative Use 
     No History of Use 1325 36.13% 41 37.61% 1366 36.18% 
     Yes History of Use 2258 61.58% 65 59.63% 2323 61.52% 
     Owner not know 48 1.31% 1 0.92% 49 1.30% 
     Missing 36 0.98% 2 1.83% 28 0.74% 
History of Tick Exposure 
     No 1990 54.27% 23 21.10% 2013 53.31% 
     Yes 1471 40.11% 72 66.06% 1543 40.86% 
     Owner not know 168 4.58% 13 11.93% 181 4.79% 
     Missing 38 1.04% 1 0.92% 39 1.03% 
 










     Male Intact 549 14.97% 16 14.68% 565 14.96% 




    Female Intact 336 9.16% 7 6.42% 343 9.08% 
    Female Spayed 1318 35.94% 44 40.37% 1362 36.07% 
    Missing 119 3.25% 2 1.83% 121 3.20% 
Age(years) 
    Less than 1 172 4.69% 2 1.83% 174 4.61% 
    1 to 3 1134 30.92% 27 24.77% 1161 30.75% 
    3 to 6 1119 30.52% 33 30.28% 1152 30.51% 
    6 to 8 572 15.60% 18 16.51% 590 15.63% 
    more than 8 579 15.79% 26 23.85% 605 16.02% 
    Missing 91 2.48% 3 2.75% 94 2.49% 
Breed Group 
    Sporting 693 18.90% 36 33.03% 729 19.31% 
    Herding 441 12.03% 23 21.10% 464 12.29% 
    Working 454 12.38% 17 15.60% 471 12.47% 
    Hound 363 9.90% 8 7.34% 371 9.83% 
    Terrier 316 8.62% 2 1.83% 318 8.42% 
    Toy 826 22.53% 9 8.26% 835 22.11% 
    Non-Sporting 233 6.35% 6 5.50% 239 6.33% 
    Other 179 4.88% 5 4.59% 184 4.87% 
    Missing 162 4.42% 3 2.75% 165 4.37% 
Weight Group (pounds) 
    Less than 15 942 25.69% 11 10.09% 953 25.24% 
    16 to 35 836 22.80% 16 14.68% 852 22.56% 
    36 to 55 583 15.90% 22 20.18% 605 16.02% 
    56 to 75 706 19.25% 33 30.28% 739 19.57% 
    More than 75 514 14.02% 25 22.94% 539 14.27% 
    Missing 86 2.35% 2 1.83% 88 2.33% 
 










     No  2505 68.31% 82 75.23% 82 2.17% 
    Yes 1162 31.69% 27 24.77% 1189 31.49% 
    Missing 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Grass 
    No 501 13.66% 18 16.51% 519 13.74% 
    Yes 3166 86.34% 91 83.49% 3257 86.26% 





    No 3053 83.26% 79 72.48% 3132 82.94% 
    Yes 614 16.74% 30 27.52% 644 17.06% 
    Missing 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Bush 
    No 2889 78.78% 82 75.23% 2971 78.68% 
    Yes 778 21.22% 27 24.77% 805 21.32% 
    Missing 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Other 
    No 3598 98.12% 106 97.25% 3704 98.09% 
    Yes 69 1.88% 3 2.75% 72 1.91% 
    Missing 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Missing 
    No 3628 98.94% 108 99.08% 3736 98.94% 
    Yes 39 1.06% 1 0.92% 40 1.06% 
    Missing 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
 










     No  513 13.99% 18 16.51% 531 14.06% 
     Yes 3154 86.01% 91 83.49% 3245 85.94% 
     Missing 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Wilderness Walks 
     No 2581 70.38% 52 47.71% 2633 69.73% 
     Yes 1086 29.62% 57 52.29% 1143 30.27% 
     Missing 0 0.00% 0  0 0.00% 
Dog Parks 
     No 2620 71.45% 82 75.23% 2702 71.56% 
     Yes 1047 28.55% 27 24.77% 1074 28.44% 
     Missing 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
No Recreational Activities 
     No 3386 92.34% 102 93.58% 3488 92.37% 
     Yes 281 7.66% 7 6.42% 288 7.63% 
     Missing 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Missing 
     No 3629 98.96% 108 99.08% 3737 98.97% 
     Yes 38 1.04% 1 0.92% 39 1.03% 


















Lived in U.S. in past 5 years 
     No 406 11.07% 12 11.01% 418 11.07% 
     Yes 3261 88.93% 97 88.99% 3358 88.93% 
     Missing/Unclear 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Lived in MW in past 5 years 
     No 3101 84.57% 90 82.57% 3191 84.51% 
     Yes 566 15.43% 19 17.43% 585 15.49% 
Lived in W in past 5 years 
     No 2680 73.08% 88 80.73% 2768 73.31% 
     Yes 987 26.92% 21 19.27% 1008 26.69% 
Lived in NE in past 5 years 
     No 3139 85.60% 63 57.80% 3202 84.80% 
     Yes 528 14.40% 46 42.20% 574 15.20% 
Lived in SE in past 5 years 
     No 1526 41.61% 57 52.29% 1583 41.92% 
     Yes 2141 58.39% 52 47.71% 2193 58.08% 
Lived in Other U.S. Regions in past 5 years 
     No 3510 95.72% 108 99.08% 3618 95.82% 
     Yes 157 4.28% 1 0.92% 158 4.18% 
Missing Dog Residecy Data (for last 5 years)  
     No 3592 97.95% 106 97.25% 3698 97.93% 
     Yes 75 2.05% 3 2.75% 78 2.07% 
 
     No 3522 96.05% 102 93.58% 3624 95.97% 
     Yes 112 3.05% 6 5.50% 118 3.13% 
     Missing 33 0.90% 1 0.92% 34 0.90% 
Leash 
     No 758 20.67% 26 23.85% 784 20.76% 
     Yes 2843 77.53% 81 74.31% 2924 77.44% 
     Missing 66 1.80% 2 1.83% 68 1.80% 
Daily Time Spend Outdoors (hours) 
     < 1 1059 28.88% 27 24.77% 1086 28.76% 
     1 to 8  2417 65.91% 77 70.64% 2494 66.05% 
     > 8 (not all day)  35 0.95% 2 1.83% 37 0.98% 
     All day and night 41 1.12% 1 0.92% 42 1.11% 













Lived in U.S. in past 2 years 
     No 640 17.45% 19 17.43% 659 17.45% 
     Yes 3027 82.55% 90 82.57% 3117 82.55% 
Lived in MW in past 2 years 
     No 3248 88.57% 93 85.32% 3341 88.48% 
     Yes 419 11.43% 16 14.68% 435 11.52% 
Lived in W in past 2  years  
     No 2833 77.26% 97 88.99% 2930 77.60% 
     Yes 834 22.74% 12 11.01% 846 22.40% 
Lived in NE in past 2 years  
     No 3247 88.55% 68 62.39% 3315 87.79% 
     Yes 420 11.45% 41 37.61% 461 12.21% 
Lived in SE in past 2 years 
     No 1791 48.84% 69 63.30% 1860 49.26% 
     Yes 1876 51.16% 40 36.70% 1916 50.74% 
Lived in Other U.S. Regions in past 2 years 
     No 3574 97.46% 109 100.00% 3683 97.54% 
     Yes 93 2.54% 0 0.00% 93 2.46% 
Missing Dog Residecy Data (for last 2 years) 
     No 3501 95.47% 102 93.58% 3603 95.42% 
     Yes 166 4.53% 7 6.42% 173 4.58% 
 









Lived in Europe in past 5 years 
     No 2708 73.85% 74 67.89% 2782 73.68% 
     Yes 959 26.15% 35 32.11% 994 26.32% 
Lived in Baltic Region in past 5 years 
     No 3653 99.62% 108 99.08% 3761 99.60% 
     Yes 14 0.38% 1 0.92% 15 0.40% 
Lived in Northern Region in past 5 years 
     No 3649 99.51% 109 100.00% 3758 99.52% 
     Yes 18 0.49% 0 0.00% 18 0.48% 
Lived in Southern Region in past 5 years 
     No 3547 96.73% 108 99.08% 3655 96.80% 
     Yes 120 3.27% 1 0.92% 121 3.20% 




     No 3662 99.86% 109 100.00% 3771 99.87% 
     Yes 5 0.14% 0 0.00% 5 0.13% 
Lived in Central Region in past 5 years 
     No 2832 77.23% 75 68.81% 2907 76.99% 
     Yes 835 22.77% 34 31.19% 869 23.01% 
Lived in Other Region in past 5 years 
     No 3652 99.59% 109 100.00% 3761 99.60% 
     Yes 15 0.41% 0 0.00% 15 0.40% 
Missing Region Data for past 5 years 
     No 3572 97.41% 107 98.17% 3679 97.43% 
     Yes 95 2.59% 2 1.83% 97 2.57% 
 









Lived in Europe in past 2 years 
     No 2743 74.80% 76 69.72% 2819 74.66% 
     Yes 924 25.20% 33 30.28% 957 25.34% 
Lived in Baltic Region in past 2 years 
     No 3657 99.73% 108 99.08% 3765 99.71% 
     Yes 10 0.27% 1 0.92% 11 0.29% 
Lived in Northern Region in past 2 years 
     No 3656 99.70% 109 100.00% 3765 99.71% 
     Yes 11 0.30% 0 0.00% 11 0.29% 
Lived in Southern Region in past 2 years 
     No 3564 97.19% 107 98.17% 3671 97.22% 
     Yes 103 2.81% 2 1.83% 105 2.78% 
Lived in Eastern Region in past 2 years 
     No 3662 99.86% 109 100.00% 3771 99.87% 
     Yes 5 0.14% 0 0.00% 5 0.13% 
Lived in Central Region in past 2 years 
     No 2846 77.61% 77 70.64% 2923 77.41% 
     Yes 821 22.39% 32 29.36% 853 22.59% 
Lived in Other Region in past 2 years 
     No 3654 99.65% 109 100.00% 3763 99.66% 
     Yes 13 0.35% 0 0.00% 13 0.34% 
Missing Region Data for past 2 years 
     No 3553 96.89% 105 96.33% 3658 96.88% 















     No 3649 99.51% 100 91.74% 3749 99.28% 
     Yes 16 0.44% 9 8.26% 25 0.66% 
     Missing 2 0.05% 0 0.00% 2 0.05% 
Dirofilaria 
     No 3631 99.02% 104 95.41% 3735 98.91% 
     Yes 32 0.87% 5 4.59% 37 0.98% 
     Missing 4 0.11% 0 0.00% 4 0.11% 
Ehrlichia 
     No 3568 97.30% 97 88.99% 3665 97.06% 
     Yes 98 2.67% 12 11.01% 110 2.91% 







Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Risk Factor (ORs, 95% CIs) 
Table I:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Owner Characteristics 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Sponsor’s Service Component                                                                    0.4393 
     Retired Military* 1.000   
     Active Duty 1.085 (0.678, 1.736) 0.7336 
     Reserve Corps 2.412 (0.305, 19.039) 0.4037 
     National Guard 6.030 (0.697, 52.132) 0.1026 
     Other 0.658 (0.153, 2.828) 0.5734 
*Referent category 
Table II:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Ownership Characteristics 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Age of Dog When Joined Family                                                                 0.1244       
     > 1 year* 1.000   
     < 3 months 0.568 (0.340, 0.948) 0.0305 
     3 to 6 months 0.879 (0.505, 1.532) 0.6501 
     6 months to a year 0.815 (0.403, 1.649) 0.5692 
Prior Ownership 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.675 (0.458, 0.996) 0.0477 
*Referent category 
Table III:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Owner U.S. Residency History 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Owner Lived in U.S.  
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.942 (0.294, 3.014) 0.9193 
Owner Lived in MW Region 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.956 (0.632, 1.448) 0.83332 
Owner Lived in W Region 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.010 (0.747, 1.623) 0.6268 
Owner Lived in NE Region 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.282 (0.192, 0.414) <0.0001 




     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.477 (0.996, 2.190) 0.0524 
Owner Lived in Other U.S. Regions  
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.713 (0.828, 3.542) 0.1468 
Missing U.S. Residecy Data  
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.650 (0.155, 2.715) 0.5545 
*”Yes” as referent category for each category 
Table IV:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Owner European Residency History 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Owner Lived in Europe 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.767 (0.524, 1.124) 0.1735 
Owner Lived in Baltic Region 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.321        (0.097, 1.063) 0.0628 
Owner Lived in Northern Region 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.841        (0.449, 7.544) 0.3963 
Owner Lived in Southern Region  
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.951 (0.476, 1.900) 0.8860 
Owner Lived in Eastern Region 
     Yes 1.000   
     No >999.999 (<0.001, >999.999) 0.9830 
Owner Lived in Central Region 
     Yes 1.000   
    No 0.674 (0.460 , 0.987) 0.0427 
Owner Lived in Other Region 
    Yes 1.000   
     No 1.979 (0.272, 14.392) 0.5000 
Missing Region European Residency Data 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.991 (0.309, 3.174) 0.9872 









* Referent category 
Table VI:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by by Dog Characteristics 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Gender                                                                                                             0.7058 
     Male Intact* 1.000   
    Male Neuter 1.020        (0.567, 1.838) 0.9462 
    Female Intact 0.715        (0.291, 1.756) 0.4640 
    Female Spayed 1.145        (0.641, 2.047) 0.6467 
Age(years)                                                                                                        0.1244 
    more than 8*    
    less than 1 0.259        (0.061, 1.102) 1.102 
    1 to 3 0.530        (0.307, 0.917) 0.917 
Table V:  Odds of  B. burgdorferi  Sero-positivity by Dog U.S. Residency History in last 5 
years 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Primary Pet Care Facility                                                                              0.1117 
     Military Facility where       
     survey completed*   1.000   
     Different Military Facility    0.617        (0.084, 4.512) 0.6345 
     Civilian Facility 0.300        (0.094, 0.950) 0.0407 
History of Heartworm Preventative Use                                                      0.4152 
     No History of Use* 1.000   
     Yes History of Use 1.355        (0.699, 2.627) 0.3675 
     Owner not know 1.826         (0.750, 4.447) 0.1849 
Current Heartworm Preventative Use                                                         0.4166 
     No History of Use* 1.000   
     Yes History of Use 0.777        (0.525, 1.151) 0.2083 
     Owner not know 0.644        (0.154, 2.696) 0.5467 
History of Flea and Tick Preventative Use                                                  0.5209 
     No History of Use* 1.000   
     Yes History of Use 1.529        (0.738, 3.169) 0.2535 
     Owner not know 1.496        (0.443, 5.049) 0.5161 
Current Flea and Tick Preventative Use                                                     0.8841 
     No History of Use* 1.000   
     Yes History of Use 0.930        (0.626, 1.383) 0.7211 
     Owner not know 0.674        (0.091, 4.998) 0.6996 
History of Tick Exposure                                                                              <0.0001 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.236        (0.147, 0.379) <.0001 




    3 to 6 0.657        (0.389, 1.109) 1.109 
    6 to 8 0.701        (0.380, 1.292) 1.292 
Breed Group                                                                                                   <0.0001 
    Sporting* 1.000   
    Herding 1.004 (0.587, 1.717) 0.9885 
    Working 0.721 (0.400, 1.299) 0.2758 
    Hound 0.424 (0.195, 0.922) 0.922 
    Terrier 0.122 (0.029, 0.509) 0.0039 
    Toy 0.210 (0.100, 0.438) <0.0001 
    Non-Sporting 0.496 (0.206, 1.191) 0.1168 
    Other 0.538 (0.208, 1.390) 0.2004 
Weight Group (pounds)                                                                                <0.0001 
    56 to 75* 1.000   
    Less than 15 0.250 (0.125, 0.498) <0.0001 
    16 to 35 0.409 (0.223, 0.750) 0.0035 
    36 to 55 0.807 (0.466, 1.400) 0.4460 
    More than 75 1.041 (0.611, 1.771) 0.8835 
*Referent category 
Table VII:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Environment Characteristics 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Dirt  
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 0.3424 0.2247 2.3226 0.1275 
Grass 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 1.250  0.748 2.091 0.3948 
Wood 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 0.530 (0.345, 0.813) 0.0037 
Bush 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 0.818 (0.526, 1.272) 0.3725 
Other 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 0.678 (0.210, 2.187) 0.5151 
Missing 
    Yes* 1.000   





Table VIII:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Recreational Activity Characteristics 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Neighborhood Walks 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 1.216 0.727 2.034 0.4555 
Wilderness Walks 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 0.384 0.262 0.563 <0.0001 
Dog Parks 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 1.214 (0.781 1.886) 0.3893 
None of the Listed Recreational Activites 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 1.209 (0.557 2.626) 0.6312 
Missing  
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 1.131 (0.154 8.312) 0.9038 
Dog is used for Sporting 
    Yes* 1.000   
    No 0.541 (0.232 1.258) 0.1534 
Dog primarily recreates on Leash 
    Yes* 1.000   
     No 1.204 0.768 1.886 0.4178 
Daily Time Spend Outdoors (hours)                                                             0.7154 
     All day and night* 1.000   
     < 1 1.045 0.139 7.881 0.9657 
     1 to 8  1.306 0.177 9.619 0.7932 
     > 8 (not all day)  0.695 0.042 11.431 0.7989 
*Referent category 
 
Table IX:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Dog U.S. Residency History in last 5 
years 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Lived in U.S. in past 5 years 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.994 0.541 1.826 0.9837 
Lived in MW in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   




Lived in W in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.543 0.953, 2.498 0.0774 
Lived in NE in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.230 0.156 0.341 <0.0001 
Lived in SE in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.538 1.050 2.2520 0.0270 
Lived in Other U.S. Region in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 4.830 (0.670, 34.817) 0.1189 
Missing U.S. Residency Data  
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.737 (0.229, 2.374) 0.6092 
*Referent category 
Table X:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Dog U.S. Residency History in last 2 
years 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Lived in U.S. in past 2 years 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.998 (0.604, 1.650) 0.9953 
Lived in MW in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.749 (0.437, 1.286) 0.2953 
Lived in W in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 2.379 (1.300, 4.356) 0.0050 
Lived in NE in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.214 (0.144, 0.320) <0.0001 
Lived in SE in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.807 (1.217, 2.682) 0.0033 
Lived in Other U.S. Region in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No >999.999 (<0.001, >999.999) 0.9834 
Missing U.S. Residency Data  
     Yes 1.000   





Table XI:  Odds of B. burgdorferi  Sero-positivity by by Dog European Residency History 
in past 5 years 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Lived in Europe in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.749 (0.497, 1.127) 0.1650 
Lived in Baltic Region in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.414 (0.054, 3.176) 0.3962 
Lived in Northern Region in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No >999.999 (<0.001, >999.999) 0.9834 
Lived in Southern Region in past 5 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 3.654 (0.506, 26.394) 0.1990 
Lived in Eastern Region in past 5 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes >999.999 (<0.001, >999.999) 0.9834 
Lived in Central Region in past 5 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes 0.650 (0.431, 0.982) 0.0410 
Lived in Other Region in past 5 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes >999.999 (<0.001, >999.999) 0.9834 
Missing Region European Residency Data in past 5 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes 1.421 (0.346, 5.837) 0.6258 
*Referent category 
Table XII:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by by Dog European Residency History 
in past 2 years 
 
Characteristic OR 95% CI p-value 
Lived in Europe in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.776 (0.512, 1.175) 0.2307 
Lived in Baltic Region in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 0.295 (0.037, 2.327) 0.2468 
Lived in Northern Region in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   




Lived in Southern Region in past 2 years 
     Yes 1.000   
     No 1.549 (0.377, 6.348) 0.5454 
Lived in Eastern Region in past 2 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes >999.999 (<0.001, >999.999) 0.9834 
Lived in Central Region in past 2 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes 0.694 (0.456, 1.056) 0.0880 
Lived in Other Region in past 2 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes >999.999 (<0.001, >999.999) 0.9834 
Missing Region European Residency Data in past 2 years 
     No 1.000   
     Yes 0.842 (0.305, 2.325) 0.7403 
*Referent category 
Table XIII:  Odds of B. burgdorferi  Sero-positivity by Co-infection 
Co-Infection OR 95% CI p-value 
Anaplasma 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.049 (0.021, 0.113) <0.0001 
Dirofilaria 
     Yes* 1.000   
     No 0.183 (0.070, 0.480) 0.0005 
Ehrlichia 
     Yes* 1.000   





















Bivariate Analyses:  Odds of B. burgdorferi  Sero-positivity by Installation Adjusting for Identified Risk 
Factors 
 Note:   Analyses do not include Signonella due to “0” sero-positivity. 




Table a: Installation Only Model (CRUDE)  
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error Pr > ChiSq ORCRUDE 
Intercept  1 -2.2827 0.1885 <.0001  
Kaiserslautern, GE 1 -0.9786 0.3494 0.0051 0.376 
Stuttgart. GE 1 -0.956 0.4067 0.0188 0.384 
Rota, SP 1 -1.1985 0.7422 0.1064 0.302 
Spangdahlem, GE 1 -1.2171 0.3873 0.0017 0.296 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.7328 0.3748 0.0505 0.481 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.3617 0.4873 <.0001 0.094 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.7426 0.489 0.0004 0.175 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.8527 1.0203 0.0052 0.058 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.8016 0.4888 0.0002 0.165 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.7976 0.4528 <.0001 0.166 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.4549 1.0292 0.1575 0.233 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.7691 0.4529 <.0001 0.17 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.135 0.4058 0.0052 0.321 
Coefficient, SE, and p-values look reasonable. Rota, Spain and Camp Pendleton, CA may be questionable (n= 67 




Table b:  Bivariate Model with Tick (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -1.6903 0.2149 <.0001   
Kaiserslautern, GE 1 -1.2501 0.3583 0.0005 0.286 0.31 
Stuttgart. GE 1 -1.2953 0.4155 0.0018 0.274 0.40 
Rota, SP 1 -1.2197 0.7521 0.1049 0.295 0.02 
Spangdahlem, GE 1 -1.4788 0.3935 0.0002 0.228 0.30 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -1.0692 0.3824 0.0052 0.343 0.40 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.3813 0.4904 <.0001 0.092 0.02 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.5204 0.4944 0.0021 0.219 -0.20 




Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.9852 0.4933 <.0001 0.137 0.20 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -2.0934 0.4922 <.0001 0.123 0.35 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.5546 1.0365 0.1336 0.211 0.10 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.668 0.4591 0.0003 0.189 -0.10 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.0968 0.4111 0.0076 0.334 -0.04 
Tick 1 -1.4373 0.2524 <.0001 0.238  
Most change in OR > 10%  confounding by Tick (Type III Analysis p-value < 0.0001) 
 
ADJUSTED (Wt in lbs) 
 
Table c: Bivariate Model with Wt in lbs (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -1.8266 0.2444 <.0001   
Kaiserslautern, GE 1 -0.9097 0.3538 0.0101 0.403 -0.07 
Stuttgart. GE 1 -0.9943 0.411 0.0156 0.37 0.04 
Rota, SP 1 -1.1693 0.7468 0.1174 0.311 -0.03 
Spangdahlem, GE 1 -1.1915 0.3916 0.0023 0.304 -0.03 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.6794 0.3797 0.0736 0.507 -0.05 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.3955 0.4902 <.0001 0.091 0.03 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.7507 0.4923 0.0004 0.174 0.01 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.7136 1.0227 0.008 0.066 -0.12 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.7147 0.492 0.0005 0.18 -0.08 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.991 0.4914 <.0001 0.137 0.21 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.542 1.0338 0.1358 0.214 0.09 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.7885 0.4565 <.0001 0.167 0.02 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.0333 0.4102 0.0118 0.356 -0.10 
Wt:  16-35 vs. < 15 1 -1.4207 0.3546 <.0001 0.242  
Wt:  36-55 vs. < 15  -0.9467 0.3121 0.0024 0.388  
Wt:  56-75 vs. < 15  -0.1974 0.285 0.4884 0.821  
Wt:  >76 vs. < 15  0.0484 0.2759 0.8606 1.05  




Table d: Bivariate Model with DgSERes2 (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -2.4441 0.2646 <.0001   
Kaiserslautern, GE 1 -0.988 0.3496 0.0047 0.372 0.01 




Rota, SP 1 -1.2434 0.7439 0.0946 0.288 0.05 
Spangdahlem, GE 1 -1.2502 0.389 0.0013 0.286 0.03 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.617 0.3968 0.12 0.54 -0.11 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.2178 0.5141 <.0001 0.109 -0.14 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.749 0.4891 0.0003 0.174 0.01 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.7063 1.0342 0.0089 0.067 -0.13 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.6672 0.512 0.0011 0.189 -0.13 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.6589 0.4795 0.0005 0.19 -0.13 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.4798 1.0297 0.1507 0.228 0.02 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.7803 0.4531 <.0001 0.169 0.01 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.1762 0.4082 0.004 0.308 0.04 
DgSERes2 1 0.2245 0.2521 0.3732 1.252  




Table e: Bivariate Model with DgWRes2 (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -3.2733 0.4535 <.0001   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -0.988 0.3498 0.0047 0.372 0.01 
Stuttgart. GE 1 -0.9649 0.4072 0.0178 0.381 0.01 
Rota, SP 1 -1.2039 0.7428 0.1051 0.3 0.01 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.2251 0.3877 0.0016 0.294 0.01 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.772 0.3753 0.0397 0.462 0.04 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.3945 0.4876 <.0001 0.091 0.03 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -0.953 0.5719 0.0957 0.386 -0.55 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.8872 1.0205 0.0047 0.056 0.04 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.8437 0.4892 0.0002 0.158 0.04 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.8285 0.4531 <.0001 0.161 0.03 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -0.6593 1.0744 0.5395 0.517 -0.55 
JBLM, WA 1 -0.9713 0.5436 0.074 0.379 -0.55 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.1694 0.4062 0.004 0.311 0.03 
DgWRes2 1 1.0685 0.4318 <.0001 2.911  




Table f: Bivariate Model with DgNERes2 (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 







Intercept  1 -2.1445 0.1909 <.0001   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -0.1306 0.4233 0.7577 0.878 -0.57 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -0.1461 0.4649 0.7533 0.864 -0.56 
Rota, SP 1 -0.364 0.7793 0.6404 0.695 -0.57 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -0.3532 0.4582 0.4408 0.702 -0.58 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.0951 0.4101 0.8165 0.909 -0.47 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -1.4721 0.5496 0.0074 0.229 -0.59 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -0.8919 0.5443 0.1013 0.41 -0.57 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -1.9791 1.0503 0.0595 0.138 -0.58 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -0.969 0.541 0.0733 0.379 -0.56 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -0.972 0.5074 0.0554 0.378 -0.56 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -0.5582 1.0617 0.5991 0.572 -0.59 
JBLM, WA 1 -0.8973 0.516 0.082 0.408 -0.58 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -0.2456 0.4793 0.6084 0.782 -0.59 
DgNERes2 1 -1.0773 0.2994 0.0003 0.341  




Table g: Bivariate Model with DgCRes5 (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -1.4919 0.4214 0.0004   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -1.7235 0.5033 0.0006 0.178 1.11 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.696 0.5436 0.0018 0.183 1.10 
Rota, SP 1 -1.1618 0.7429 0.1178 0.313 -0.04 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.9615 0.5302 0.0002 0.141 1.10 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.7288 0.3754 0.0522 0.482 0 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.3381 0.4877 <.0001 0.097 -0.03 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.7534 0.4895 0.0003 0.173 0.01 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.8423 1.0205 0.0054 0.058 0 
Fort Lee, NJ 1 -1.8209 0.4895 0.0002 0.162 0.02 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.7456 0.4542 0.0001 0.175 -0.05 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.3993 1.0299 0.1743 0.247 -0.06 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.7499 0.4533 0.0001 0.174 -0.02 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.0945 0.4068 0.0071 0.335 -0.04 
DgCRe5 1 -0.8465 0.412 0.0399 0.429  







Table h: Bivariate Model with POwn (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -2.0151 0.2205 <.0001   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -0.9297 0.3503 0.008 0.395 -0.05 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -0.8959 0.408 0.0281 0.408 -0.06 
Rota, SP 1 -1.1588 0.7433 0.119 0.314 -0.04 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.1902 0.3879 0.0022 0.304 -0.03 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.6825 0.3761 0.0696 0.505 -0.05 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.3538 0.4876 <.0001 0.095 -0.01 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.7122 0.4895 0.0005 0.18 -0.03 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.8522 1.0206 0.0052 0.058 0.00 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.8017 0.4892 0.0002 0.165 0.00 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.959 0.4886 <.0001 0.141 0.18 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.4658 1.0302 0.1548 0.231 0.01 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.7652 0.4533 <.0001 0.171 -0.01 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.1078 0.4066 0.0064 0.33 -0.03 
POwn 1 -0.4267 0.2018 0.0345 0.653  




Table i: Bivariate Model with Wood (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -1.712 0.2698 <.0001   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -1.1066 0.3542 0.0018 0.331 0.14 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.1953 0.4184 0.0043 0.303 0.27 
Rota, SP 1 -1.1195 0.7432 0.132 0.326 -0.07 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.2486 0.3882 0.0013 0.287 0.03 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.8553 0.3791 0.0241 0.425 0.13 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.4208 0.4884 <.0001 0.089 0.06 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.6852 0.4899 0.0006 0.185 -0.05 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.7924 1.0208 0.0062 0.061 -0.05 
Fort Lee, NJ 1 -1.9147 0.4917 <.0001 0.147 0.12 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.8398 0.4537 <.0001 0.159 0.04 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.3835 1.03 0.1792 0.251 -0.07 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.8332 0.4543 <.0001 0.16 0.06 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.1296 0.4063 0.0054 0.323 -0.01 








Table j: Bivariate Model with WWalk (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -1.6735 0.2209 <.0001   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -1.1521 0.3537 0.0011 0.316 0.19 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.2322 0.4131 0.0029 0.292 0.32 
Rota, SP 1 -1.1172 0.7452 0.1338 0.327 -0.08 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.4163 0.3919 0.0003 0.243 0.22 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.705 0.3772 0.0616 0.494 -0.03 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.3458 0.4885 <.0001 0.096 -0.02 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.881 0.4918 0.0001 0.152 0.15 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.7463 1.0213 0.0072 0.064 -0.09 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.7087 0.4906 0.0005 0.181 -0.09 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.7424 0.4544 0.0001 0.175 -0.05 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.3934 1.0323 0.1771 0.248 -0.06 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.8501 0.455 <.0001 0.157 0.08 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.0867 0.4079 0.0077 0.337 -0.05 
WWalk 1 -0.9533 0.2032 <.0001 0.385  




Table k: Bivariate Model with Ana (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 0.6289 0.4829 0.1928   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -0.9633 0.355 0.0067 0.382 -0.02 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.0727 0.4223 0.0111 0.342 0.12 
Rota, SP 1 -1.1149 0.7435 0.1338 0.328 -0.08 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.2507 0.3954 0.0016 0.286 0.03 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.6962 0.3799 0.0668 0.498 -0.03 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.338 0.4908 <.0001 0.097 -0.03 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.7565 0.4956 0.0004 0.173 0.01 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.8647 1.0253 0.0052 0.057 0.02 
Fort Lee, NJ 1 -1.7179 0.4907 0.0005 0.179 -0.08 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.7924 0.458 <.0001 0.167 -0.01 




JBLM, WA 1 -1.8016 0.4603 <.0001 0.165 0.03 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.0981 0.4104 0.0075 0.333 -0.04 
Ana 1 -2.9952 0.4581 <.0001 0.05  




Table l: Bivariate Model with Diro (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -0.4501 0.536 0.401   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -0.9487 0.3509 0.0069 0.387 -0.03 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -0.9226 0.4082 0.0238 0.398 -0.04 
Rota, SP 1 -1.2134 0.7458 0.1038 0.297 0.02 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.1621 0.3887 0.0028 0.313 -0.05 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.6984 0.3763 0.0635 0.497 -0.03 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.4036 0.4898 <.0001 0.09 0.04 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.7401 0.4905 0.0004 0.175 0.00 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.8541 1.0218 0.0052 0.058 0.00 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.8286 0.4912 0.0002 0.161 0.02 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.8116 0.4547 <.0001 0.163 0.02 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.3999 1.0298 0.174 0.247 -0.06 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.74 0.454 0.0001 0.176 -0.03 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.0758 0.4071 0.0082 0.341 -0.06 
Diro 1 -1.8877 0.5237 0.0003 0.151  




Table m: Bivariate Model with Ehr (Adjusted) 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 




Intercept  1 -0.5039 0.3844 0.1898   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -1.0591 0.3525 0.0027 0.347 0.08 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.0321 0.41 0.0118 0.356 0.08 
Rota, SP 1 -1.3615 0.7507 0.0697 0.256 0.18 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.2106 0.3878 0.0018 0.298 -0.01 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.8757 0.3813 0.0216 0.417 0.15 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -2.4542 0.4898 <.0001 0.086 0.09 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -1.9028 0.4949 0.0001 0.149 0.17 




Fort Lee, VA 1 -2.0671 0.5003 <.0001 0.127 0.30 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.9782 0.4597 <.0001 0.138 0.20 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -1.7157 1.0424 0.0998 0.18 0.29 
JBLM, WA 1 -1.8252 0.4547 <.0001 0.161 0.06 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -1.2617 0.411 0.0021 0.283 0.13 
Ehr 1 -1.7996 0.3403 <.0001 0.165  







Multivariate Analyses:  Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity by Installation Adjusting for Identified Risk 
Factors 
 Note:   Analyses do not include Signonella due to “0” seropositivity. 
  ORs are as compared to Fort Drum NY, the installation with the highest prevalence 
 
CRUDE (Full Model)  
 Outcome = B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity 
 Exposure of Interest = Installation (w/o Sigonella) as compared to Fort Drum NY (INST “9”) 
 Potential confounders = tick wt dgseres2 dgwres2 dgneres2 dgcres5 pown wood wwalk ana  ehr 
 
Table A1:  Full Model 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF 
Wald 
Pr > ChiSq 
Chi-
Square 
INST 13 16.277 0.2345 
Tick 2 25.3572 <.0001 
Wt 4 15.6877 0.0035 
DgSERes2 1 0.5294 0.4668 
DgWRes2 1 5.3494 0.0207 
DgNERes2 1 5.8201 0.0158 
DgCRes5 1 0.9059 0.3412 
POwn 1 1.4229 0.2329 
Wood 1 0.5342 0.4648 
WWalk 1 5.5423 0.0186 
Ana 1 30.4136 <.0001 













Intercept  1 2.7017 0.8716  
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -1.0837 0.6509 0.338 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.48 0.6975 0.228 
Rota, SP 1 -0.6117 0.8291 0.542 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.3014 0.6761 0.272 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.4477 0.4571 0.639 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -1.6854 0.5814 0.185 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -0.4583 0.6615 0.632 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.0933 1.1622 0.123 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.3101 0.5831 0.27 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.4616 0.5926 0.232 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -0.1186 1.1619 0.888 
JBLM, WA 1 -0.3334 0.6598 0.716 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -0.3618 0.5132 0.696 
History of Tick  
(Yes vs. No) 1 -1.0858 0.2673 0.338 
History of Tick  
(Don’t Know vs. No) 1 0.6557 0.3522 1.926 
Dog Weight in pounds 
(<15 vs. 56 to 75) 1 -1.2224 0.3717 0.295 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(16 to 35 vs. 56 to 75) 1 -0.9193 0.3271 0.399 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(36 to 55 vs. 56 to 75) 1 -0.245 0.2971 0.783 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(> 75 vs. 56 to 75) 1 -0.2031 0.2957 0.816 
Dog lived in SE U.S. within 
last 2 yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 0.1935 0.2659 1.213 
Dog lived in W U.S. within 
last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 -1.1238 0.4859 0.325 
Dog lived in NE U.S. within 
last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 0.7893 0.3272 2.202 
Dog lived in Central Europe  
within last 5 yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 -0.4719 0.4958 0.624 
Prior Ownership  
(No vs. Yes) 1 -0.2617 0.2194 0.77 
Wooded living environment 
(No vs. Yes) 1 -0.1887 0.2582 0.828 
Recreates through 
Wilderness Walks  
















Reasonable coefficients and SEs 
Rota, Spain and Camp Pendleton, CA may be questionable (n= 67 and n = 43, respectively) 
 
 
REDUCED (without DgSERes2) 
 Outcome = B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity 
 Exposure of Interest = Installation (w/o Sigonella) as compared to Fort Drum NY (INST “9”) 
 Potential confounders = tick wt dgwres2 dgneres2 dgcres5 pown wood wwalk ana  her 
 
 
Table B1:  Reduced Model  
(without DgSERes2) 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF 
Wald 
Pr > ChiSq 
Chi-
Square 
INST 13 19.7432 0.1018 
Tick 2 25.1889 <.0001 
Wt 4 15.7045 0.0034 
DgWRes2 1 5.1036 0.0239 
DgNERes2 1 6.7454 0.0094 
DgCRes5 1 0.9728 0.324 
POwn 1 1.4969 0.2212 
Wood 1 0.5243 0.469 
WWalk 1 5.4892 0.0191 
Ana 1 30.6385 <.0001 
Ehr 1 7.1242 0.0076 
 
 
Co-infected with Anaplasma 
spp. 
(No vs. Yes) 1 -2.7521 0.499 0.064 
Co-infected with Ehrlichia 
spp. 











Change in OR                 
(Cr-Adj)/Adj  
Intercept  1 2.8073 0.8596   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -1.0427 0.6466 0.353 -0.04 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.443 0.6953 0.236 -0.03 
Rota, SP 1 -0.5456 0.8243 0.579 -0.06 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.2322 0.6682 0.292 -0.07 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.4886 0.4544 0.614 0.04 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -1.7703 0.5688 0.17 0.09 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -0.4447 0.6602 0.641 -0.01 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.2047 1.1591 0.11 0.12 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.3724 0.5768 0.253 0.07 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.5378 0.5827 0.215 0.08 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -0.0845 1.1586 0.919 -0.03 
JBLM, WA 1 -0.3192 0.659 0.727 -0.02 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -0.2902 0.5036 0.748 -0.07 
History of Tick  
(Yes vs. No) 1 -1.0706 0.2659 0.343 -0.01 
History of Tick  
(Don’t Know vs. No) 1 0.6719 0.3512 1.958 -0.02 
Dog Weight in pounds 
(<15 vs. 56 to 75) 1 -1.2297 0.3715 0.292 0.01 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(16 to 35 vs. 56 to 75) 1 -0.9218 0.327 0.398 0.00 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(36 to 55 vs. 56 to 75) 1 -0.2586 0.2964 0.772 0.01 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(> 75 vs. 56 to 75) 1 -0.2147 0.2953 0.807 0.01 
Dog lived in W U.S. within 
last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 -1.0913 0.4831 0.336 2.61 
Dog lived in NE U.S. within 
last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 0.8331 0.3208 2.3 -0.86 
Dog lived in Central Europe  
within last 5 yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 -0.4875 0.4943 0.614 2.59 
Prior Ownership  
(No vs. Yes) 1 -0.2681 0.2192 0.765 -0.18 
Wooded living environment 
(No vs. Yes) 1 -0.1869 0.2582 0.83 -0.07 
Recreates through 
Wilderness Walks  
(No vs. Yes) 1 -0.5437 0.2321 0.581 0.43 
Co-infected with Anaplasma 
spp. 








Changes in Institution ORs barely > 10%  NO confounding by DgSERes2; NOT return to model 
 
REDUCED (without  DgSERes2 Wood) 
 Outcome = B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity 
 Exposure of Interest = Installation (w/o Sigonella) as compared to Fort Drum NY (INST “9”) 
 Potential confounders = tick wt dgwres2 dgneres2 dgcres5 pown wwalk ana  ehr 
 
Table C1:  Reduced Model  
(without DgSERes2  and Wood) 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald Pr > ChiSq 
Chi-
Square 
INST 13 19.3367 0.113 
Tick 2 25.9649 <.0001 
Wt 4 15.6329 0.0036 
DgWRes2 1 5.0496 0.0246 
DgNERes2 1 6.8424 0.0089 
DgCRes5 1 0.9801 0.3222 
POwn 1 1.5588 0.2118 
WWalk 1 6.8189 0.009 
Ana 1 30.925 <.0001 
Ehr 1 7.3502 0.0067 
 
 
Co-infected with Ehrlichia 
spp. 












OR                 
(Cr-Adj)/Adj 
Intercept  1 2.6931 0.8427   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -1.015 0.6446 0.362 -0.02 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.3768 0.6871 0.252 -0.06 
Rota, SP 1 -0.5601 0.8231 0.571 0.01 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.2328 0.667 0.291 0.00 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.4582 0.4516 0.632 -0.03 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -1.7432 0.5672 0.175 -0.03 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -0.4749 0.6572 0.622 0.03 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.2204 1.1599 0.109 0.01 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.3368 0.5731 0.263 -0.04 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.5169 0.581 0.219 -0.02 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -0.1125 1.1586 0.894 0.03 
JBLM, WA 1 -0.3111 0.6581 0.733 -0.01 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -0.2962 0.5033 0.744 0.01 
History of Tick  
(Yes vs. No) 1 
-1.0843 0.2649 0.338 0.01 
History of Tick  
(Don’t Know vs. No) 1 
0.6763 0.3512 1.967 0.00 
Dog Weight in pounds 
(<15 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-1.2215 0.371 0.295 -0.01 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(16 to 35 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.9184 0.3272 0.399 0.00 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(36 to 55 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.2574 0.2964 0.773 0.00 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(> 75 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.2 0.2943 0.819 -0.01 
Dog lived in W U.S. within 
last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-1.0831 0.482 0.339 -0.01 
Dog lived in NE U.S. within 
last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
0.8377 0.3202 2.311 0.00 
Dog lived in Central Europe  
within last 5 yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-0.4878 0.4927 0.614 0.00 
Prior Ownership  
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-0.2734 0.2189 0.761 0.01 
Recreates through 
Wilderness Walks  
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-0.5855 0.2242 0.557 0.49 
Co-infected with Anaplasma 
spp. 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-2.772 0.4985 0.063 8.22 
Co-infected with Ehrlichia 
spp. 1 






No changes in OR > 10%  NO confounding by Wood; NOT return Wood to model 
 
REDUCED (without  DgSERes2, Wood, and  DgCRes5)  
 Outcome = B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity 
 Exposure of Interest = Installation (w/o Sigonella) as compared to Fort Drum NY (INST “9”) 
 Potential confounders = tick wt dgwres2 dgneres2  pown wwalk ana  her 
 
Table D1:  Reduced Model  
(without DgSERes2 , Wood and DgCRes2) 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald Pr > ChiSq 
Chi-
Square 
INST 13 18.5773 0.1368 
Tick 2 26.1419 <.0001 
Wt 4 15.464 0.0038 
DgWRes2 1 5.0239 0.025 
DgNERes2 1 7.1922 0.0073 
POwn 1 1.5905 0.2073 
WWalk 1 6.7741 0.0092 
Ana 1 31.6165 <.0001 
Ehr 1 7.3162 0.0068 
 
 


























































Changes in OR > 10%  confounding by DgCRes2; keep in model 
 








OR                 
(Cr-Adj)/Ad 
Intercept  1 2.2525 0.7184   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -0.5641 0.4562 0.569 -0.36 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -0.9226 0.5127 0.397 -0.37 
Rota, SP 1 -0.5416 0.8213 0.582 -0.02 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -0.7757 0.4828 0.46 -0.37 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.4625 0.4515 0.63 0.00 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -1.734 0.566 0.177 -0.01 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -0.4498 0.6538 0.638 -0.03 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.098 1.1194 0.123 -0.11 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.3095 0.5716 0.27 -0.03 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.5329 0.5806 0.216 0.01 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -0.1293 1.1578 0.879 0.02 
JBLM, WA 1 -0.3188 0.6581 0.727 0.01 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -0.3027 0.503 0.739 0.01 
History of Tick  
(Yes vs. No) 1 
-1.0969 0.2647 0.334 0.01 
History of Tick  
(Don’t Know vs. No) 1 
0.6608 0.3508 1.936 0.02 
Dog Weight in pounds 
(<15 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-1.2156 0.3713 0.297 -0.01 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(16 to 35 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.9107 0.327 0.402 -0.01 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(36 to 55 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.2564 0.2961 0.774 0.00 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(> 75 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.1933 0.2944 0.824 -0.01 
Dog lived in W U.S. within 
last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-1.0769 0.4804 0.341 -0.01 
Dog lived in NE U.S. within 
last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
0.8558 0.3191 2.353 -0.02 
Prior Ownership  
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-0.2758 0.2187 0.759 -0.19 
Recreates through 
Wilderness Walks  
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-0.5835 0.2242 0.558 0.36 
Co-infected with Anaplasma 
spp. 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-2.8078 0.4994 0.06 8.28 
Co-infected with Ehrlichia 
spp. 
(No vs. Yes) 1 





REDUCED (without DgSERes2, Wood, and POwn)  
 Outcome = B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity 
 Exposure of Interest = Installation (w/o Sigonella) as compared to Fort Drum NY (INST “9”) 
 Potential confounders = tick wt dgwres2 dgneres2 dgcres5 wwalk ana  ehr 
 
Table E1:   Reduced Model  
(without DgSERes2, Wood, and POwn)  
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF 
Wald 
Pr > ChiSq 
Chi-
Square 
INST 13 19.5047 0.1083 
Tick 2 29.0135 <.0001 
Wt 4 16.2616 0.0027 
DgWRes2 1 4.6877 0.0304 
DgNERes2 1 7.0413 0.008 
DgCRes5 1 1.3929 0.2379 
WWalk 1 6.6774 0.0098 
Ana 1 30.4467 <.0001 






































































Change in OR                 
(Cr-Adj)/Ad 
Intercept  1 2.5443 0.8324   
Kaiserslautern, DE 1 -1.126 0.6306 0.324 0.12 
Stuttgart. DE 1 -1.4511 0.6767 0.234 0.08 
Rota, SP 1 -0.5627 0.8176 0.57 0.00 
Spangdahlem, DE 1 -1.3397 0.6564 0.262 0.11 
Fort Belvoir, VA 1 -0.4737 0.4504 0.623 0.01 
Fort Bragg, NC 1 -1.7332 0.5668 0.177 -0.01 
Fort Carson, CO 1 -0.5022 0.6535 0.605 0.03 
Fort Hood, TX 1 -2.1577 1.142 0.116 -0.06 
Fort Lee, VA 1 -1.3348 0.5738 0.263 0.00 
Camp Lejeune, NC 1 -1.5183 0.5778 0.219 0.00 
Camp Pendleton, CA 1 -0.1242 1.1605 0.883 0.01 
JBLM, WA 1 -0.3223 0.6537 0.724 0.01 
Great Lakes, IL 1 -0.2757 0.5028 0.759 -0.02 
History of Tick  
(Yes vs. No) 1 
-1.1017 0.2647 0.332 0.02 
History of Tick  
(Don’t Know vs. No) 1 
0.7708 0.3451 2.161 -0.09 
Dog Weight in pounds 
(<15 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-1.2311 0.3705 0.292 0.01 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(16 to 35 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.946 0.3279 0.388 0.03 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(36 to 55 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.2415 0.2956 0.785 -0.02 
Dog Weight in pounds  
(> 75 vs. 56 to 75) 1 
-0.201 0.2927 0.818 0.00 
Dog lived in W U.S. within last 2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-1.0343 0.4777 0.355 -0.05 
Dog lived in NE U.S. within last 
2yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
0.8494 0.3201 2.338 -0.01 
Dog lived in Central Europe  
within last 5 yrs 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-0.5645 0.4783 0.569 0.08 
Recreates through Wilderness 
Walks  
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-0.5779 0.2236 0.561 0.36 
Co-infected with Anaplasma spp. 
(No vs. Yes) 1 
-2.6813 0.4859 0.068 7.19 
Co-infected with Ehrlichia spp. 
(No vs. Yes) 1 





























Table F1: Odds of B. burgdorferi Sero-positivity Controlling for Identified Risk Factors 
Parameter OR 95% CI 
Kaiserslautern, DE vs. Fort Drum NY 0.324 (0.094,1.116) 
Stuttgart. DE vs. Fort Drum NY 0.234 (0.062, 0.883) 
Rota, SP vs. Fort Drum NY 0.57 (0.115, 2.828) 
Spangdahlem, DE vs. Fort Drum NY 0.262 (0.072, 0.948) 
Fort Belvoir, VA vs. Fort Drum NY 0.623 (0.258, 1.505) 
Fort Bragg, NC vs. Fort Drum NY 0.177 (0.058, 0.537) 
Fort Carson, CO vs. Fort Drum NY 0.605 (0.168, 2.179) 
Fort Hood, TX vs. Fort Drum NY 0.116 (0.012, 1.084) 
Fort Lee, VA vs. Fort Drum NY 0.263 (0.085,  0.81) 
Camp Lejeune, NC vs. Fort Drum NY 0.219 (0.071, 0.68) 
Camp Pendleton, CA vs. Fort Drum NY 0.883 (0.091,  8.588) 
JBLM, WA vs. Fort Drum NY 0.724 (0.201, 2.609) 
Great Lakes, IL vs. Fort Drum NY 0.759 (0.283, 2.034) 
History of Tick  (Yes vs. No) 0.332 (0.198, 0.558) 
History of Tick  (Don’t Know vs. No) 2.161 (1.099, 4.251) 
Dog Weight in pounds (<15 vs. 56 to 75) 0.292 (0.141, 0.604) 
Dog Weight in pounds  (16 to 35 vs. 56 to 75) 0.388 (0.204, 0.738) 
Dog Weight in pounds  (36 to 55 vs. 56 to 75) 0.785 (0.44, 1.402) 
Dog Weight in pounds  (> 75 vs. 56 to 75) 0.818 (0.461, 1.452) 
Dog lived in W U.S. within last 2yrs (No vs. Yes) 0.355 (0.139, 0.907) 
Dog lived in NE U.S. within last 2yrs (No vs. Yes) 2.338 (1.249, 4.379) 
Dog lived in Central Europe  within last 5 yrs (No vs. Yes) 0.569 (0.223, 1.452) 
Recreates through Wilderness Walks  (No vs. Yes) 0.561 (0.362, 0.87) 
Co-infected with Anaplasma spp.(No vs. Yes) 0.068 (0.026, 0.177) 










Military Human Disease Data System Review 
 
The military has several human disease data sources; therefore the first step in creating this combined report was to 
determine the one best suited for use in the USAPHC ZDR. In order to do so, a systematic review of five of the most 
commonly used human military data systems was conducted.  The data systems reviewed include M2, DMSS, 
ESSENCE, DRSi, and HL7.  The approach involved the following three phases: 1) detailed system descriptions, 2) a 
comparison of specific data systems attributes, and 3) an evaluation of each system’s data quality.   
 
A standardized framework based on CDC guidelines was used to compile data from each military data system (1).  
The resulting document provides a comprehensive comparison of the key attributes and capabilities of each system.  
This document can be used as a reference to assist military public health personnel in selecting the most appropriate 
data system to use for specific monitoring or surveillance activities.  The knowledge acquired during this phase 
permitted the assessments of each data system’s attributes during the next two phases.   
 
Based on the specific goals and objectives of the ZDR, it is recommended that the USAPHC ZDR uses M2 as the 
primary source of military human medical data.  This data system represents the most comprehensive and reliable 
source of both medical and population data; capturing not only the entire target population, but also having the 
ability to capture cases from military and civilian healthcare facilities.  In addition, M2 can be directly queried by 
USAPHC personnel, which greatly improves the quality of the data and the timeliness of the information.  The M2 
does not automatically incorporate Reportable Medical Event or laboratory data, but because it retains unique 
identifiers, queries of M2 can be cross referenced and supplemented with information from sources that do (DRSi 
and HL7, respectively).  These recommendations were presented to the USAPHC Disease Epidemiology Program in 
January of 2013; subsequently these sources were used to provide human disease data for the first publication of the 




An evaluation of data quality, through calculations of data source completeness, established M2 as the most 
complete source of military human medical data.  Specifically, a comparison of Lyme disease case count data 
showed 55% of total captured cases came from the M2 system alone; in addition, the percent of cases missed by M2 
was lower than the percent of cases missed by any other source.  The investigation also revealed a substantial 
underlap between sources, indicating that reliance on a single data source could lead to significant underestimation 
of total cases.  These findings again support the recommendation that USAPHC use M2 as the primary source of 
human disease data, supplemented with data from DRSi and HL7 as appropriate.  This phase of the analysis 
involved the use of case count data resulting from data system queries; due to technical issues associated with 
producing the requested data, DMSS and ESSENCE were not included.   
 
Military Pet Dogs as Sentinels in Lyme Disease Surveillance 
 
Currently the animal disease information utilized in the ZDR is limited to that taken from the public access 
databases of intergovernmental organizations.  Although there is value in this information, the current pilot study 
using canine Borrelia burgdorferi (Bb) seroprevalence showed the advantages of using animal disease data from 
military populations as sentinel surveillance for zoonotic disease military populations.  The study involved three 
parts:  1) an investigation of the correlation between Bb seroprevalence in military pet dogs and military human 
Lyme disease data, 2) a comparison of military pet dog Bb seroprevalence data to published civilian pet dog data in 
order to determine if meaningful differences exist indicating the more appropriate population for use in sentinel 
surveillance, and 3) a determination of the validity of the military pet dog seroprevalence data by location.   
 
Based on the correlation found between the animal Bb seroprevalence and human Lyme disease data, military pet 
dogs are recommended in sentinel surveillance in human military populations.  The pilot study found that 
seroprevalence estimates in military pet dogs consistently reflect incidence rates in military human populations, both 
at areas of high and low expected prevalence.  In addition, the prevalence estimates in the canine populations were 
consistently higher than the incidence rates seen in the human populations, demonstrating dogs as a more sensitive 




from routine in-house diagnostic testing, showing the use of animal data from military veterinary facilities as a 
convenient measure of the risk of Lyme disease in sentinel surveillance in human military populations.      
 
The comparison of military pet dog seroprevalence data to that published on civilian pet dogs undoubtedly supports 
the recommendation of military animal data as a more appropriate indicator of human disease risk in military 
populations.  Using disease data collected from military pet dog populations offers a more reliable way to acquire 
data from locations where civilian pet dog data may be limited or where barriers to accessing such data may exist.   
Also, the use of military pet dog data proved to be a more accurate marker of disease risk in military populations.  In 
particular, the higher seroprevalence of military pet dogs in Illinois more accurately reflected the military incidence 
of Lyme disease in the state (at the Great Lakes Naval Air Station) than the civilian pet dog data did.    
 
The military pet dog Bb seroprevalence estimates were unable to be confidently evaluated for confounding by the 
distribution of identified canine risk factors; therefore the use of these animals valid indicators of Lyme disease risk 
for military populations could not be definitively determined.  In order to make this determination  the study should 
be repeated for a longer period in order to meet the required sample size (many of the installations were 
underpowered).  In addition, because of the low overall B. burgdorferi seroprevalence in this population (likely due 
to the high overall level of flea and tick prevention), the target sample size should be increased, or a different 




The creation of the ZDR truly embodies the concept of One Health, combining health data from human, animal, and 
entomological sources in order to provide military public health officials and commanders with a powerful health 
risk assessment tool.  The use of military human disease data systems permits sensitive and specific reflection of the 
zoonotic disease status of this population world-wide.  Unfortunately, the same cannot be confidently said about the 
animal disease data contained in the report.  Because military veterinary facilities have historically lacked a 




populations, the animal disease data contained in the ZDR is currently limited to that available from public access 
databases.   
 
The pilot study conducted in this dissertation demonstrates pet dogs belonging to Service members as a more 
accurate indicator of zoonotic disease than civilian pets living in the same locations.  The current deployment of a 
web-based electronic medical record known as the Remote Online Veterinary Record (ROVR) has the potential to 
provide animal disease data from military veterinary facilities.  It is strongly recommended that this animal disease 
data source becomes incorporated into the ZDR.   
 
Incorporating ROVR in the ZDR 
 
The combined review of existing public health surveillance systems and literature using animals as sentinels in 
zoonotic disease surveillance revealed several factors to consider before making risk assessments based on animal 
disease data.  The following discussion is not all inclusive, rather it is intended to highlight a few of the factors that 
should be considered before incorporating military animal data into the ZDR.  When possible, specific examples 
discussing ROVR’s capabilities will be used.   
 
In order to accurately characterize the risk of disease in humans it is important to understand the animal population 
represented in the data system.   The animal population captured in ROVR may include pets, government owned 
animals, and sometimes strays; all of which have varying degrees of zoonotic diseases exposure and therefore may 
play different roles in risk assessment.   For this reason it is important that information about the presence of 
zoonotic diseases in military animals includes details on from which animal population the data came.   
 
Making appropriate risk comparisons between locations with unequal population sizes require data to be presented 
as ratios or proportions rather than counts.  In order to do this requires knowledge of denominator data such as total 
population at risk or total population tested.  Ideally, the data from ROVR would include not only the number of 
positive animals for the zoonotic disease but also the total number of animals at risk for the disease or the total 




To most accurately assess the risk of disease at a certain locality, the animal data should include details of prior 
travel and residency locations as well as preventive medicine practices (i.e. vaccination status, flea and tick 
preventative use).  Some of this information is already captured in ROVR; specifically, the travel history data is 
captured under the animal transfer screen and vaccination histories and preventive medicine purchases are captured 
under the prevention screens.  In addition, ROVR contains animal demographic data such as species, breed, sex, and 
age, all of which may play a role in disease risk in animal populations. 
 
The review also showed the importance of standardized case definitions in ensuring consistency in data quality and 
accuracy in risk assessments across locations.  Unfortunately, although the DoD has reportable medical event 
guidelines and case definitions for human disease, there is currently no veterinary equivalent (2).  In the absence of 
these standards, in addition to the disease name, the animal disease data from ROVR should include details such as 
the method of diagnosis (laboratory test, physical exam findings, and clinical assessment) and the diagnostic 
category assigned (suspect, probable, confirmed).   
 
A Zoonotic Disease Surveillance System Combining Human and Animal Disease Data 
 
To this point, these recommendations have been focused on ways to refine disease data collection and analysis 
methods before their incorporation in disease reports, specifically the USAPHC ZDR.  Although reports like these 
are a valuable public health tool, reliance on them or other forms of published data for disease risk assessments has 
inherent limitations.  The following outlines some of these limitations, using the current ZDR as an example.  The 
intent of this discussion is not to point out flaws of the report, but rather to provide concrete justification for the 
continued investment in methods for improved zoonotic disease surveillance practices in the military. 
 
Due to the time involved in collecting, compiling, reviewing, and publishing disease reports, the data presented are 
generally somewhat dated and therefore have practical limitations in terms of implementing preventive strategies.  
Currently the ZDR is published on a quarterly basis, with additional data published on a supplemental basis as 





It is not possible to include all diseases in a publication; therefore reports are generally limited to conditions 
considered to be important by those publishing the report.  The diseases reported in the ZDR are based on a 
stakeholder survey that was conducted in 2011.  In order to ensure the report continues to contain the most reverent 
diseases for the target population, however, would require periodic stakeholder surveys to be conducted.   
 
Published reports are limited in the amount of details they can contain; information such as patient demographics, 
clinical presentation, or pathogen subtype is generally not included.  Although the ZDR attempts to discuss pertinent 
details on disease trends, the majority of the data are limited to summary case count data by location.   
 
Based on these limitations, the best approach to conducting health risk assessments is a health surveillance system 
that permits users to access the health data themselves.  The deployment of the web-based electronic veterinary 
record system provides the military with the opportunity to fully embrace the next phase One Health; merging data 
from both human and animal populations into one centrally accessible database.  This would permit users to query 
the database to their own (or their commander’s) specifications.  Details of the query fields and filters would still 
need to be determined, but at a minimum it is recommended they include zoonotic disease name, location of 
diagnosis, species affected (to include human), and data of diagnosis.  In addition, they system could incorporate 
features found to be useful in existing systems, such as the user-defined alter capability of ESSENCE.   
 
It is recommended that USAPHC employ the technical expertise available within its command to compile a task 
force focused on designing a comprehensive zoonotic disease data system utilizing data from animal and human 
populations simultaneously.  Ultimately, the goal should be also incorporate entomological, laboratory, and 
environmental data as well.  In doing so the USAPHC has the unique opportunity to be the first organization 
employing this comprehensive approach to zoonotic disease surveillance; leading the way in fully embracing the 
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